Modelling trade and financial liberalisation effects for Argentina by Debowicz, Dario J
 
 
 
A University of Sussex DPhil thesis  
Available online via Sussex Research Online:  
http://eprints.sussex.ac.uk/ 
This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author. 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details 
Modelling trade and financial liberalisation effects for Argentina  
 
 
 
 
 
Dario Debowicz 
 
 
 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
University of Sussex 
 
 
 
October 2010  
 
  
Summary 
 
This thesis is a response to the growing recognition that the workings of the financial 
sphere significantly affect the value of social production, its distribution, and the 
magnitude of income poverty. The thesis extends a general equilibrium single-country 
model targeted to a developing economy (the IFPRI Standard Model) to account for the 
workings of the financial sphere and ‗money in the production function‘, in the tradition 
begun by Milton Friedman (1969). The models are calibrated and their workings are 
analysed. It is found that the inclusion of ―money in the production function‖ by itself 
only causes financial outcomes to significantly affect the overall level of production and 
the unemployment rate in the presence of strong wage rigidities. This is explained in 
terms of the model parameters. The extended model is employed in a stylised static way 
to identify the short-run stresses generated by current and capital account liberalisation 
in Argentina during its Currency Board Regime, adopted over 1991-2001, with the 
finding that in the short-run the volatility of capital flows was transmitted to 
employment and activity levels. The model is then linked in a sequential way to a 
behavioural microsimulations model, separating out the different transmission channels 
involved. It is found that the significant capital outflows witnessed by the country 
surrounding the end of its Currency Board Regime worsened poverty and inequality 
indicators in the country, and that the main transmission channel through which the 
capital outflow had the most distributional impact was the selectivity of labour market 
rationing.  
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Introduction 
This thesis aims to capture the transmission channels by which trade and capital account 
liberalisation impacted growth and income distribution in developing countries during 
the last wave of globalisation. Additionally, it provides an analysis of Argentina‘s 
experience with liberalisation during its Currency Board (1991-2001). 
 
This work further aims to contribute to the debate on globalisation. Thus, it starts by 
discussing in a non-technical way the different positions on globalisation found in this 
debate. This establishes the conceptual background to the dissertation, and allows us to 
identify the transmission channels by which current and capital account liberalisation - 
the central features of the last globalisation wave (Taylor 2004) - have affected levels of 
activity and income distribution in developing countries. An important point that 
transpires from the debate is that, critically, the effects of globalisation depend on 
institutional and other country-specific characteristics (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, 
p.41).   
 
Given that the globalisation process had large direct and second-round effects on the 
economy, this thesis draws on CGE modelling, which seems the most pertinent 
framework to: i) understand how the effects rippled through the markets of goods, 
factors (Bourguignon and Pereira da Silva 2003, p.12-18) and assets; ii) combine the 
analysis of macro-level changes in the stocks of financial assets and money, the activity 
level and the employment level (prone for macro analysis) with a structural adjustment 
story (prone for CGE analysis); iii) contribute to closing the gap between macro and 
CGE models identified by Sherman Robinson (2006).   
 
I review CGE models that capture the financial sphere of the economy in a structural 
way (FCGE models), finding that they enrich the model specification, allow us to 
capture imperfections in the financial markets and deepen our insight into the real 
effects of financial shocks, including those generated by capital flows facilitated by 
capital account liberalisation. However, while some of them model the ―working 
capital‖ channel – thus capturing firms‘ credit dependency - none of them allows for the 
possibility that firms may substitute away from working capital when its cost rises. 
15
Moreover, I identify a debate among CGE modellers concerning the relevance of 
capturing the workings of the financial sphere (Adam and Bevan 1998).  
 
I define at this point my modelling strategy, with two central goals in mind: 1) to 
elucidate the structural adjustment effects of trade and capital account liberalisation, 
with special emphasis on growth and income inequality; and 2) to contribute to the 
existing debate over the economic significance of including the financial sphere in CGE 
models. Similarly to Adam and Bevan (1998), I start from a non-financial CGE model 
that captures in a conventional way the structural adjustment effects of liberalisation and 
subsequently incorporates the financial sphere into extended models, thus allowing for 
additional macroeconomic relationships and rigidities. In the incorporation of the 
financial sphere, I account for the presence of financial stocks and the consistency 
between stocks and flows noted by Tobin (1969). Following the tradition of ―money in 
the production function‖ originating with Milton Friedman (1969), I capture the 
presence of working capital
1
, including it as a substitutable factor in the production 
function. I specify a market for working capital where its allocation and remuneration 
are determined, filling a gap in the CGE literature.   
 
 
I thus arrive at a FCGE model which accounts for the channels identified in the debate 
on globalisation and the structural characteristics common to developing countries.
2
 The 
model also accounts for the presence of substitutable working capital and a completely 
specified market for it, and is able to capture country-specific characteristics in terms of 
the calibrated parameters and the economic agents included in it. The model allows to 
track the specific forms of savings and asset stocks, an essential part of the economic 
process (Tobin 1981, p.13), as indicated by the series of financial crisis that has hit 
developing countries over the years and the recent crisis originated in developed 
countries with worldwide reverberation. Providing analysts with a wide spectrum of 
policy options, the model includes a variety of macroeconomic policy instruments: a set 
of fiscal instruments (different tax rates and forms of government expenditures, 
                                                 
1 The idea of including working capital in the form of "money in the production function" was suggested 
by Sherman Robinson.  
2 According to Richard Agènor and Peter Montiel (1999,p.4), ―among the distinctive aspects of 
development macroeconomics are the usefulness of a three-good (exportables, importables and non-
tradables) disaggregation of production and the roles of financial repression, informal markets, public 
sector production, imported intermediate goods, working capital, and labor market segmentation‖. 
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disentangling transfers, public consumption and public investment), a set of monetary 
instruments, including levels and rates of rediscounts and bank required reserve ratios 
and, where there is a fixed exchange rate regime, the nominal exchange rate. 
 
After calibrating the models assuming that the starting point of observation is a solution 
point of the model, following the tradition started by Shoven and Whalley (1972), I 
apply a set of real and financial external shocks,  with the finding that the inclusion of 
―money in the production function‖ only leads the financial outcomes of the capital and 
trade account shocks to significantly affect the overall level of production in the 
presence of strong wage rigidities. I explain this outcome in terms of the model 
parameters.  
 
I next apply a version of the final model, capturing wage rigidities for the Argentinean 
economy in a stylised way, focusing on the liberalisation phase that took place during 
the Convertibility Plan (1991-2001). The Argentinean experience with liberalisation 
seems especially interesting to analyse given that it was associated with a series of 
crises and a severe worsening of income distribution.  I identify stylised facts regarding 
the Argentinean economy, and check that the model reflects structural characteristics of 
the economy. Overall, the model reflects the stresses generated by the volatile capital 
flows that it received by the country, and suggests that the trade liberalisation-cum-
export-reimbursement implemented in the country as well as the net capital inflow it 
received worsened inequality by increasing the income share of the capitalist 
representative household group (RHG). By the same token, the CGE analysis also 
suggests that capital outflows improved household income distribution.  
 
In order to fully account for the observed households‘ and individuals‘ heterogeneity 
and to evaluate changes regarding the full income distribution of plausible shocks, I 
consistently link the CGE model with a microsimulation model (MSM) through the 
factor markets. As in Anne-Sophie Robilliard, François Bourguignon and Sherman 
Robinson (2008) (henceforth RBR), I allow the selection of the individuals who are 
fired (or hired) when there is a change in labour demand to be based on econometric 
analysis, and investigate the distributional effects of the capital outflow suffered by 
Argentina in the period surrounding the end of the Convertibility Plan. This is 
interesting given that these outflows led to an economic crisis in the country that 
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included a short-run worsening of social indicators, including unemployment rates and 
the poverty and inequality indices (Frenkel and Rapetti 2006).  As in RBR, I find that 
the selectivity of labour market rationing is the channel through which economy-wide 
phenomena have the most distributional impact.  
 
The dissertation is organised in two parts. Part I goes through the steps of building and 
analysing the workings of a model that captures the effects of the last wave of 
globalisation on activity level and income distribution for a stylised developing country, 
specifically a middle-income one. It does so by describing the background given by the 
debate on globalisation and identifying the channels highlighted in it (Chapter 1), 
reviewing existing FCGE models (Chapter 2), describing the nested FCGE models that 
are for a stylised middle-income country (Chapter 3) and their calibration (Chapter 4), 
and analysing their workings (Chapter 5). Part II applies the final model to investigate 
the effects of liberalisation in Argentina during its Currency Board (Chapter 6), and 
links the model to micro-simulations, applying the layered model in a sequential way to 
investigate the full distributional effects of the capital outflows suffered by Argentina 
near the end of the Currency Board (Chapter 7). Conclusions are organised into i) the 
modelling of the effects of globalisation on growth and income distribution in 
developing countries; ii) the understanding of the effects of globalisation on growth and 
distribution in Argentina during the Currency Board; iii) the derivation of policy 
implications; and iv) the identification of further research.   
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Modelling the effects of 
globalization in a typical middle-
income country 
 
This section goes through the steps of building and analysing the workings of a model 
that captures the effects of the last wave of globalisation on activity level and income 
distribution for a stylised developing country, specifically a middle-income one. It does 
so by describing the background given by the debate on globalisation and identifying 
the channels highlighted in it (Chapter 1), reviewing existing FCGE models (Chapter 2), 
describing the nested FCGE models that are built focusing on a stylised middle-income 
country (Chapter 3) and their calibration (Chapter 4), and analysing their workings 
(Chapter 5).   
19
Chapter 1 The international debate on the effects of 
globalisation on growth and income distribution in 
developing countries 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature on the effects that the different spheres of 
globalisation have had on growth and income distribution. I start by providing a 
definition of globalisation and an outline of the basic positions. Given that in the last 
two decades the liberalisation of current (particularly trade) and capital accounts was the 
central feature of globalisation in developing countries (Taylor 2004), the review mainly 
focuses on the effects of these spheres. While describing the transmission channels at 
stake, I identify with a mark (Tr. Channel Gn) the transmission channels to be modelled 
and consider the insights provided by the econometric approach. 
1.1   What is globalisation? 
 
Globalisation may be defined as the growing interdependence and interconnectedness of 
the modern world through increased flows of goods, services, capital, people and 
information, a process driven by technological advances and reductions in the costs of 
international transactions, which spreads technology and ideas, raises the share of trade 
in world production and increases the mobility of capital. Other important aspects of 
globalisation are the diffusion of global norms and values, the spread of democracy and 
the proliferation of global agreements and treaties, including international 
environmental and human rights agreements (DFID 2000).
3
 According to this definition, 
globalisation includes two clearly distinct phenomena: one related to technological 
changes and one related to political, economic and social choices (Helleiner 2001). 
1.2   How do the different spheres of globalisation affect growth and distribution? Basic 
positions 
 
A worldwide debate on the effects that globalisation – especially the latest wave4- has 
had on national growth, distribution and poverty has taken place from the beginning of 
                                                 
3 A definition with less emphasis on social choices is provided by Bhagwati (2004, p.3): ―Economic 
globalisation constitutes integration of national economies into the international economy through trade, 
direct foreign investment (by corporations and multinationals), short-term capital flows, international 
flows of workers and humanity generally, and flows of technology‖. 
4 As described in World Bank (2002), globalisation had a first wave (1870 to 1914) driven by advances in 
transportation and agreed reductions of barriers at worldwide level, second wave (1950 to 1980) focusing 
on integration among the developed countries and the present (third) wave (1980 to now) that included 
LDCs. 
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the nineties (Milanovic 2002). Even though there are multiple opinions in this debate, it 
is possible to distinguish among the participants three basic positions on globalisation: 
the first one, a Pro-Globalisation one, the second, an Anti-Globalisation one, and lastly 
one which understands globalisation as a definitely complex and multifaceted process, 
and which therefore proposes a more regulated global environment e.g. Wade (2001). 
 
The Pro-Globalisation position conforms the mainstream view and has two basic 
identifiers: first, it sustains that globalisation has basically benign effects that by 
themselves spur growth and contribute to the reduction of poverty (Milanovic 2003); 
and second, it minimizes or even denies the distributive problem. The Anti-
Globalisation position sustains that globalisation inherently comes with more 
exploitation at individual and country level. It has been caricatured by Pro-Globalisers 
as a trilogy of discontents constituted by an anti-capitalism – anti-corporation – anti-
globalisation mindset (Bhagwati 2004, p.3). Their main proponents are Ralph Nader and 
Pierre Bourdiex (Bhagwati 2004). Finally, the proponents of a more regulated global 
environment observe that the arrival of globalisation does not assure greater rates of 
growth, that it typically generates more instability in growth, particularly in developing 
countries, and that it tends to worsen the income distribution within these countries and 
at worldwide level (Foster and Szekely 2001; Milanovic 2002; Milanovic 2003); finally, 
it emphasises that, in general, not only growth but also distribution plays a relevant role 
in the determination of poverty (White 2001). In conclusion, their evidence points to a 
revision of the prevailing Pro-Globalisation vision.  
 
Specifically, the Pro-Globalisation position emphasises that high rates of growth and 
poverty reduction can be achieved by implementing a set of macro and reform policies 
that includes trade and capital openness, fiscal discipline, property rights, etc 
(Washington Consensus-type policies); and suggests that, in general terms, globalisation 
does not worsen income distribution, which in turn has only scant effects on poverty 
(Dollar and Kraay 2000, 1999; Fischer 2003; WorldBank 2002). For example, Dollar 
and Kraay (2000) suggest that ―Standard pro-growth macroeconomic policies are good 
for the poor‖ (Dollar and Kraay 2000, p.6) and ―Income of the poor rises one-for-one 
with overall growth‖ (Dollar and Kraay 2000, p.1), which implies that, on average, 
globalisation is not only beneficial for the poor but also neutral in distributive terms. In 
the early 2000s, the World Bank (2002), while maintaining the general message that 
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overall globalisation was reducing inequality (WorldBank 2002, p.2), accepted that in 
some cases income inequality could be worsening. However, it absolved the 
globalisation process and signalled the need for complementary policies (e.g. adoption 
of an education system that serves all levels of society) that, although costly, should be 
adopted without compromising the speed at which liberalisation takes place  
(WorldBank 2002, p.14).   
 
The pro-regulation position presents evidence which shows that the latest bout of 
globalisation can be characterised by more inequality between countries (Milanovic 
2003) and within countries (Foster and Szekely 2001), and less growth (Milanovic 
2003). If its approach is right – that is, if globalisation is not a panacea for world 
problems and its malignant side cannot be ignored (Milanovic 2003), then a redesign of 
globalisation may lead to more broadly shared benefits and even to a higher and more 
stable rate of growth (Stiglitz 2002). However, it is not obvious what specific shape this 
redesign should eventually take. To help answer this question, and keeping in mind the 
MDG goal of halving poverty, one of the pre-requisites is to understand the specific 
channels by which the main spheres of globalisation affect the two basic drivers of 
poverty: growth and income distribution (Ravallion 2001; White 2001).  
 
1.3   Effects of trade openness on growth 
 
In the mainstream view trade liberalisation is expected to have positive medium- and 
long- run effects on growth. The medium-run effects would come from changes in 
relative price signals, which lead to a reallocation of resources (Tr. Channel G1) in 
favour of the sectors with static comparative advantages. This resource reallocation, in 
turn, contributes to increased efficiency (Winters, McCulloch, and A.McKay 2004; 
Taylor 2004). In other words, trade liberalisation has the expected effect of switching 
production from non-tradable goods and inefficient import-substitutes towards 
exportable goods where developing countries have a static comparative advantage 
(Taylor 2004). The long-run effects would come from increased access to technology, 
improved access to intermediate and capital goods, and benefits of increased scale
5
 and 
competition (Winters, McCulloch, and A.McKay 2004).  
                                                 
5 A point also made by Bhagwati (2004). 
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 However, these positive effects are not guaranteed (Winters, McCulloch, and A.McKay 
2004). The presence of market failures (Tr. Channel G2), including the possibility of 
positive production externalities in import-competing sectors, implies that trade 
liberalisation may not be beneficial, even in the long run. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2001) 
illustrates this point with a two-sector-economy model where only one of the sectors 
enjoys ‗learning by doing‘: when openness induces the developing country to rely more 
on the other sector (e.g. the primary one), the country‘s growth rate is negatively 
affected, with the country falling into what UNCTAD (2002) has called an 
―international poverty trap‖, a situation by which the link with the international 
economy keeps the country underdeveloped
6
. Wood et al (1996) makes a similar point 
concerning educational investments: for a country where educational levels are 
relatively low, trade liberalisation may lead to specialisation in goods of low skill 
intensity. The result is a loss of positive externalities from educational investments and 
lower growth rates.  
 
Besides, if not accompanied by sound demand policies, liberalisation may imply a 
switch in aggregate demand away from the country‘s domestic markets, thus reducing 
the demand for the country‘s output and hence growth (Stiglitz 2002). For example, it 
may be the case that the adoption of international prices leads to an increase in net 
imports. If real devaluation does not take place (e.g. because of capital inflows and/or a 
fixed exchange rate coupled with downward inflexibility in domestic prices) as 
frequently observed in the Latin American country (LAC) context of last bout of 
liberalisation, then producers will shift to the non-tradable sector and net imports will be 
sustained, affecting aggregate demand and output (Taylor 2004; Evans 2005). 
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies might help compensate for the negative 
effect of a shift of demand toward foreign markets on the domestic activity level, but 
they will reinforce the external imbalance by pushing imports even higher. Moreover, to 
the extent that acquiring production capabilities takes time, an inappropriate timing of 
trade liberalisation may make national firms collapse and output fall in the face of a 
competition for which they are not conveniently prepared (Stiglitz 1998). Finally, trade 
liberalisation may lead to ―immeserizing growth‖, with negative terms of trade shocks 
                                                 
6 A poverty trap is defined as a situation when ‗poverty has effects that act as the causes of poverty‘ 
(Nissanke and Thorbecke 2005,p23). 
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reducing the nominal value (and the purchasing power) of domestic production, even 
when the domestic production might be growing in physical terms (Bhagwati 2004).  
 
The mainstream view has been supported by econometric work seeking evidence of a 
significant and positive link from trade openness (or liberalisation) to growth at cross-
country level. Regressing per capita income on a trade openness indicator (exports plus 
imports divided by GDP) plus a set of control variables from around 100 countries, 
Dollar and Kraay (1999) finds that trade openness has a positive and significant effect 
on growth. However, Rodrik (2000) argues that the supposedly positive effect is 
spurious, due to econometric misspecifications, particularly in the election of the trade 
openness indicator
7
: Rodrik contends that the (exports + imports) / GDP indicator is 
―selected to systematically bias the results in favour of showing a statistically and 
quantitatively significant link between trade liberalisation and growth‖ (2000, p.5), and 
emphasises that it is a well-known fact that the countries which perform well usually 
increase their trade/GDP ratios as a by-product.
 8
 In other words, Rodrik suggests that 
Dollar and Kraay‘s regressions suffer from a serious problem of reverse causation.  
 
Rodrik‘s critics have argued that reverse causation, even when in theory could be 
relevant, is not such in practice. They have shown that even when reverse causation is 
taken into account, the positive significant effect from openness remains. Different 
ways of taking into account reverse causation have been applied, including: i) 
instrumenting openness with borders and distances among countries, building on a 
gravity model for international trade, and controlling for the effect of country-size 
(population and area) on per capita income, as Frankel and Romer (1999) and Frankel 
and Rose (2002)
 9 10
; ii) regressing in differences and instrumenting openness by lagged 
openness, as in Dollar and Kraay (2003). The first approach has been criticised by 
Rodriguez and Rodrik for the existence of channels by which geography might affect 
                                                 
7 The same comment appears in Birdsall and Hamoudi (2002) and Milanovic (2003) 
8 Rodrik also points out other Dollar and Kraay‘s arbitrary selection criteria which are misleading, 
including mismatches between the periods where taxes lowered and the period where trade volumes 
increased (their instrumental variable). 
 
9 As explained by Frankel & Romer, ‗Just as a country‘s income may be influenced by the amount its 
residents trade with foreigners, it may also be influenced by the amount its residents trade with one 
another‘ (Frankel and Romer 1999 p.380). 
10 The latter also incorporates controls for closeness to the Equator and to the Tropics and continental 
dummies.  
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income, independently of the trade channel (e.g. via affecting the availability of natural 
resources) and for lack of answer to the relevant policy question at stake: how policy-
induced barriers to international trade affect growth. As claimed by the authors, ―trade 
restrictions (…) will work differently from natural or geographical barriers to trade‖ 
(Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001, p.2). It is also to be noted that in most cases the authors 
regress per capita incomes (and not growth), and positive differences in per capita 
incomes associated with positive differences in openness (ceteris paribus) would be 
indicative of trade openness positively affecting growth rates only under certain 
departure levels for trade openness and income. Besides, Lee et al (2004) sustains that 
lagged openness is not a reliable instrument, as it may lead to an increase in the imports 
of physical capital and hence cause growth by a channel which is independent of present 
openness. Finally, all this econometric studies trying to find a strong link between trade 
openness and growth have been criticised because of a possible need of complementary 
policies (e.. to encourage investment) to ensure that trade liberalisation leads to 
sustained growth  (Winters, McCulloch, and A.McKay 2004).   
1.4   Effects of trade openness on income distribution  
The literature on the effect of trade liberalisation or trade openness on income 
distribution mainly comprises studies that describe the main channels by which trade 
liberalisation affects income distribution, in addition to a series of econometric and 
CGE modelling studies which have applied very different methodologies arriving at  
different conclusions (Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007)) . 
With regards to the mechanisms by which trade liberalisation affects income 
distribution, conventional trade theory (Heckscher-Ohlin theory with its companion 
Stolper-Samuelson theorem) addresses the issue in a static way using a model with only 
two factors, two sectors and two countries. Its corollary is that trade liberalisation 
increases the relative price of the relative abundant factor in each country leading to a 
fall in inequality. This may not be correct, particularly in the light of empirical evidence 
suggesting that trade liberalisation is not reducing inequality in the developing world 
(Milanovic 2002). As argued in the following paragraphs, to analyse the mechanisms 
just mentioned with more realism, it is particularly important to distinguish the time 
frame and the existence of more factors, sectors and countries.  
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In the short run, openness to trade in a small economy will affect income distribution by 
the increasing adoption of international prices. On the imports side, the competition of 
cheaper imported goods will erode the rents (profits, wages, land rents) in the protected 
sectors of producers at home (Milanovic and Squire 2005), with the consequent change 
in income distribution. On the exports side, the changes will come mainly from a 
reduction in wedges (taxes and subsidies) to exports
11
, with reduction of taxes 
(subsidies) increasing (lowering) the incomes of exporters. As described by Goldberg 
and Pavcnik (2007), the latest globalisation wave seems to have led to an increase in the 
demand for skilled workers, thereby increasing the skill premium and affecting income 
distribution. For middle-income countries, part of this change in factor demand can be 
explained by a simple extension of the traditional trade theory, accounting for skilled 
labour, unskilled labour and capital; and by distinguishing between low-, middle- and 
high-income countries: as low income countries entered in the world markets and 
started to export unskilled-intensive goods (e.g. China‘s textiles), the comparative 
advantage of middle-income countries may have shifted from unskilled to relatively 
skilled workers (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, p.61), with an associated change in factor 
demand.  
The medium-run changes in income distribution are related to the medium-run 
transmission channel explained in the ―trade liberalisation and growth‖ section: as 
changes in relative price signals lead to factor reallocation, the average wages earned by 
the factors change due to i) the presence of original sector-specific wage distortions and 
ii) the effects that the reallocations have on overall factor wages (Tr. Channel G3). The 
mentioned reallocations are partly motivated by developed countries outsourcing, a 
mechanism by which firms in the developed countries shift the production of some 
intermediate goods to developing countries. With the production of these intermediates 
being relatively skill-intensive
12
, this contributes to explain the increase in the skill 
premium commented above (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, p.62). 
 
In the long run, the productivity and technology transfers brought about by trade are 
likely to generate new changes in factor demands, factor returns and income distribution 
                                                 
11 Also in taxes and subsidies to inputs imported for the purpose of subsequent exporting, with an 
importance depending on the importance of outsourcing in the economy. 
12 The production may be characterized as skill-intensive from the perspective of LDCs but unskilled-
intensive from the perspective of developed countries. 
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(Evans 2005). In particular, and in the context of international capital inflows, trade 
liberalisation may lead to a fall in the price of imported capital goods and increases in 
the physical capital stock of developing countries with ‗skill-biased‘ embodied 
technology (Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, p.63) also helping in explaining the skill 
premium increase. This is also confirmed by evidence of low substitution between 
skilled labour and physical capital for middle-income countries reported by Agénor et al 
(2005, p.11) (Tr. Channel G4). 
Besides, the potential switch in aggregate demand towards foreign markets described in 
the section ―trade liberalisation and growth‖ may also have lasting distributional effects, 
especially when liberalisation takes place prior to the adoption of social safety nets 
(Stiglitz 2002) (Tr. Channel G5).  
Finally, the changes in income distribution as a result of trade liberalisation will depend 
significantly on country-specific factor endowments (which will impact on the 
reallocation of resources and on the possibility of productivity and technology transfers) 
and on market institutions (which will resolve the market disequilibria in favour of 
changes in prices or in quantities) (Tr. Channel G6), as well as on the international rate 
of return to capital, which will influence the national rate of return to capital to the 
extent that capital is mobile at the international level. In relation to labour market 
institutions, trade liberalisation will usually come with reduced activity-based or skill-
based sindicalisation, thus allowing for more wage flexibility (Milanovic and Squire 
2005). Public finances will also have a role in income distribution: as tariffs and 
subsidies are cut, the government will attempt to budget its finances, which may imply 
an increase in existing taxes, introduction of new ones, and/or a reduction in public 
expenditure which may be non-neutral (Evans 2005). 
With regards to the regressions approach, there is a number of econometric studies 
supporting the mainstream view, suggesting that trade openness and/or liberalisation has 
no systematic effect on income distribution (Edwards 1997; Londono 2002; Dollar and 
Kraay 2000; Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely 2001), as well as a number of studies 
suggesting that it worsens income distribution (Barro 2000; Spilimbergo, Londono, and 
Szekely 1999; Lundberg and Squire 2003), and even one that suggests that the effects of 
trade openness may be context-dependent: they may be pro-equality in middle- or high-
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income countries but pro-inequality in poor countries (Milanovic 2002) or they may 
depend on investments in human capital (Edwards 1997, p.209).  
Milanovic (2002) analyses the effects of trade openness and FDI on income distribution 
in developed and developing countries, using seemingly unrelated regressions (SURE), 
a class of regression targeted to a system of simultaneous equations. The author does 
cross-country regressions analysis, regressing the ratio of expenditure or income 
(depending on availability) of each population decile to the mean income in each 
country on a set of variables including trade openness, with data on income by deciles 
coming from household surveys of ―almost 90 countries‖ around two benchmark years: 
1988 and 1993. In addition to trade openness, defined as imports + exports normalised 
by GDP, some of the other covariates the study includes are: FDI in recipient country, 
also as a percentage of GDP; and interaction terms between trade openness and GDP 
and between FDI and GDP to take account of possible diverse effects of these spheres 
of globalisation. Milanonic applies regressions both in levels and first differences, 
finding significant effects of trade openness only in levels, with the sign of the effect 
depending on countries‘ initial income level: his evidence suggests that for countries 
with per capita GDP below $5000-$6000, it is the rich who benefit relatively more from 
openness; above that range, it is the relative income of the poor and the middle class 
which increases.   
Edwards (1997, p.206), in turn, regresses the change in the Gini and in the income share 
of the poorest quintile of 27 developing and 17 developed countries over the 1970s and 
1980s on variables that account for trade liberalisation
13
, increase in the percentage of 
population with secondary education, and macroeconomic conditions (GNP, growth and 
inflation) and a dummy for developed countries. His results suggest that ―trade reform 
(…) does not appear to have significantly affected changes in income distribution‖ 
(Edwards 1997, p.209). He suggests that investment in education leads to a reduction in 
inequality, but he does not interact education with openness, which would have allowed 
checking whether the effect of trade liberalisation depends on the human capital stock 
of the country (e.g. by affecting the education premium).  
 
                                                 
13 Specifically, these are: average tariffs; average quantitative restrictions coverage; the World Bank index 
of outward orientation; average collected tariff ratio; Wolf‘s index of import outward orientation; and 
average black-market premia.  
28
Behrman et al (2001) study uses an unbalanced panel based on 93 national household 
surveys micro data
14
 from 17 Latin American countries over the 1977-2000 period. It 
groups individuals in poor, middle-class and rich according to the position in the 
country-level income distribution, and classifies those in the first three deciles as poor; 
those in the tenth decile as rich; and the rest as middleclass. It regresses the differences 
between the log of the average incomes of the rich group and the middle class group 
over that of the poor group, applying first-difference OLS on a set of covariates that 
include direct measures of the liberalisation effort, as well as controls for average 
individual and time-varying country-characteristics which are assumed to have different 
effects across the income distribution (e.g. inflation). The purpose of regressing the 
differences (and not the levels) of income is essentially to get rid of the effect on wages 
of country-specific differences. The purpose of applying OLS in first-differences is to 
avoid the endogeneity problem as country‘s inequality may affect their liberalisation 
efforts. Both are devices that intend to avoid omitted variable biases. In particular, the 
liberalisation effort is accounted for by a trade policy index (the ―average level of tariffs 
and tariff dispersion‖ and a capital account liberalisation index that averages a) controls 
to FDI; b) limits to profits repatriation; c) limits to foreign credit to domestic private 
sector; d) controls to capital flows (Behrman, Birdsall, and Szekely 2001, p.13). The 
results suggest that trade liberalisation does not significantly affect inequality, 
something which they interpret as trade liberalisation having a set of offsetting effects 
on inequality. 
1.5   Effects of capital account openness on growth   
In the mainstream view, ―free capital movements help channel resources into their most 
productive uses, and thereby increase economic growth and welfare—nationally and 
internationally‖ (Camdessus 1998). More broadly, financial globalisation is expected to 
enhance growth by a series of channels described by Prasad et al (2003) that directly or 
indirectly affect growth. The former include reducing the cost of capital from increased 
risk sharing; transferring technology and developing domestic financial sectors. The 
latter include increasing specialisation in production due to the possibility of augmented 
risk sharing; and improving macro policies and institutions by the disciplining force of 
the markets. Besides, capital account liberalisation is expected to allow for economic 
                                                 
14 With the exemptions of surveys for Argentina and Uruguay, which are urban, but where the urban 
populations have 70% and 90% of the total population, respectively. 
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activity smoothing, with countries borrowing in bad times and lending in good times 
(Prasad et al. 2003; Gottschalk and Cirera 2003).  
 
However, the pro-regulation position has highlighted that 1) the presence of market 
failures in the international capital markets (Rodrik 1999), 2) the lack of a sequential 
opening of the economy (McKinnon 1991) and 3) the lack of sound domestic and 
international institutions and policies (Prasad et al. 2003; WorldBank 2002) may induce 
international capital mobility to not enhance - and possibly harm- growth.  
 
The existence of informational asymmetries, agency problems, self-fulfilling 
expectations, bubbles (rational and otherwise), and myopia are common examples of 
market failures in worldwide capital markets (Rodrik 1999, p.22). These, combined 
with international capital mobility, may generate irrational changes in the direction of 
capital flows, as acknowledged by World Bank (2002). It is found that capital account 
liberalisation comes with a significant increase in volatility of capital flows, which in 
turn makes the rate of growth less stable (Birdsall 1999; Wade 2001). Even worse, as 
capital flows tend to move pro-cyclically, they provide an additional source of 
instability (Prasad et al. 2003; Stiglitz 2002), probably also generating uncertainty, a 
loss in efficiency, and a lower trend growth (Gottschalk and Cirera 2003). As described 
by Taylor (2004), capital account liberalisation, especially in LAC, has led to capital 
inflows that caused appreciation in real exchange rates (via changes in the nominal 
exchange rates or in domestic prices) and to domestic credit expansions. The former 
switched demand away from the liberalising country. The latter encouraged 
consumption of domestic and foreign goods, thereby affecting the domestic activity 
level and external balances. Sooner or later, due to unsustainable external imbalance or 
capital outflow, the demand expansion ended.   
 
As highlighted by Mc Kinnon (1991), the capital account liberalisation may not be 
growth enhancing if conducted before the following sequence is executed: i) the 
government achieves fiscal equilibrium hence allowing for price stability; ii) capital 
markets are opened at the domestic level; iii) the current account is liberalised slowly 
and orderly, following a ―five-to ten-year adjustment period‖ toward zero tariffs after 
converting quantitative restrictions into tariffs, with tariffs better cascading downward 
from domestic finished consumer goods, to manufactured intermediate products, to 
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industrial raw materials and energy. Besides, once this sequence is executed, capital 
account liberalisation should not take place in a big-bang way, but rather as a gradual 
process, starting with FDI; continuing with long-term flows; followed by short-term 
flows; and being concluded with outflows by residents, first institutional investors, then 
individuals (Gottschalk and Cirera 2003). Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977), departing 
from previous work by Bhagwati (1973), shows sufficient conditions under which a 
capital inflow after the opening of the capital account but before eliminating import 
tariffs leads to ―immiserizing growth‖, by which the economy grows but aggregate 
welfare falls. They consider a small tariff-imposing country within the standard two-
commodity two-factor model of international trade with an economy incompletely 
specialised in the production of labour-intensive goods and constant returns to scale in 
production. The economy receives a capital inflow that is small enough for the host 
country to continue incompletely specialised. With the capital inflow being the only 
source of savings for the economy, it is directly used to finance an increase in the 
existing physical capital stock, thereby contributing to the expansion of the domestic 
production possibility frontier. To the extent that non-residents receive the full 
(untaxed) value of the marginal product of its capital (i.e. its market rate of return), the 
authors demonstrate that the capital inflow leads to an upward shift in domestic income 
but to a downward shift in national income (the relevant one for residents). As 
explained by the authors (Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro 1977, p.317), the fall in national 
income can be decomposed into three components: i) the loss due to tariff-created 
distortions in consumption and production given the initial factor endowments; ii) the 
loss (or gain) coming from the accumulation of capital in the presence of the distorting 
tariff if the capital were owned by residents; and iii) the repatriation of profits to non-
residents. As explained in Johnson (1967), the accumulation of capital in the protected 
industry attracts resources thereby increasing the waste through an excess cost of 
additional protected production. While these workers increase their contribution to 
output at tariff-distorted market prices, they may lower it at social prices, hence driving 
social welfare down. In essence, the tariff distortion channels the capital inflow towards 
the production of the good where the country has no comparative advantage (the 
capital-intensive one) and, provided the inflow of capital does not lead the country to a 
complete specialisation in capital-intensive goods, it makes aggregate welfare fall once 
foreign profits on the incoming capital are deducted.  
 
31
Finally, the absence of a series of institutions and policies at international and national 
level could make the capital account liberalisation harm growth. These include 
international coordination on accounting standards and policies to address global 
imbalances, in addition to policies that can address issues such as: lack of transparency, 
existence of corruption, and risky lending practices (WorldBank 2002; Prasad et al. 
2003). Also, capital account liberalisation may hurt the government‘s autonomy in 
different ways. The actual or feared event of capital outflows may induce governments 
to adopt a set of ―market friendly‖ economic policies, i.e. policies that discourage 
capital to leave the country, or that sacrifice the adoption of measures to address the 
development problems facing the country at stake. For example, governments may 
adopt restrictive demand policies and liberalise the labour market because these policies 
are perceived to be market friendly even in the context of deep recession which may call 
instead for a stimulus to aggregate demand. With a fixed exchange rate regime, 
governments will lose some autonomy to manage aggregate demand (and hence the 
activity level) as the domestic interest rate will be basically driven by the international 
rate (Bhagwati 2004).  Lastly, governments may lose some taxing autonomy as the 
capacity to tax capital will be reduced by the possibility of domestic capital flowing 
towards jurisdictions with lower or no taxes.   
 
The econometric evidence is one more time elusive. Even when a positive statistical 
association is found in general terms - but with exceptions for countries of high growth 
but late or partial financial globalisation (China, India) and countries of low growth but 
financially opened (South Africa) -, the positive effect of financial globalisation on 
growth is not conclusive. The majority of recent studies finds no effect or a mixed effect 
at best (generally with only FDI having a positive effect on domestic investment and 
growth), thus not supporting the theoretical argument that financial globalisation per se 
enhances economic growth (Prasad et al. 2003). As a brief illustration, Rodrik (1998), 
using a cross-country regression approach on a sample with almost 100 countries, finds 
that capital openness does not have a significant effect on growth; Kraay (1998) who 
regresses growth on three measures of capital account openness, concludes that ―capital 
account liberalisation…does not appear to have measureable first-order effects on key 
macroeconomic outcomes such as growth‖.    
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1.6   Effects of capital account openness on income distribution  
 
The effects of capital account liberalisation on income distribution remain relatively 
uncovered by the literature. Among the few studies on the topic, Behrman et al (2001) 
suggests that capital account liberalisation may lead to capital inflows that in turn make 
the price of capital fall and physical investment go up (Tr. Channel G7)
15
. With capital 
being complementary to skilled labour and substitute for unskilled labour, the gap 
between their wages increases and income distribution worsens. Under this argument, it 
is implicitly assumed that the capital inflow leads to increased foreign savings that do 
not (completely) offset domestic savings, such that the overall level of savings (and 
investment) increases
16
. When the authors perform regressions to estimate the effect of 
capital account liberalisation on income distribution – with a methodology described in 
the section ―trade liberalisation and growth‖, they find that international financial 
liberalisation does increase inequality, reinforcing the validity of their theoretical 
argument. At the same time, Milanovic (2002) – with a methodology described in the 
same section - suggests that capital account liberalisation does not affect income 
distribution.  
1.7   Conclusions 
 
The international debate on the effects of globalisation on income and distribution in 
developing countries allows us to understand the transmission channels at work. The 
conflicting econometric results suggest that it may simply be wrong to assume that a 
model applies equally to every country; that dynamics and path dependency are 
irrelevant, and that measurements across countries are homogeneous (Winters, 
McCulloch, and A.McKay 2004). Instead it may be the case that the relationship 
between trade and capital account liberalisation, on one hand, and growth and 
distribution, on the other, is a contingent one, dependent on a host of country and 
external characteristics which should be identified (Rodriguez and Rodrik 2001), and 
that can be captured with a single-country economic model.     
 
 
 
                                                 
15 The fall in the price of capital will be included in the model in the sense that trade liberalisation will 
affect the price at which physical capital can be imported. 
16 Otherwise, one would conclude that they confuse financial and physical capital. 
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Chapter 2 Review of CGE models 
2.1   CGE models: origins, concept, types and uses 
 
―Computable general equilibrium (CGE) models can be seen as a natural outgrowth of 
input-output and linear programming models, adding neoclassical substitutability in 
production and demand, as well as an explicit system of market prices and a complete 
specification of the income flows in the economy‖ (Robinson 1989, p.888). The first 
application was done by Johansen (1960) and the first developing country applications 
by Adelman and Robinson (1978) and Taylor and Lysy (1979). The evolution of CGE 
models was close to policy concerns in the international agenda: ―In the early 1970s, 
international attention shifted to a concern about income distribution‖, and models 
included prices and incomes, as it was perceived that rapid growth and structural change 
did not suffice to reduce poverty and that large groups of poor people were not 
benefiting from growth. In the late 1970s and 1980s, with a growing concern with issues 
of foreign debt, policy analysis focused on questions of ―structural adjustment‖17. How 
could countries bring about the changes in the structure of production and trade required 
to adapt to lower levels of foreign exchange availability? What macroeconomic 
adjustments were required, and what was their impact on medium- to long-run growth 
and structural change? Faced with a foreign exchange crisis that significantly affected 
growth, issues of income distribution and poverty alleviation gradually lost priority in 
the international agenda, and policy-modellers reacted, among other actions, by 
improving the treatment of foreign trade in CGE models.   
 
In essence, a ―CGE model works by simulating the interaction of various economic 
actors across markets‖ using the following components: 1) the actors or agents whose 
behaviour is analysed (e.g. consumers and producers);  2) their behavioural rules, 
reflecting their assumed motivation (e.g. producers decide their factor uses at given 
prices in order to maximize profits); 3) the signals observed by the agents that affect 
their actual behaviour (typically prices); 4) the rules of the game for the interaction of 
agents (e.g. perfect competition); 5) the system constraints (e.g. markets for products 
and factors clear) (Robinson 1989, p.906) . 
                                                 
17 As mentioned in Robinson (1989), ―structural adjustment‖ is a catch-all term. Here it is used as defined 
by Robinson (1989, p.891): ―an adjustment to some shock that requires not only compositional changes in 
production, resource allocation, demand, and relative prices, but also changes in macroeconomic 
aggregates such as income, investment, absorption, consumption and government expenditure‖. 
34
 As a consequence, CGE models are essentially structural, capturing market mechanisms 
explicitly, and specifying demand and supply behaviours with roles for prices and 
demand and supply elasticities. ―Walras rather than Keynes is the patron saint (…)‖ 
(Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson 1982, p.6), i.e. their spirit is essentially microeconomic. 
However, in order to gain realism, the factor and products equilibrium concepts that 
come from the Arrow-Debreu general equilibrium theory are sometimes enriched by 
additional equilibria concepts and ad-hoc elements. The former include: 1) flow 
equilibrium in the market for loanable funds; 2) equilibrium in specific asset markets; 
and 3) inter-temporal equilibrium, with agents‘ behaviour based on their expectations 
about the future course of the economy. The ad-hoc elements include the following 
―structuralist‖ features: 1) limited substitution elasticities in a variety of important 
relationships (―elasticity structuralist‖); 2) lack of proper work or even absence of 
various markets – e.g. restrictions to factor mobility, price rigidities, rationing, 
neoclassical disequilibrium, non-profit maximising behaviour by firms- (―micro 
structuralist‖); 3) equilibrating mechanisms among macro aggregate nominal flows 
(―macro structuralism‖ typical in Lance Taylor‘s work). Models are then set in a 
continuum going from Walrasian to Keynesian models, and can be classified in 
different ways, e.g. according to the equilibrium concepts they include, the ad-hoc 
devices they have, their treatment of expectations, their size, etc. In any case, the 
Walrasian model is ―an uneasy host for incorporating macro phenomena‖, not existing 
still an ―acceptable reconciliation of micro and macro theory‖ (Robinson 1989, p.895) . 
2.2   Macro financial CGE models 
 
A survey of one-country macro financial CGE models seems useful to frame the set of 
models I build
18
. These models generally depart from traditional CGE models that 
already incorporate flow equilibria in product and factor markets, with the assumptions 
in these markets being critical. Also as traditional CGE models, they tend to incorporate 
a functional relationship between the real exchange rate and the trade balance, being this 
                                                 
18 A detailed survey of CGE models is out of the scope of the dissertation. McKibbin and Sachs (1989) 
Global and McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1999) G-Cubed dynamic GE models of the world economy divides 
the world into regions and deals with financial assets (public bonds, foreign investment positions), but 
their perfect foresight assumption, perfect substitutability among financial assets and global character lets 
the case at stake out of the domain of applicability of these models. Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium models are left out also due to their lack of concern with structural adjustment and perfect 
foresight assumptions.   
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a critical transmission channel, and tend to reflect imperfect substitution between 
imports and domestic goods, and imperfect transformation between domestic goods and 
export goods, reflecting the difficulty of changing trade shares at the sector level and 
giving a degree of isolation to the domestic price level.  
 
However, FCGE models significantly differ from traditional CGEs. While in traditional 
CGEs the ―loanable funds‖ market collects savings and purchases capital goods in a 
single account, financial CGE models focus on the elaboration of this account 
(Robinson 1991),  adding a set of imperfectly substitutable assets that capture 
imperfections in the capital markets. These models are generally designed to analyse the 
short- and medium- run impact on economic performance and income distribution in 
developing economies of structural adjustment and stabilisation programmes 
implemented in response to external macro shocks (e.g. increased oil prices, reduced 
availability of foreign borrowing). Given their concern with the short- and medium- run 
effects on the economy, they tend to directly incorporate macro phenomena and to have 
a simple treatment of expectations
19
.  They all break the neoclassical separation between 
the real and financial spheres of the economy and, for doing this, each of them has at 
least one structuralist feature.  
 
A review of a set of sixteen macro-financial CGE models that focuses on the 
equilibrating mechanism in different markets, on the structuralist features and on the 
channels by which the performance of the financial sphere affects the real one is 
summarised in the following table. To avoid repeating the description of characteristics 
which are common to many models, a row – denominated ―default‖ – is added 
specifying these characteristics, and then referring to their presence in specific models. 
The table starts with a non-financial CGE model (the IFPRI Standard Model), as it is 
useful to illustrate the difference between financial and non-financial CGE models and 
to show the departure point for my modelling strategy in following chapter. The 
summary suggests the following general patterns among financial CGE models:  
 Their factor markets tend to be similar, with the capital stock being immobile across 
sectors and with some form of wage rigidity in the labour market: a fixed nominal 
wage (Rosenzweig and Taylor 1990), a price-indexed nominal wage (Taylor 1981; 
                                                 
19 As mentioned in Robinson (1991), ―long-run models which assume full employment and embody 
steady-state equilibria with rational (or model-consistent) expectations will miss most of the action‖. 
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Easterly 1990), or a wage curve by which the real wage is affected by the 
unemployment rate (Fargeix and Sadoulet 1994; Vos 1997).  
 The product markets tend to assume perfect competition, but in some models prices 
are determined as a mark-up on variable costs (e.g. Yeldan (1997)), are fixed by the 
government (Decaluwe and Nsengiyumva 1994), or even have the overall price 
level as the variable that equilibrates the money market (Yeldan 1997).  
 Asset markets tend to clear via quantity adjustment, with the interest rate sometimes 
equilibrating sources and uses of funds by banks (Taylor 1981), with ex-ante 
savings sometimes limiting fixed investment (Decaluwe and Nsengiyumva 1994; 
Yeldan 1997; Vos 1997; Lewis 1992)
20
, but also sometimes with investment driving 
savings (Taylor 1983; Easterly 1990). They include a large set of financial assets, 
and can include currency, deposits, loans, required reserves, domestic and foreign 
bonds, and international reserves held by the central bank, with these assets 
sometimes classified according to their currency denomination (local vs. foreign).  
 A variety of exchange rate regimes are modelled, including fixed and flexible (as in 
traditional CGE models), but also administered fluctuation (IMMPA) and crawling 
peg (Taylor 1983).   
 By including the financial sphere, these models make it possible to track the 
economic actors‘ portfolios (in size and composition). They enrich the way in which 
the relationship with the rest of the world is captured, allowing us to explain 
financial flows between residents and non-residents, their effects on the domestic 
economy liquidity, and valuation effects (e.g. due to an appreciation of the foreign 
currency).  
 They capture a variety of links going from the financial to the real side of the 
economy. These include impacts on the aggregate supply and aggregate demand for 
goods.  
o Concerning the former, they tend to reflect it via a ―working capital‖ 
channel. As explained by Decaluwe et al (1994, p.263-4), this channel 
incorporates firms credit dependency, and was pioneered by Kapur (1976) 
and Mathieson (1980). ―In these studies, they consider that there is a direct 
link between bank credit availability and the level of production. The link is 
introduced in their models by supposing that the fixed or variable capital 
                                                 
20 Lewis (1997) only in the scenario with fixed interest rate 
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stock used by the firms is financed in a certain proportion by bank credit‖. In 
some studies the cost of working capital hits the effective production cost of 
firms and, in turn, the firm‘s desired level of production - the ‗maquette‘ 
(Bourguignon, Branson, and Melo 1992), IMMPA -; in others the higher 
production cost is passed on to consumers (Taylor 1981). Finally, in some 
models the availability of working capital directly affects the production 
possibilities of the firm, as working capital is entered as an argument in a 
Leontief production function that does not allow for substitution away from 
working capital (Decaluwe and Nsengiyumva 1994; Naastepad 2002). 
o Concerning the effects from the financial sphere to the demand for goods, 
they capture: i) the positive effect of real balances on consumption (Easterly 
1990); ii) the negative effect of the interest rate on physical investment 
(Bourguignon, Branson, and Melo 1992; Thissen 2000); and iii) the positive 
effect of international capital inflows on physical investment via relaxing 
binding financial constraints, as in Vos(1997). The mentioned effects on the 
demand for goods in turn affect the overall supply of goods 
contemporaneously (to the extent that factor use is flexible) or with a lag, as 
investment decisions affect the capital stock supply and the production 
possibility frontier for subsequent periods.   
 
Overall, it is clear that all these models rupture the neoclassical duality between the real 
and financial spheres, and major differences show up in how the loanable funds market 
is modelled and in how the performance of the financial sphere affects the real side of 
the economy. Many of them include a working capital channel, but do not allow for the 
possibility that firms will tend to substitute away from working capital when its cost 
rises.  
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Table 2-1 Macro FCGE Models 
 
 
Model Factors closures Products closures Asset markets and their closures Loanable funds market 
("Saving-Investment") 
closure
Fiscal closure RoW closure 1: 
exchange rate regime 
RoW closure 2: balance 
of payments
Intertemporal equilibrium Core links from financial to real 
sphere
Default Only labour factors are 
mobile across sectors 
and have fixed wages 
and unemployment.
  Prices are market-
clearing
  Quantity adjustment Savings-driven  Flexible public savings Single period without role 
for expectations
IFPRI Standard Model For each factor, the user 
chooses between 1) 
flexible wages vs. flexible 
factor use and 2) mobility 
vs. immobility across 
sectors
Prices vary to clean the 
markets
Absent The user chooses 
between default and 
investment-driven savings
The user chooses 
betweeen default and 
flexible tax rates 
The user chooses 
between fixed exchange 
rate (with flexible trade 
balance) or viceverse.  
The balance of payments 
is limited to the trade 
balance and international 
transfers 
Absent Absent
Taylor (1981A) IS-LM 
in the Tropics
Default, or the labor 
wage is price-indexed 
Default Deposits, loans from households 
and banks to firms, and banks 
reserves are present. Asset 
demands are in terms of stocks. 
Working capital loans are not 
rationed. Interest rates are 
endogenous. 
The interest rate 
equilibrates the market
Default Fixed  The capital account is 
absent. The foreign 
reserves held by the 
central bank change as 
derived from the 
endogenous trade 
balance. 
Default Depending on selected 
parameters of saving and 
investment functions, monetary 
contractions can either lift or 
reduce the activity level. Firms 
borrow to finance working 
capital needs, and pass along its 
financial cost without an effect 
on total output. 
Taylor (1981B)  Ch8: 
"Foreign Assets and 
Balance of Payments" 
(basic version)
Fixed real wages (fixed 
mark-up for capital) with 
flexible use of labor and 
capital
Demand-driven quantities 
clear the markets
Households demand the 
following imperfectly 
substitutable assets: deposits, 
foreign assets and a non-
tradable ("gold" or "land"). 
There are also bank loans to 
firms.
Investment-driven A fiscal institution is 
absent
Crawling peg The capital account is 
absent. The foreign 
reserves held by the 
central bank and 
households change as 
derived from the 
endogenous trade 
balance. 
Perfect-foresight, 
multiperiod model
Excess supplies of loans lead to 
price level increases that lower 
the real interest rate and lifts 
physical investment.
Bourguignon, Branson 
and De Melo "Maquette" 
(1992)
Money holdings (against a 
consolidated financial system), 
domestic bonds, foreign bonds, 
equity, loans and international 
reserves are present. The 
portfolio composition of assets 
by households and liabilities by 
firms depends on asset returns. 
The interest rate adjusts to clear 
the money market, and the 
return on equity is endogenously 
given by the return on physical 
capital. 
Default via investment 
credit being rationed 
Default Versions with fixed 
exchange rate (with 
flexible trade balance) 
and viceverse.  
The balance of payments 
is always in equilibrium. 
In the fix exchange rate 
regime, the government 
borrows to equilibrate it. 
Adaptive expectations, 
multi-period model
The interest rate affects physical 
investment and there is a 
working capital channel.
Default or Keynesian mark-up pricing with 
endogenous capacity utilization
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Table 2-1 Macro FCGE Models (cont.) 
 
 
 
 
Model Factors closures Products closures Asset markets and their closures Loanable funds market 
("Saving-Investment") 
closure
Fiscal closure RoW closure 1: 
exchange rate regime 
RoW closure 2: balance 
of payments
Intertemporal equilibrium Core links from financial to real 
sphere
Default Only labour factors are 
mobile across sectors 
and have fixed wages 
and unemployment.
  Prices are market-
clearing
  Quantity adjustment Savings-driven  Flexible public savings Single period without role 
for expectations
Rosenzweig and Taylor 
(1990)  
Default Default Currency, deposits, loans, 
bonds, equity, deposits of non-
residents, foreign exchange 
reserves of Central Bank, 
rediscounts and required 
reserves are present. CES and 
CET functions determine the 
composition of household's 
assets and firms liabilities. The 
interest rate adjusts to equate 
bank sources and uses of funds. 
The price of equity adjusts to 
clear the equity market. 
Not explicit Default Fixed Endogenous trade 
balance, capital account 
balance and overall 
balance of payments.
Multi-period The interest rate affects physical 
investment
Easterly (1990) Fixed or price-indexed 
labor and capital wages, 
with flexible employment 
level and capacity 
utilization 
Demand-driven quantities 
clear the markets
Deposits, loans, required 
reserves, foreign assets and 
bonds denominated in local and 
foreign currency are present.  
Investment-driven, with 
foreign savings being the 
equilibrating variable.
Default Fixed Endogenous trade 
balance, capital account 
balance and overall 
balance of payments.
Default Real balances hit consumption. 
Firms interest payments affect 
their cash flow and hence their 
investment levels.
Lewis (1992) The wages are flexible. 
Only labour is mobile. 
Default  The core of the financial system 
is provided by deposits and 
loans from banks - see Savings-
Investment closure. 
Either i) the interest rate 
is fixed at a level where 
planned savings are 
below planned 
investment (credit 
rationing); or ii) the 
interest rate equilibrates 
planned savings and 
investments. 
Default Flexible and other 
schemes, e.g. a premium 
rationing scheme for 
imports.
Exogenous international 
capital flows determine 
the capital account 
balance and, with a 
change in sign, the 
current account balance, 
such that the balance of 
payments is always in 
equilibrium.
Default The interest rate affects real 
investment and hence the 
composition of aggregate 
demand, but not the activity 
level, determined by the full 
employment assumption. A 
working capital channel is 
present.
Decaluwe et al (1994) Default Mostly quantity 
adjustment given a strong 
degree of price rigidity -
e.g. the producer price 
for exports is fixed via an 
equalization public fund.
Money, deposits, loans, 
international reserves held by 
Central Bank, bonds and equity 
are present. 
Default via investment 
credit being rationed 
Default Fixed Exogenous exports, 
Armingtonian imports 
and exogenous capital 
account flows determine 
the overall result of the 
balance of payments.  
Default The credit supply limits the firms 
effective demand for variable 
production factors and physical 
investment, with short and 
medium run effects.  
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Table 2-1 Macro FCGE Models (cont.)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Model Factors closures Products closures Asset markets and their closures Loanable funds market 
("Saving-Investment") 
closure
Fiscal closure RoW closure 1: 
exchange rate regime 
RoW closure 2: balance 
of payments
Intertemporal equilibrium Core links from financial to real 
sphere
Default Only labour factors are 
mobile across sectors 
and have fixed wages 
and unemployment.
  Prices are market-
clearing
  Quantity adjustment Savings-driven  Flexible public savings Single period without role 
for expectations
Fargeix and Sadoulet 
(1994)
The labor wages adjust 
partially through wage 
curves. 
Default Currency, deposits, loans, 
bonds, foreign currency held by 
Central Bank and households, 
and Equity are present
The interest rate 
equilibrates the market
Default Fixed vs. flexible 
exchange rate regimes
The current account, the 
capital account (via 
endogenous capital flight) 
and the overall result of 
the balance of payments 
(in the fixed exchange 
regime case) are 
endogenous.
Multi-period, adaptive 
expectations
Money emission leads to 
inflation and real wage fall, lifting 
labor use and output. A working 
capital channel is present
Yeldan (1997) Default Prices are set as markups 
over variable costs, and 
product market equilibria 
are achieved via quantity 
adjustment. The overall 
price level clears the 
money market. 
There are domestic and foreign 
currency, public and private 
bonds and saving deposits. The 
interest rate equilibrates banks 
sources and uses of funds  
Default Default Flexible The balance of payments 
is in equilibrium. 
Exogenous limited 
borrowing abroad by 
private and public sectors 
determine the capital 
account balance and, 
with a change in sign, the 
current account balance
Default Money emission leads to 
inflation and real wage fall, lifting 
labor use and output.
Vos (1997) for Philipines The labor wages adjust 
partially through wage 
curves. 
"Fix-flex prices": Mark-
up pricing and quantity 
adjustment in some 
sectors, price adjustment 
in others
A system of supply-led finance 
(credit rationing) with fixed 
nominal returns and perfectly 
elastic liability demand 
Default Default Fixed Capital flows are 
exogenous and exports 
are derived from CET 
functions. The balance of 
payments is equilibrates 
via adjustment of 
imports.
Multiperiod Capital inflows - which are 
exogenous - boost investment if 
binding.
Adam & Bevan asset 
market model (1998)
The wages are flexible. 
Only labour is mobile. 
Default  Currency holdings, deposits in 
domestic banks in local 
currency, deposits abroad, 
equity, bonds, loans, 
international reserves and 
required reserves are present.
As Lewis (1992) Default Flexible The foreign savings are 
exogenous 
Multi-period With full employment, financial 
decisions - e.g. public deficit 
bond-financed vs. money-
financed - may affect output 
composition 
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 Table 2-1 Macro FCGE Models (cont.) 
 
Model Factors closures Products closures Asset markets and their closures Loanable funds market 
("Saving-Investment") 
closure
Fiscal closure RoW closure 1: 
exchange rate regime 
RoW closure 2: balance 
of payments
Intertemporal equilibrium Core links from financial to real 
sphere
Default Only labour factors are 
mobile across sectors 
and have fixed wages 
and unemployment.
  Prices are market-
clearing
  Quantity adjustment Savings-driven  Flexible public savings Single period without role 
for expectations
Thissen (2000) The labor wages adjust 
partially through wage 
curves. 
Default  Currency holdings, deposits in 
domestic banks in local and 
foreign currency, deposits 
abroad, equity, bonds, loans, 
international reserves, 
rediscounts, required reserves 
and excess reserves are present. 
All asset returns are determined 
with independence of market 
clearing, e.g. the interest rate on 
bonds follow a uniform rate of 
variation path.  
The investment follows a 
partial adjustment model. 
Savings are provided by 
households - as a 
function of their income 
and net wealth, the 
governemnt, and non-
residents. There is not a 
single variable which 
adjusts to equilibrate 
savings and investments. 
Default Fixed Endogenous current 
account balance and 
exogenous capital flows - 
reflecting limited access 
to foreign borrowing -
determine an endogenous 
balance of payments 
result.  
Multi-period, averaging 
adaptive and rational 
expectations 
The interest rate affects real 
investment 
Naastepad  (2002) The labor wage is price-
indexed. 
Fix-flex prices as in Vos 
(1997)
Loans, deposits, rediscounts, 
bonds, and required reserves 
are present. Asset returns are 
determined by regulation, with 
the financial system being supply-
led as in Vos (1997)
An ex-post investment 
function has a roof given 
by the available savings. 
Default Fixed As in Thissen (2000)  Default The production function is 
Leontief and includes working 
capital.  
IMMPA (2003) The labor market is 
segmented. In a segment, 
labor wages are price-
indexed. In another, they 
move along wage curves. 
Land is fully employed 
and immobile across 
agricultural activities.
Default Currency, deposits (in local and 
foreign currency), bonds (in 
middle-income country version) 
and deposits abroad - among 
other assets - are present. The 
public bonds market has a 
market-clearing price. The 
interest rates on deposits and 
loans are linked to the rate on 
Central Bank rediscounts.
Savings depend on the 
interest rate, household 
income and other 
variables. Investment 
depends on the return on 
capital and a flexible 
accelerator effect. There 
is not a single variable 
which adjusts to 
equilibrate savings and 
investments. 
Public transfers to 
households adjust to 
meet a fiscal deficit 
target.
Fixed, flexible or 
administered 
The banks can borrow 
abroad without limit until 
they close their gap 
between sources and 
uses of funds. As a 
consequence, the overall 
balance of payments may 
end in disequilibrium.
Adaptive expectations, 
multiperiod
When the Central Bank reduces 
the rediscount rate, the interest 
rates and therefore the cost of 
working capital go down. This 
reduces the effective cost of 
labor and leads the employment 
level and production to raise. 
Agenor and Montiel 
(2008) - Version with 
rigid labor real wage
The labor wage is fixed in 
real terms.  
Default Currency holdings in local and 
foreign currency, deposits in 
domestic banks in local and 
foreign currency, deposits 
abroad, bonds, loans, 
international reserves, 
rediscounts, and required 
reserves are present. Banks 
supply of liquidity to firms is 
perfectly elastic at the prevailing 
lending rate.
Default A fiscal institution is 
absent
Fixed or flexible Residents are allowed to 
hold assets abroad  - in 
an exogenous amount -, 
while non-residents are 
not allowed to hold 
domestic assets
Default Same as IMMPA (2003)
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Chapter 3. Design of a set of nested CGE models for a typical
middle-income country
3.1 Introduction
Having identified the main transmission channels linking the last wave of
globalisation with growth and inequality in developing countries and sur-
veyed macro financial CGE models, I will next describe the modelling
approach I take. The modelling strategy has the following aims:
1. Push the frontier of CGE modelling by including money as a substi-
tutable factor in the production function, following the tradition of Fried-
man (1969).
2. Contribute to the existing debate over the economic significance of in-
cluding the financial sphere in CGE models.
3. Help understand the structural adjustment effects of trade and capital
account liberalisation in a sytlised middle-income country, with special
emphasis on the effects on growth and income inequality.
3.2 Money in the production function
Departing from a real CGE model characterized by the absence of strong
wage rigidities and an activity level essentially locked by the availability of
real factors, I intend to reflect that not only the availability of real factors,
but also that of money matters in the determination of the activity level. For
this, I include a transmission channel from the financial to the real sphere
in the tradition of ’money in the production function’ started by Levhari
and Patinkin (1968). Specifically, I include (endogenous) working capital
in real terms as a substitutable factor in the (CES) production function,
which allows to free real factors for the production of commodities proper,
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via allowing for greater specialization and exchange (Levhari and Patinkin,
p. 737). In turn, this affects the efficiency with which real factors are used
in economic activities and, as a result, the overall supply of output, the
structure of production and the return for working capital (the interest rate
on bank loans). A conventional “cash-in-advance” approach could have
allowed for effects on the activity level when applied to the demand of
intermediate goods (used in fix proportion with value added), but it would
not have captured in a structural form that it allows to free real factors for
the production of commodities proper.
As Milton Friedman (1969) argued, the money supply is not necessarily
neutral in the short run: “the separation of the act of sale from the act of
purchase (provides money with a) fundamental productive function” (p.3),
such that “() real cash balances are at least in part a factor of production”
(p.14). Friedman illustrated his point in the following way: “a retailer can
economize on his average cash balances by hiring an errand boy to go to
the bank on the corner to get change for large bills tendered by customers.
When it costs ten cents per dollar per year to hold an extra dollar of cash,
there will be a greater incentive to hire the errand boy, that is, to substitute
other productive resources for cash. This will mean both a reduction in the
real flow of services from the given productive resources and a change in
the structure of production, since different productive activities may differ
in cash-intensity, just as they differ in labour- or land- intensity” (p.14).
This is not captured in existent FCGE models where either: 1) working
capital is absent (e.g. Thissen 2000); 2) working capital is not included in
the production function but affects the effective cost of the real factors (e.g.
IMMPA model); 3) working capital acts as a constraint to hire real pro-
duction factors which are assumed to be strictly complements of working
capital (via a Leontief function) - e.g. Decaluwe et al (1994), Naastepad
(2002). This chapter seeks to fill this gap.
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3.3 Nested modeling
To contribute to the existing debate over the economic significance of in-
cluding the financial sphere in CGE models that Christopher Adam and
David Bevan (1998) describe and participate in, and as in that paper, I start
from a conventional non-financial CGE model and subsequently incorpo-
rate into extended models the financial sphere and its relevance for the real
sphere of the economy.
I begin with the IFPRI Standard Model, a stylised non-financial CGE model
targeted to a developing country, with a neoclassical core that captures the
structural adjustment effects of liberalisation in a conventional way. As
shown in Figure 3-1, the nested models I build are denominated real model
(R), real financial model (RF) and real financial augmented model (RFA).
The models are nested in the sense that the latter ones include the former
ones but endogeneise additional variables and include additional equations.
The real model is a straightforward extension of the IFPRI Standard model;
the real financial model essentially captures the financial assets and liabil-
ities present in the economy; and the real financial augmented model in-
cludes money in the production function - in the lines explained above. The
last model includes a “Short-Run” version (RFAS) that captures additional
short-run rigidities in the economy, allowing financial and real shocks to
hit employment and activity levels harder.
The real model includes skilled labour, unskilled labour and physical cap-
ital. There are three straightforward departures from the IFPRI Standard
Model: 1) skilled labour and physical capital have a relatively low sub-
stitution elasticity, which helps to shape the change in primary income
distribution as observed in the last globalisation wave for middle-income
countries (Tr. Channel G4); 2) there is imperfect mobility between (for-
mal and informal) segments of the labour market; 3) different regions with
which the country trades are separated out, allowing for different traded
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Figure 3-1: Nested Models
Money in the Production Function
Financial Sphere
IFPRI Standard Model + Real Extensions
Real Model
Real Financial Model
Real Financial Augmented Model
output varieties, prices, and tax rates.
The financial extension mainly accounts for a set of financial assets and li-
abilities with the consistency between the stocks and the flows in the econ-
omy that was remarked by Tobin (1969). The purpose is to try to capture
in a stylised way an essential aspect of the economic process, improving
our understanding of it. The financial markets are subject to market fail-
ures (Tr. Channel G2), but with asset portfolios determined as a choice
coming from utility theory - as in Adam and Bevan (1998) and Naastepad
(2002) -. The model treatment of expectations is very simple, as in most
FCGE models. External capital flows are allowed to partly hit the current
account balance that the country can afford (particularly, the trade balance)
and partly to result in the build-up of Central Bank’s foreign reserves and
domestic monetary expansion. However, the working capital channel is
absent in this model. A wide variety of macroeconomic policy instruments
is present, including different tax rates, government expenditures, deficit
monetisation, rediscount levels and rediscount rates, and bank required re-
serve ratios, but in this model the production sphere of the model is essen-
tially unaffected by the monetary policy instruments, given the absence of
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the working capital channel.
The real financial augmented (RFA) model incorporates the working cap-
ital channel, including money in the production function and specifying a
market for working capital that determines the interest rate on bank loans.
Given that domestic financial conditions are linked to exogenous external
capital flows, the model captures the strong influence that these can have
on the activity level, whereas other models (e.g. IMMPA) assume that
the country (via the banking sector) can borrow any amount from world
capital markets at the prevailing interest rate. In the short-run version of
this model, the perceived existence of capital vintages and nominal wage
rigidity in the formal labour markets reinforce this link.
The final model captures the transmission channels identified in the glob-
alization debate. The traditional transmission channels from foreign prices
to factor allocation and factor income distribution - G1, G3 and G5 - identi-
fied in Chapter 1 is captured. Factor unemployment and rigidities in asset
returns reflect the presence of market institutions, solving disequilibria by
changing quantities rather than prices - channel G6. Segmentation in the
markets for factors, goods, and financial and physical assets illustrate the
presence of other market failures - channel G2. The causal chain from
capital inflows (allowed by capital account liberalisation) to the domestic
interest rate and in turn to physical investment reflects G7. Finally, the es-
pecially low elasticity of factor substitution between physical capital and
skilled workers leads physical investments to bias labour demand in favour
of the skilled workers, capturing G4.
Three main reasons preclude the final model from being characterized by
the classical dichotomy between the real and the financial spheres:
1. A working capital transmission channel, by which increases in the mon-
etary base in real terms allow banks to increase their real supply of working
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capital to firms, reducing its cost and allowing firms in turn to increase their
output (with an upper bound).
2. The presence of nominal wage rigidities in the formal labour market
segments, by which the changes in the domestic price level generated by
capital account movements translate into changes in real wages, labour de-
mand, and the levels of factor use and output.
3. The effect of capital flows on the composition of aggregate demand via
i) their effect on the value of the trade balance that the country can finance;
ii) their effect on the financial cost of physical investment and the physical
investment demand.
3.4 The actors
The disaggregation of sectors of activity, commodities, production factors,
representative households, the rest of the world and the financial sector
mainly seeks to frame in a stylised way the causal chains by which the last
wave of globalisation affected the level of activity and income distribution
of middle-income countries. Economic activity is disaggregated into pri-
mary, industrial, construction, private services and public services sectors,
perceived as reflecting different pricing, distribution rules, tradability and
tax treatment. The set of commodities coincides with the set of activities
but, as usual in the CGE literature, the relationship between activities and
commodities is not bi-univocal: an activity is allowed to produce more than
one commodity, and a commodity can be produced by more than one ac-
tivity. Real factors are classified as capital and labour, with labour further
classified according to skills and formality. The model includes four real
factors: formal skilled, formal unskilled, informal unskilled and physical
capital. As in the IMMPA model, a high perceived disutility of work or
fear of an adverse signalling effect on future employers dissuades skilled
workers from looking for a job or working in the informal sector.
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The model includes three representative household groups (RHG): skilled
wage recipients, unskilled wage recipients, and capitalists. In order to take
account of the different evolution of taxes for different trading partners and
(probably) different traded commodity varieties, the world is disentangled
into different regions for trade. The domestic financial sector is divided
into commercial banks and the central bank. The financial assets available
to domestic actors - which include public bonds, equity, deposits in local
and foreign currency and deposits abroad - and the relative simplicity of the
financial system here represented, makes the stylised final model applica-
ble only to middle-income countries. As with any of the surveyed models,
the models built here allow us to track changes in household income distri-
bution at a rather aggregate level - i.e. that allowed by the disaggregation
of households into representative household groups.
3.5 The closures and the numeraire
The models are closed by fixing some exogenous variables in the sys-
tem (Adelman and Robinson 1978; Taylor and Lysy 1979). Savings are
investment-driven, with households’ marginal propensity to save varying
in order to make the overall savings flow (determined by households, firms,
public and foreign sectors) consistent with the overall investment value
(determined in turn with a Tobin’s Q type investment function). The public
sector has exogenous tax rates and real expenditures (essentially outcomes
of policy decisions), with its savings endogenously determined. Foreign
savings become locked once the capital flow in the balance of payments is
determined.
In the real model, the classical dichotomy between real and nominal vari-
ables prevails. With the number of domestic currency units per unit of for-
eign currency being fixed (fixed nominal exchange rate) and the price of
imported goods in foreign currency being also fixed due to the small coun-
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try assumption, the domestic currency price of imported goods becomes
locked and the numeraire is provided by the bundle of imported goods.
With the price of exports being also fixed (small country assumption), the
barter terms of trade become fixed. The flexibility of the real exchange rate
is achieved through changes in the prices of non-traded goods.
In the real-financial models, the numeraire is provided by local currency.
As illustrated in Chapter 2, where I reviewed a set of real-financial models,
the determination of the domestic price level is done differently by differ-
ent authors. Jeffrey Lewis states that in the market for currency of the
real-financial model he builds, the major equilibrating mechanism is given
by changes in the price level (Lewis, 1992, p.150). In Richard Agenor
and Peter Montiel (2008), the nominal price level assures the equilibrium
of the goods market. And in Rob Vos (1997), the nominal price level is
generated reflecting a set of adjustment mechanisms with roles for mark-
up pricing, world market prices, and supply constrains (Vos 1997, p.335).
In the real-financial models I present, the prices of domestic goods are
generated reflecting: i) the nominal anchor, ii) the small country assump-
tion, iii) the functional relationship between the real exchange rate and the
trade balance, and iv) a fixed relation between the current and the capi-
tal account balances. To reflect a fixed exchange rate regime, the nominal
exchange rate is held fixed and the international reserves held by the Cen-
tral Bank are allowed to vary in order to equilibrate the foreign exchange
market.1The nominal price level, i.e. an average of the (nominal) prices
of domestic and import goods, varies through changes in the prices of do-
mestic goods to generate a given value for the trade and current account
balances consistent with the capital account balance. This role of the nom-
inal price level prevents it from having the role of equilibrating the money
market.2 In any case, a capital inflow is expected to lead to a domestic
1A float could be captured by holding the international reserves of the Central Bank fixed and solving
the equilibrium condition of the foreign exchange market for the nominal exchange rate, as done in Richard
Agenor and Peter Montiel (2008)
2The money market reaches equilibrium with quantity adjustment: the part of the money supply which
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price level increase, a result that we would also get in a qualitative way in
a real-financial model where a capital inflow translates into a money sup-
ply increase, which in turn translates into an increase in aggregate demand
and hence in the domestic price level.
Equilibria in the commodity markets are achieved via Walrasian price ad-
justments. Equilibria in the informal labour market and in the sector-
specific markets for sunk physical capital are determined via full wage-
adjustment, while equilibria in the markets of formal workers are reached
via partial wage-adjustment with unemployment. The rate of returns on
financial assets are endogenous, except for those determined via a small
country assumption in financial markets (the risk-free world interest rate)
and a policy-determined rate (the rediscounts rate).
3.6 Specification of the nested models
Next, I describe the full specification of the models I build, organising the
explanation in relevant blocks, and referring to the surveyed models as the
description evolves. The model equations can also be seen in Appendix II,
together with a complete description of their elements.
3.6.1 Real Model
Prices of domestic goods, imports and exports. As in the 1-2-3 model of Shan-
tayanan Devarajan, Jeffrey Lewis and Sherman Robinson (1990), domestic
prices are partially insulated from changes in foreign prices, by assuming
imperfect substitutability among commodities of different origins and des-
tinations. Outputs used domestically comprise goods produced domesti-
cally and imports, while outputs produced domestically can be used do-
is not demanded by households is residually demanded by the banks in the form of reserves. This is a
critical mechanism in the link from foreign capital inflows to the expansion of working capital and output
which I am intending to capture as a stylized fact of the Argentinean experience with the Currency Board.
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mestically or exported. The prices of domestic goods (PDc) are endoge-
nous and market-clearing, with excess demand generating rises and ex-
cess supply generating falls until market equilibrium is re-established. The
sector-specific demand for goods are given by the sum of intermediate con-
sumption, final private consumption, investment and public consumption.
QQc =∑
a
QINTc,a+∑
h
QHc,h+QIc+QGCc (1)
Domestic currency-denominated regional import prices, as perceived by
purchasers, are calculated as exogenous regional CIF dollar-denominated
import prices (small country assumption) plus regional ad-valorem import
tariffs times the nominal exchange rate (fixed reflecting a fixed exchange
regime).
PMRc,r = pwmrc,r · (1+ tmrc,r) · exr c ∈CM (2)
Domestic currency-denominated regional export prices as perceived by
producers are analogously calculated as exogenous dollar-denominated FOB
world export prices, minus ad-valorem export taxes, times the nominal ex-
change rate.
PERc,r = pwerc,r · (1− terc,r) · exr c ∈CE (3)
The world-wide import (export) price is an average of the regional import
(export) prices, with weights given by import (export) quantities.
PMc ·QMc =∑
r
PMRc,r ·QMRc,r c ∈CM (4)
PEc ·QEc =∑
r
PERc,r ·QERc,r c ∈CE (5)
Other prices. As in the IFPRI Standard Model, the sector-level prices of
composite goods are determined so as to make the sector-level value of
absorption consistent with the sum of the values of domestic spending on
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domestic output and imports.
PQc ·QQc = PDc ·QDc+PMc ·QMc (6)
The producer prices are calculated such that the value of production is
consistent with the sum of the values of domestic spending on domestic
output and exports.
PXc ·QXc = PDc ·QDc+PEc ·QEc (7)
The price obtained by each producer for his gross output is a weighted
average of the prices of the commodities produced by him, weighted by
the shares of the goods in his production.
PAa =∑
c
θa,c ·PXACa,c (8)
The value-added prices are determined such that payments for value-added
and intermediate consumption fully exhaust the revenues for each pro-
ducer.
PAa ·QAa = PVAa ·QVAa+PINTAa ·QINTAa (9)
The CPI, the price of capital (at replacement cost) and the price of inter-
mediate aggregates are differently weighted averages of composite good
prices: the consumer price index (CPI) is weighted by using the commod-
ity value shares in overall final consumption, the price of capital for the
private sector is weighted by the commodity value shares in overall physi-
cal private investment, and the price of intermediate aggregates is weighted
by the intermediate input coefficients.
CPI =∑
c
wcpic ·PQc (10)
PK =∑
c
capcompc ·PQc (11)
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PINTAa =∑
c
icac,a ·PQc (12)
The GDP deflator simply measures the ratio between domestic value-added
calculated at current and base-year value added prices.
GDPDEFL=
∑aPVAa ·QVAa
∑aPVA0a ·QVAa
(13)
Production. Real GDP is determined by summing the value-added of each
sector at base-year prices.
RGDP=∑
a
PVA0a ·QVAa (14)
The quantity produced of each commodity (c) by each sector (a) is given
by the sector’s yield of the commodity, times its activity level, allowing
single sectors to produce more than one commodity.
QXACa,c = θac ·QAa (15)
The aggregate production of each commodity is defined as a CES aggre-
gate of the output level of the different activities producing the commodity.
QXc = αacc ·∑
a
(δaca,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c
a,c )
−1
ρacc (16)
The optimal quantity produced by each activity (QXACa,c) is positively
related to the overall commodity price and inversely related to the activity-
specific commodity price.
PXACa,c = PXc ·QXc ·∑
a′
(δaca′,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c
a′,c )
−1 ·δaca,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c −1
a,c (17)
As illustrated in Figure 3-2, the activity level (gross production value) in
each sector is generated by a nested production function that, at the top,
uses value added and a set of intermediate inputs in fixed proportions.
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Figure 3-2: The Production Function in the Real Model
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QVAa = ivaa ·QAa (18)
QINTAa = intaa ·QAa (19)
QINTc,a = icac,a ·QINTAa (20)
Value added, in turn, is a CES function of an aggregate of physical capital
and skilled labour (FA1), informal unskilled workers and formal unskilled
workers.
QVAa = αvaa · (∑
f a
δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a,a )
− 1ρvaa f a= {FA1, IU,FU} (21)
Physical capital and skilled labour in each activity are aggregated through
a CES function. The substitution elasticity among factors in the aggregate
is relatively low, reflecting the perception that physical capital tended to
subtitute unskilled rather than skilled labour during the last globalization
wave in middle-income countries.
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QFFA1,a = α
g
FA1,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA1,a f = FS,K (22)
Trade. For non-tradable commodities, absorption coincides with the do-
mestic production and the domestic production for domestic use.
QQc = QXc = QDc c ∈ (CMN∩CEN) (23)
For tradable commodities (primary and industrial), absorption is a CES
aggregate of imperfectly substitutable imported and domestic commodities
(i.e. an Armington function).
QQc = αqc ·
(
δqc ·QM−ρ
q
c
c +(1−δqc) ·QD−ρ
q
c
c
)− 1
ρqc c ∈ (CM∩CD)
(24)
with the optimal mix achieved through expenditure minimisation under
perfect competition such that a fall in the relative price of imports makes
the imported share of absorption rise in real terms.
QMc
QDc
=
(
PDc
PMc
· δ
q
c
1−δqc
) 1
1+ρqc
c ∈ (CM∩CD) (25)
Tradable goods produced domestically are allocated either to exports or
to domestic sales, with imperfect transformability between them captured
through a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function.
QXc = αtc ·
(
δtc ·QEρ
t
c
c +(1−δtc) ·QDρ
t
c
c
) 1
ρtc c ∈ (CE ∩CD) (26)
and the exported share of production increasing in real terms with the rel-
ative price of exports.
QEc
QDc
=
(
PEc
PDc
· 1−δ
t
c
δtc
) 1
ρtc−1
c ∈ (CE ∩CD) (27)
Imperfect substitutability (transformability) between imports from (exports
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to) different regions is also assumed, deriving optimal mixes in analogous
ways:
QMRc,r = QMc · [PMRc,r · (α
m
c )
ρmc
PMc ·δmc,r
]
− 1ρmc +1 c ∈CM (28)
QERc,r = QEc · [ PERc,rPEc ·δec,r · (αec)ρec
]
1
ρec−1 c ∈CE (29)
Factor markets. The factor demands of each sector are derived from firms’
short-run profit maximisation under perfect competition both at the levels
of aggregates and individual factors:
W f a ·WDISTf a,a =PVAa · (1− tvaa) ·QVAa ·∑
f a′
(δvaf a′,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a′,a )
−1 (30)
·δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a −1
f a,a f a= {FA1, IU,FU}
W f ·WDISTf ,a =∑
FA1
(WFA1 ·WDISTFA1,a ·QFFA1,a) ·∑
f ′
(δgf ′,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ′,a )
−1
(31)
·δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a−1
f ,a f = FS,K
The sector-specific supply of physical capital results from the accumu-
lation of excesses of past gross physical investments over depreciations.
Once installed in a sector, it is immobile and fully utilised, so that sector-
specific equilibria are reached via adjustment of the sector-specific wage
distorsions, using equation (31).
QKa,t = (1−δk) ·QKa,t−1+∆QKa,t−1 (32)
QFFK,a =CAPUT a ·QKa (33)
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The supplies of skilled and unskilled workers are exogenous. As in IMMPA,
skilled workers prefer remaining openly unemployed in the formal sec-
tor to getting a job in the informal one, due to reasons that include their
concern with possible adverse signalling effects associated with informal
work. Unskilled workers, besides, have imperfect mobility between the
formal and the informal segment of the labour market, in the spirit of Har-
ris and Todaro’s (1970) migration model. During each period a fraction of
the unskilled workers moves into or out of the formal segment if there is
an expected wage gain in doing so, with the expected wage in the formal
segment given by the average wage WFLFU times the probability of find-
ing a job (proxied by 1−URFLFU ), and the expected wage in the informal
segment proxied by the average wage WFLIU .
QFSFLUN = QFSFLFU +QFSFLIU (34)
QFSFLFU,t−QFSFLFU,t−1
QFSFLIU,t
= εmigw · log
(1−URFLFU,t) ·WFLFU,t
WFLIU,t
+ γmigw
(35)
The formal (skilled and unskilled) labour market segments are subject to
unemployment, with wages that adjust only partially through real wage
curves (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994), and a complementary slackness
condition included to assure the non-negativity of unemployment rates.
(UR f l f ≥ 0).
(1−UR f ) ·QFS f =∑
a
QFf ,a f ∈ FLF (36)
W f
CPI
= γwf · (UR f −nur)ε
w
f f ∈ FLF (37)
In the informal component of the labour market, equilibrium is reached
via variation in the economy-wide undistorted wage (WFLIU), using the
following equation:
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QFSFLIU =∑
a
QFFLIU,a (38)
The income of each factor can now be determined by summing the (after-
tax) incomes earned in each sector, in turn given by an overall (undistorted)
wage, times a sector-specific distortion factor, times the quantity of factor
used. The distortions are fixed for labour factors - allowing the model to
reflect initial wage differentials observed across sectors, and are flexible in
the case of physical capital, allowing sector-specific demands for physical
capital to meet sector-specific supplies.
YFf =∑
a
W f ·WDISTf ,a ·QFf ,a (39)
The ratio between factor income and the total use of each factor allows us
to find average wages per unit of factor use.
WAV f =
YFf
∑aQF( f ,a)
(40)
Institutions: income, expenditure, and savings.
Households. Representative households differ in their income sources. The
skilled (unskilled) RHG has skilled (unskilled) labour income and an in-
terest flow received from deposits at the domestic bank, net of interest on
loans. The unskilled one also receives public transfers. The capitalist RHG
gets dividends from holding shares in domestic firms and interest not only
on deposits at domestic banks, but also on holdings of public bonds and de-
posits abroad, net of interest on loans. All interest flows come from multi-
plying a fixed relevant rate of return by a relevant asset/liability value, thus
being essentially fixed and analogous to fixed transfers among economic
agents. To keep the focus on the real sphere, the determination of these
flows is explained in Section 2 (Real Financial Model).
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YHS =∑
f l
(shh fS, f l · (1− t f f l) ·YFf l)+FINT S,B−FINTB,S (41)
YHU =∑
f l
(shh fU, f l ·(1−t f f l)·YFf l)+FINTU,B−FINTB,U+TRNSFRU,G
(42)
YHC =∑
e
DIVDe+ ∑
n=B,G,R
FINTC,n−FINTB,C (43)
Households save a share of their income (their propensity to save) which
adjusts proportionately so that overall savings (of households, firms, public
and foreign sectors) finance overall planned investment in the economy.
SAVh = mpsh ·MPSADJ ·YHh (44)
The remaining income is spent over available goods using a Linear Expen-
diture System (LES) derivable from the maximisation of a Stone-Geary
utility function.
EHh = YHh−SAVh (45)
PQc ·QHc,h = PQc · γmc,h+βmc,h · (EHh−∑
c′
(PQc′ · γmc′,h)) (46)
Enterprises. Before-tax firm profits are composed of physical capital in-
come and interest flows received from banks on their deposits, minus in-
terest flows paid to banks on their loans. In the case of the private service
sector, bank profits - in turn determined as the difference between interest
earned and paid by the bank - are summed as a transfer from the bank to
the private services sector.
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PROFBTe=∑
a
WFK ·WDISTFK,a ·QFFK,a+FINT e,B−FINTB,e+TRNSFRe,B
(47)
TRNSFRES,B = PROFBTB (48)
PROFBTB =∑
n
(FINTB,n−FINT n,B) (49)
To find after-tax profits, a fixed fraction is deducted to pay for profit tax -
if profits are positive - and exogenous public transfers are added.
PROFATe = min((1− t pre) ·PROFBTe,PROFBTe)+TRNSFRe,G (50)
To the extent that after-tax firm profits are positive, an exogenous fraction
of them (the “pay-out ratio”) is used for dividend payments. The rest is
saved by the firm.
DIVTe = max(0,shrpe ·PROFATe) (51)
SAVe = PROFATe−DIVTe (52)
The fractions of dividends paid to residents and non-residents are deter-
mined by their (exogenous) share in the firms’ equity.
DIVDe = SHEQDe ·DIVTe (53)
DIVEe = (1−SHEQDe) ·DIVTe (54)
Government. The government obtains its income from ad-valorem taxes
on value added, the labour formal wage bills, the value of traded goods
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and firms’ profits, and from transfer of the interest earned by the Central
Bank. The value-added tax is modelled as an activity tax. Banks’ profits
are indirectly taxed as their profits are transferred to the private services
sector, whose profits are taxed.
YG=∑
a
tvaa ·PVAa ·QVAa+ ∑
f∈ f l f
t f f ·YFf (55)
+∑
c,r
tmrc,r · pwmrc,r · exr ·QMRc,r+∑
c,r
terc,r · pwerc,r · exr ·QERc,r
+∑
e
max(0, t pre ·PROFBTe)+TRNSFRG,CB
TRNSFRG,CB = PROFBTCB (56)
There are two main sources of profits for the Central Bank: interest on
rediscounts given to commercial banks and interest on the international
reserves it holds abroad.
PROFBTCB = FINTCB,B+FINTCB,R (57)
Public current expenditures include public consumption as well as public
transfers and interest payments on the public debt.
EG=∑
c
PQc ·QGCc+∑
n
TRNSFRn,G+∑
n
FINT b,G b= {C,R,B,CB}
(58)
The difference between the public sector income and its current expendi-
tures determines public savings.
SAVG = YG−EG (59)
Non-residents. Foreign savings are determined as non-residents’ income
net of their expenditures, and more specifically by the sum of domestic
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net imports (valued at world prices) plus dividends, net interests and net
transfers paid to non-residents. They are denominated in local currency
for consistency with the savings of other actors.
SAVR =exr ·∑
c,r
(pwmrc,r ·QMRc,r− pwerc,r ·QERc,r) (60)
+∑
e
DIVEe+∑
n
FINTR,n−∑
n
FINT n,R
+∑
n
(TRNSFRR,n−TRNSFRn,R)
Savings and investments. Savings are generated by households, firms, the
public sector (usually negative) and the rest of the world.
SAVTOT =∑
h
SAVh+∑
e
SAVe+SAVG+SAVR (61)
Sector-specific firms’ gross physical investments by sector of destination
follow Tobin’s Q type functions that depend on the ratio between the sector
remuneration for physical capital and the financial unitary cost of physical
capital - a cost that is included in Lewis’ (1992) model of the investment
function.
∆QKa = dqkna · [WFK ·WDISTFK,aRL ·PK ]
εIq a ∈ APRI (62)
It is converted into investments by sector of origin by multiplying its sum
by sector-specific capital coefficients, and summing to it the public invest-
ments by sector of origin. The disaggregation of public investments by
sector of origin reflects that the sector distribution of public investment is
a policy tool.
QIc = capcompc ·∑
a
∆QKa+qgic (63)
The values of the sector-specific private investements by sector of origin
come from multiplying the associated quantities by the price of capital
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relevant to the private activities.
VIa = PK ·∆QKa a ∈ apri (64)
For the public sector, the quantities invested are separated out among sec-
tors, and multiplied by the sector-specific commodity prices.
VIAG =∑
c
PQc ·qgic (65)
The value of the total investment for the economy is given by the sum of
the investments by sector of destination.
VIT =∑
a
VIa (66)
The total value of domestic savings is identical to that of investments, and
a “Walras” term is added to the original identity to check the consistency
between the total income flow and the total expenditure flow in the model.
VIT = SAVTOT +WALRAS (67)
3.6.2 Real Financial Model
Financial stock holdings are represented in the assets-liabilities matrix in
Figure 3-3 and in actor-specific financial balance sheets (Appendix III), as
in IMMPA. The cells inside the matrix have financial stock values, with the
asset holder in the column and the liability holder in the row. The financial
net wealth of each institution - accumulated through past and present sav-
ings excess over physical investment - is given by the sum of the values in
its column minus the sum of the values in its row. The sum of the financial
wealth of all the institutions is necessarily zero.
Explicit portfolio balance equations, equalling the value of assets to that
of liabilities plus net financial wealth for individual agents, are present in
the model for households, firms, banks and the Central Bank, and can be
calculated for the public sector and non-residents.
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Figure 3-3: Matrix of Financial Assets and Liabilities
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Household liabilities consist of bank loans. Skilled and unskilled house-
holds allocate their assets in cash holdings (for transaction purposes) and
domestic bank deposits. Capitalist households are assumed not to face in-
formational difficulties and transaction costs to enter into other financial
markets (as in IMMPA), and also hold other assets i.e. equity in private
firms, bonds, dollar-denominated deposits in domestic banks and deposits
abroad. Currency holdings are assumed to be fixed, to simplify the work-
ings of the money multiplier by which monetary base changes affect work-
ing capital and other bank loans.
CURRh+DEPh = LOANh+NFWh h= S,U (68)
CURRC+DEPC+ exr ·DEPDC+AHC = LOANC+NFWC (69)
Firms’ financial assets consist of deposits in domestic banks in local cur-
rency, and their liabilities are given by the sum of bank loans and equity -
a financial asset for the share holders.
DEPe = LOANe+EQTe+NFWe (70)
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Banks’ assets consist of loans, bonds and deposits abroad (amalgamated
into AB) and required reserves. Their liabilities are given by the sum of
deposits (in local currency and dollars) and rediscounts received from the
Central Bank. Given that banks transfer their profits to the private services
sector, their savings are null and their net financial wealth constant.
AB+REQRES=∑
dd
DEPdd+exr ·DEPDC+RED+NFWB dd= h∪e∪{R}
(71)
The assets of the Central Bank are given by the local currency value of
the country’s international reserves, the value of public bonds held by it
coming from past and present deficit monetisations, and the rediscount
credits given to domestic banks. Its liability is the monetary base held by
households and by banks - the latter in the form of required reserves. Given
that the Central Bank transfers its profits to the (Central) Government, its
savings are null and its net financial wealth is constant.
exr · INTRES+PBOND ·BONDCB+RED=MB+NFWCB (72)
∑
h
CURRh+REQRES=MB (73)
Households assets demand. Since currency held by households is exoge-
nous, skilled and unskilled households’ deposits are determined as a resid-
ual from their portfolio balance equation. Deposits by capitalist house-
holds are consistent with the stock of required reserves held by the bank-
ing sector, and the allocation into local-currency-denominated deposits and
dollar-denominated deposits follows a fixed proportion for the sake of sim-
plicity.
exr ·DEPDC = k ·DEPC (74)
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The portfolio allocation of capitalist households among bonds, equity and
deposits abroad is then determined by maximising a CES utility function
(as derived in Appendix IV) with arguments being the expected earnings
of the assets, as in Adam and Bevan (1998). This reflects the perception
that agents look at relative returns when deciding portfolio asset shares
and that they are risk averse (they tend to avoid corner solutions). With
the elasticity of substitution on asset earnings εC exceeding one, the share
of each asset rises with its relative return. A set of perceived probability
of defaults pde f on domestic assets (as in IMMPA model) affects their
expected returns.
PBOND ·BONDC =ΘCG ·AHC (75)
EQDe =ΘCe ·AHC (76)
DEPAC =ΘCR ·AHC (77)
ΘCG =
(δCG)
εC · [RB · (1− pde fC,G)]εC−1
QC
(78)
ΘCe =
(δCe )εC · (REe)εC−1
QC
(79)
ΘCR =
(δCR)
εC · [RW · (1− pde fC,R)]εC−1
QC
(80)
QC =(δCG)
εC · [RB · (1− pde fC,G)]εC−1+∑
e
(δCe )
εC · (REe)εC−1 (81)
+(δCR)
εC · [RW · (1− pde fC,R)]εC−1
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The equity demanded by capitalist households and that demanded by non-
residents - the latter determined in (115) - determines the total equity and
the share of residents in the equity of each sector.
EQTe = EQDe+EQEe (82)
SHEQDe =
EQDe
EQTe
(83)
Firms assets demand. Firms allocate their financial assets to domestic bank
deposits, as derived from their portfolio balance.
Rest of the world assets demand. Non-residents hold domestic assets in the
form of deposits in domestic banks, equity and bonds, with the flows that
alter the values of these stocks being exogenous - as shown in the determi-
nation of the capital account of the balance of payments.
Commercial banks assets demand. Banks’ required reserves are defined by
the required reserves ratio times total deposits, both in local and foreign
currency.
REQRES= rr · (∑
dd
DEPdd+exr ·DEPDC) dd = h∪e∪{R} (84)
The rest of the portfolio (AB) is allocated using a CES utility function
analogously to capitalist households.
LOANl =ΘBl ·AB l = h∪ e (85)
PBOND ·BONDB =ΘBG ·AB (86)
exr ·DEPAB =ΘBR ·AB (87)
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ΘBl =
(δBl )
εB ·RLεB−1
QB
(88)
ΘBG =
(δBG)
εB · [RB · (1− pde fB,G)]εB−1
QB
(89)
ΘBR =
(δBR)
εB · [RW · (1− pde fB,R)]εB−1
QB
(90)
QB =∑
l
(δBl )
εB · (RL)εB−1+(δBG)εB · [RB · (1− pde fB,G)]εB−1 (91)
+(δBR)
εB · [RW · (1− pde fB,R)]εB−1
Rates of return. Interest rates are allowed to vary endogenously in the fi-
nancial models. The interest rate on deposits in domestic banks RD is de-
termined with an LM equation that captures transactions demand and liq-
uidity preference and where, as in Lewis (1992), ceteris paribus, increases
in the real stock of money (proxied by the monetary base divided by the
GDP deflator) leads the interest rate to fall, and increases in transactions
(proxied by real GDP) lead it to rise. The interest rate on bank loans RL
is determined by the interest rate on deposits adjusted by the reserves ratio
(exogenously determined by the Central Bank) and an exogenous mark-up
rate. The reserve ratio is included to reflect that, for a given rate on de-
posits, an increase in the reserve ratio needs to be balanced by a higher
rate on loans to keep banks’ profits constant.
log
MB
GDPDEFL
= εmy · log(RGDP)− εmr · log(RD)+ γLM (92)
RL=
RD
1− rr · (1+µ) (93)
The return on bonds RB adjusts to clear the bonds market, and it is assumed
to be paid as a perpetuity.
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BONDS=∑
b
(BONDb) b= {C,R,B,CB} (94)
RB=
1
PBOND
·RB0 (95)
Sector-specific returns on equity REe are determined by the ratio between
after-tax profits (distributed and retained) and equity.
REe =
PROFATe
EQTe
(96)
The interest rate on Central Bank rediscounts RRED is exogenously deter-
mined by the Central Bank, bank reserves in the Central Bank are not re-
munerated (as in IMMPA model), and the return on deposits abroad RW is
exogenously determined in the international financial markets (small coun-
try assumption).
Interest flows. The holdings of financial stocks and relevant rates of return
determine a set of interest flows among the actors in the model. Banks re-
munerate depositors (households, enterprises and non-residents) at the rate
of return on deposits, RD [(97),(98)]. Loan holders (households and enter-
prises) remunerate the banks at the rate of return on loans, RL (99). The
central government remunerates bond holders (capitalist households, non-
residents, banks and the central bank) at the rate of return on bonds, RB
(100). Non-residents remunerate domestic depositors (households, banks
and the Central Bank) at the risk-free world interest rate, RW [(101),(102)].
Finally, the banks remunerate the central bank at the Central Bank redis-
count rate, RRED (103).
FINTdd,B = RD ·DEPdd dd = {S,U}∪ e∪{R} (97)
FINTC,B = RD · (DEPC+ exr ·DEPDC) (98)
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FINTB,l = RL ·LOANl l = h∪ e (99)
FINTb,G = RB ·PBOND ·BONDb b= {C,R,B,CB} (100)
FINTda,R = RW · exr ·DEPAda da= {C,B} (101)
FINTCB,R = RW · exr · INTRES (102)
FINTCB,B = RRED ·RED (103)
Balance of payments. The current account of the balance of payments is
determined as foreign savings, changed in sign and converted into dollars.
The capital account balance is determined as the sum of the value increases
in non-resident holdings of equity in domestic firms, deposits in domestic
banks and domestic bonds, minus the increase in deposits abroad held by
domestic actors (capitalist households and banks). The overall balance of
payments is found by summing the current and capital account balances,
and determines the variation of international reserves held by the Central
Bank.
exr ·CAB=−SAVR (104)
exr ·KAB=∑
e
(∆EQEe)+∆DEPR+∆VBONDR− exr∑
da
∆DEPAda
(105)
∆INTRES=CAB+KAB (106)
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While Lewis (1992) and Yeldan (1997) models assume that the current ac-
count balance exactly mirrors the capital account balance, in this model,
reflecting the perception that capital inflows lead both to a rise in domes-
tic monetisation and to finance deficits in the current account, the current
account superavit (deficit) is assumed to move together with the capital
account deficit (superavit), in a proportion given by a parameter kI, to be
calibrated.
CAB=−kI ·KAB (107)
Updates for financial stocks. The financial stocks are updated using the fi-
nancial flows of the current period without lag. There are updating con-
ditions for households’ net financial wealth - using their savings in (108)
- and enterprises’ net financial wealth (using their excess of savings over
physical investments in (109)) and the value of the public debt - using the
public deficit in (110) -. For banks and the Central Bank, given that they
transfer their profits (to the private services sector and the central govern-
ment, respectively), their savings are null and their net financial wealth is
constant.
∆NFWh,t = SAVh,t (108)
∆NFWe,t = SAVe,t−VIa,t (109)
PBOND ·∆BONDS=∑
c
PQc ·qgic−SAVG (110)
There are also updating conditions for the total quantity of public bonds
(111), the quantity and the value of the bonds held by economic actors
(capitalist households, non-residents, banks and the Central Bank) -in (112)
and (113)-, non-residents’ deposits at domestic banks (114) and their eq-
uity holdings (115), and the deposits abroad by capitalist households and
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banks (116), as well as the Central Bank international reserves (117).
BONDSt = BONDSt−1+∆BONDSt (111)
BONDb,t = BONDb,t−1+∆BONDb,t b= {C,R,B,CB} (112)
∆VBONDb,t =PBONDt ·BONDb,t−PBONDt−1 ·BONDb,t−1 b= {C,R,B,CB}
(113)
DEPR,t = DEPR,t−1+∆DEPR,t (114)
EQEe,t = EQEe,t−1+∆EQEe,t (115)
DEPAda,t = DEPAda,t−1+∆DEPAda,t da= {C,B} (116)
INTRESt = INTRESt−1+∆INTRESt (117)
3.6.3 Real Financial Augmented Model
To allow financial outcomes to affect the efficiency with which real factors
are used in the economy and, as a result, the overall supply of output and
the structure of production, a working capital channel is incorporated along
the lines of Friedman (1969), including working capital as an additional
factor in the formal components of each private activity as shown in Figure
3-4 and reflected in the following equations.
QVAa = αvaa · (∑
f a
δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a,a )
− 1ρvaa f a= {FA1, IU,FA2} (118)
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Figure 3-4: The Production Function in the Real Financial Augmented Model
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QFFA1,a = α
g
FA1,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA1,a f = FS,K,WK1 (119)
QFFA2,a = α
g
FA2,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA2,a f = FU,WK2 (120)
First order conditions concerning factor demands are accordingly adjusted
at the level of factor aggregates and individual factors:
W f a ·WDISTf a,a =PVAa · (1− tvaa) ·QVAa· (121)
∑
f a′
(δvaf a′,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a′,a )
−1 ·δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a −1
f a,a f a= {FA1, IU,FA2}
W f ·WDISTf ,a =∑
f a
(WFA1 ·WDISTFA1,a ·QFFA1,a) · ∑
f ′,FA1
(δgf ′,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ′,a )
−1
(122)
·∑
FA1
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a−1
f ,a ) f = FS,K,WK1
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W f ·WDISTf ,a =∑
f a
(WFA2 ·WDISTFA2,a ·QFFA2,a) · ∑
f ′,FA2
(δgf ′,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a
f ′,a )
−1
(123)
·∑
FA2
(δgf ,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a−1
f ,a ) f = FU,WK2
A market for working capital is specified, allowing working capital to
move across sectors. Its total supply in nominal terms is determined by
banks in (124) as the total loanable funds (AB) of banks, times the sum of
the shares of enterprises derived in (88). It is translated into real terms in
(125) using the GDP deflator.
LOANE =∑
e
ΘBe ·AB (124)
QFSFW =
LOANE
GDPDEFL
(125)
The return per real unit of working capital adjusts until market-clearing is
reached, unless a minimum wage for working capital is reached first, in
which case a halt is put to the productive use of working capital and thus
on its effect on the activity level. This intends to reflect that there is a limit
after which monetary expansions stop raising the activity level.3
(1−URW ) ·QFSFW = ∑
f w,a
QFf w,a f w= {WK1,WK2} (126)
WAVFW =
YFFW
∑ f w,aQFf w,a
f w= {WK1,WK2} (127)
WAVFW ≥ minwwk (128)
The return per real unit of working capital is then translated into a return
per nominal unit of working capital by multiplying it by the GDP deflator.
3In the experiments with the model, I never hit this limit.
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This determines the rate of return on bank loans RL, replacing the LM
equation (92). The functional relationship between RD and RL in (93)
continues to hold, so now RD is determined using (93).
RL=WAVFW ·GDPDEFL (129)
Last, the shares of working capital are used to assign loans across enter-
prises.
LOANe =
∑ f wQFf w,a
QFSFW
·LOANE e= a ∈ apri (130)
Short-run Version. This version of the RFA model seeks to allow for higher
effects of financial shocks on the aggregate supply of goods by reflecting a
higher degree of wage rigidity in the factor markets. In the market for phys-
ical capital, the existence of capital vintages (which should be researched
in an institutional framework) is reflected by imposing a minimum real
wage for physical capital [(131),(132)]. Once this minimum is reached,
the capacity utilization of the physical capital stock is allowed to adjust
downwards (133).
WKRa ·GDPDEFL=WDISTFK,a ·WFK a ∈ apri (131)
WKRa ≥ minwpk a ∈ apri (132)
CAPUTa ≤ 1 a ∈ apri (133)
To add rigidity to the wages of formal workers derivable from nominal
contracts, the wage curve (134) is replaced by a curve on nominal instead
of real wages and the elasticity in the wage curve is significantly reduced
- from 0.1 to 0.01 - letting the model approach the case of nominal wage
rigidity in the formal labour market segments.
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W f = γwf · (UR f −nur)ε
w
f f ∈ FLF (134)
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Chapter 4 Calibration of the parameters of the set 
of nested models 
 
Once the models are specified, their parameters must be assigned. They can be 
econometrically estimated or, as often the case in CGE models, calibrated. As argued by 
Dawkins et al (2001), calibration is conceptually similar to conventional estimation, in 
the sense that both refer to choosing parameter values subject to a goodness of fit 
criterion with respect to data. Calibration can be conceptualised as a special case of 
estimation: estimation in the case of under-identification, where the number of 
parameters to be estimated exceeds the number of observations. Calibration is widely 
used in microeconomic models, has become in recent years a mainstream form of 
empirical investigation in macroeconomics, and is a widely used technique in natural 
and life sciences (Dawkins, Srinivasan, and Whalley 2001). The reason for calibrating 
vis-à-vis estimating the model is to keep the focus on the main causal chains at stake, 
i.e. the modelling aims stated at the start of the preceding chapter. In any case, 
calibration does have a cost: the resulting numerical model lacks a complete and 
consistent econometric formulation which, in turn, precludes the use of the model for 
forecasting, with its results only yielding ―indications of the relative orders of 
magnitude for possible policy (or shock) adjustments in the economy‖ (Dawkins, 
Srinivasan, and Whalley 2001, p.3677). The goal of the analysis becomes to obtain a 
quantitatively informed insight for better understanding of the economic processes at 
stake and policy input, enabling one to evaluate which effects are large, which are the 
major stresses to which the economy is subjected, whether the effects are opposite to 
received wisdom and, if so, what explains them.  
 
In principle, one would like to follow best practices in calibration. However, as 
explained by Dawkins et al (2001), there is no discussion in the literature as to what 
these are. As usual, in calibrating a general equilibrium model, the numerical values of 
some model parameters are set exogenously, while others, the calibrated parameters, are 
endogenously determined so as to reproduce the benchmark data
21
 as an equilibrium of 
the model. This follows a tradition started by Shoven and Whalley (1972), who, when 
seeking to calculate the welfare costs of differential tax treatment of capital income by 
                                                 
21 It refers to the micro-consistent equilibrium dataset derived from adjusting basic data in order to satisfy 
the equilibrium conditions of the model.  
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sectors in the US, introduced equations characterising the equilibrium solution of the 
model to solve for the values of the parameters whose values had not been set 
exogenously. Essentially, they converted the parameters into variables, and solved for 
their values by trivially imposing equilibrium as an identifying restriction, using 
benchmark data.  
 
4.1   Calibration and the SAM 
 
The benchmark data in CGE models is typically organised in a Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM), which ―provides a complete account of the circular flow in the 
economy‖ (Robinson 1989, p.907), its level of disaggregation depending on the problem 
at hand. The SAM must satisfy certain conventions: ―the rows and columns represent 
the income and expenditure accounts (respectively) of the various actors, and must 
always balance. A SAM is thus defined as a square matrix, with the totals of 
corresponding rows and columns always being equal‖, such that there are ―no leakages 
or injections into the system and every flow must go from some actor to some other 
actor‖ (Robinson 1989, p.898). 
 
For the purpose of calibrating the models and enabling us to evaluate their workings, I 
designed and completed the cells of a SAM targeted to a middle-income country (the 
Argentinean economy at the beginning of the Convertibility Plan in 1991), taking 
account of real and financial flows, and arrived at a SAM which is presented in a 
conceptual way below (in Figure 4-1). In the current accounts of the SAM, there are 
activities (sectors), commodities, factors, and the institutions included in the model: 
households, enterprises, government, rest of the world, commercial banks and the 
central bank. Each of the institutions in the current account has also a capital account 
which describes how it allocates its savings into financial and real investments. The 
categories of activities, commodities, factors, households and enterprises follow those 
already defined for the model. Payments in the SAM, as usual, are made from accounts 
in the columns to accounts in the rows. The description of the flows present in the SAM 
follows the order in which the accounts are presented there, going downward through its 
main diagonal: 
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o Activities (producers) gain their income from the commodities account and pay 
for intermediate inputs to commodities, for value added at factor cost to factors 
and for value-added tax to the government.  
o Commodities gain their income from selling intermediate inputs to activities, 
consumption goods to households and government, exports to the rest of the 
world, and gross fixed physical investment to the (capital accounts of) the 
enterprises and the government
22
. Their income is spent on payments to 
activities (for production), to the rest of the world (for imports) and to the 
government (for taxes on imports and exports).  
o Factors get their income from adding value to activities, and spend it on 
payments to households (labour income), enterprises (physical and working 
capital factors) and to the government (taxes on labour).  
o Households receive after-tax labour income from factors, dividends from 
enterprises, transfers from the government and interest payments from banks (on 
domestic deposits), from government (on public bonds) and from non-residents 
(on deposits abroad). They allocate this income to consumption, paying interest 
on their bank loans, and savings.  
o Enterprises receive (capital) factor income, transfers from the public sector and 
from domestic banks (in the case of private service enterprises) and interest 
payments on domestic deposits. They pay interests on their bank loans and taxes 
on their profits, saving a fraction of their post-tax profits and then distributing 
the rest among capitalist households and non-residents, these last two in 
proportions which depend on their equity shares.  
o The government receives income from taxes and central bank profits, and in its 
current account spends on public consumption, transfers to households and 
enterprises, and interest payments on their bonds stock, saving the difference. 
o Non-residents receive income from the country‘s imports, profits distributed by 
domestic firms to non-residents and interests on their holdings of domestic 
deposits and bonds, and pay for the country‘s exports and for interests on 
deposits abroad by domestic agents.  
o Banks get interest payments on their loans to households and enterprises, their 
bond holdings and their deposits abroad. They pay interests on deposits to 
                                                 
22 Changes in inventories are ignored to avoid unnecessary complicating the model. 
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households, enterprises, and non-residents, and on central bank rediscounts, 
transferring their profits to the service sector.  
o The central bank receives income on its bond holdings, rediscounts and reserve 
deposits abroad, and transfers eventual profits to the central government.  
o Households allocate their savings into acquiring currency, deposits in domestic 
banks (in local or foreign currency) and banks abroad, shares in enterprises and 
public bonds. 
o Enterprises allocate their retained post-tax profits plus loans from banks to 
acquiring capital stock and domestic deposits.  
o The government conducts public investment, financing it with own and/or 
borrowed savings – via selling public bonds to households, non-residents, 
commercial banks and the central bank. 
o Non-residents allocate their savings to deposits in domestic banks, shares in 
domestic enterprises, and public bonds.  
o Banks allocate the savings received by them to reserves at the central bank, 
lending to households, enterprises and non-residents, and the acquisition of 
public bonds.  
o The central bank balances its liability increases and its asset increases. Its 
liabilities are composed of the monetary base (held by banks and households) 
and its assets by its holdings of public bonds, foreign reserves and rediscounts to 
commercial banks 
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Figure 4-1 Conceptual social accounting matrix for Argentina 
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4.2   Calculating the cells of the Numeric SAM  
 
The SAM cells are calculated in three main steps. First I prepare an aggregated proto-
SAM, a table mostly based on National Accounts data where I keep activities, 
commodities, factors, households and enterprises aggregated into a single activity, a 
single commodity, etc, and where consistency is not assured: agents‘ sources of income 
do not necessarily match their uses. Second, I disaggregate the accounts in the proto-
SAM using other sources, still without assuring consistency. Finally, I eliminate 
inconsistencies generating a consistent SAM based on the proto-SAM by minimising 
the ―cross-entropy‖ distance between the SAM and the proto-SAM.  
 
This distance in a previous version of the cross-entropy software prepared by Sherman 
Robinson, Andrea Cattaneo and Moataz El-Said (2000) was given by the Kullback-
Leibler cross-entropy distance, which is equal to the expression ∑ ∑      
   
   
   , with 
∑       , where     are the elements of the SAM, and    
  are those of the proto-SAM. 
In the present version, elaborated by Sherman Robinson and Scott Mc Donald, the 
cross-entropy technique estimates the cells of a consistent SAM assuming that the initial 
data are inconsistent and measured with error. The cross entropy minimand only 
includes probability weights for the various error support sets, which can be specified as 
additive or, as here, multiplicative, and that can affect specific cells, rows, columns, 
blocks, or macro aggregates. I imposed macro controls on GDP, aggregate demand 
components apart from private consumption
 
(obtained as residual in National 
Accounts), and tax receipts. I modified the code slightly to assure that the sector-
specific payments to capital match with the payments from capital to the sector-specific 
enterprises, and that the commodity shares in private investment are invariant across 
enterprises, to be consistent with the uniqueness of the composition of the private 
capital good assumed in the model. While the details of the construction of the Proto-
SAM - steps 1 and 2 described above - can be seen in Appendix V, the final Numeric 
Macro-SAM can be seen below. 
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4.3   Exogenous parameters and calibration 
 
The elasticities are choice parameters, except for those in the wage curve equations 
(0.10), which are taken from an econometric estimation for Argentina during the period 
of the Convertibility Plan, conducted by Damill, Frenkel et al (2002). Elasticities in the 
production function are 0.8, except for that of the skilled-capital composite, which is 
assigned a 0.2 value, reflecting evidence of low substitution between skilled labour and 
physical capital for middle-income countries, as reported by Agénor et al (2005, p.11). 
The elasticities in the import-domestic Armington function and export-domestic CET 
function are 4.5, and those for import origins and export destinations 1.5, reflecting 
especially low substitution and transformation possibilities between Mercosur area and 
the rest of the world
23
.
 
The migration elasticity among segments of the labour market 
equals 0.1. The semi-elasticity in the investment function equals 0.2. Elasticities of 
money demand are 2 with respect to interest rate on deposits and 1 with respect to real 
GDP changes. Elasticities in the CES utility functions on asset earnings equal 1.05, such 
that the asset shares in the portfolios of capitalist households and banks tend to be quite 
stable (they would be stable with a value approaching 1).  
 
In relation to the remaining choice parameters, the originally perceived probabilities of 
default were set at 0, the annual depreciation of the capital stock at 2 per cent, and the 
nominal exchange rate was fixed at 1. The sensitivity of the current account superavit 
(deficit) to the capital account deficit (superavit) was calculated as the benchmark ratio 
between them, resulting in the value 0.797. The natural unemployment rate was 
assumed to be relatively low (3 per cent).   
 
As usual in CGE models, most initial prices are given a value of 1,
24
  thus allowing one 
to directly read most values in the SAM as quantities: for example, by setting the initial 
PM (import price perceived by the purchaser) equal to 1, the benchmark QM (import 
quantity) is read directly from the value paid by buyers for imported commodities in the 
SAM. The setting of the original prices together with the use of benchmark data as 
identifying restrictions allows for the calibration of the remaining model parameters, 
                                                 
23 The elasticities in the CES and CET functions (ε) inform the ρ parameters which enter explicitly in the 
model, with ρ=1/ε-1 in the CES and ρ=1/ ε +1 in the CET functions.  
24 Excluding those which are assigned as a function of other prices e.g. pwmrc,r in equation (2). 
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with the only exception of those in the LES consumption function. For example, for 
each commodity which is both imported and produced domestically, the scale (  
 
) and 
the share parameters (  
 
) in the import-domestic Armington function are assigned using 
as identifying restrictions the Armington function and the import-domestic demand 
equilibrium ratio (eqs. 24 and 25), with the remaining elements in the equations already 
set:   
 
 from the exogenous Armington elasticity, the associated prices (PM and PD) 
from the arbitrary unitary setting, and the associated quantities (QQ,QD and QM) from 
reading values of absorption, domestic demand of domestic good and import of the 
commodity in the SAM. For the calibration of the marginal share (   
 ) and subsistence 
(   
   consumption parameters, the Frisch parameters were taken from De Melo and 
Tarr (1992), and adjusted to assure Engel-Law-consistent elasticities, following the 
methodology explained in their Appendix B. The minimum wage for working capital is 
set at a value which does not bind the wage of working capital in any experiment  
(1*10
-12
). 
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Chapter 5 Models sensitivity analysis 
 
In this chapter I investigate the workings of the built models, comparing the results of a 
set of shocks across them. Given the focus of this thesis, I concentrate on shocks related 
to the foreign sector. I perform 10 simulations on the real, the real financial and the real 
financial augmented model, largely focusing the description on the main transmission 
mechanisms at work and results on the balance of payments with non-residents, Macro 
indicators, and household income distribution. The available set of parameters 
accounting for external shocks (tabulated below) include five where the impulse to the 
economy is given essentially via the capital account of the balance of payments (pdefn,n‘, 
RW,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ R,     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ e and   ̅̅ ̅̅ R) and five via the trade balance (tmrc,r , terc,r , pwmrc,r , 
pwerc,r
 
and exr
25
).   
 
 
Figure 5-1 Models parameters accounting for external shocks 
 
Parameter Description 
pdefn,n‘ Probability of default perceived by institution n on payments of institution n‘    
  ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅  Risk-free world interest rate  
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ R Stock of non-residents‘ deposits in domestic banks  
    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ e Non-residents‘ holdings of equity in domestic firms  
  ̅̅ ̅̅ R Non-residents public bond holdings  
tmrc,r Import taxes  
terc,r Export taxes  
pwmrc,r World prices of imports  
pwerc,r World prices of exports 
exr  Nominal exchange rate (domestic-currency price of foreign currency) 
 
For the sake of conciseness I report in detail the results of only two simulations, which 
illustrate the essential differences between the models: one relating to capital account 
(pdef) and the other to trade account (tmr) of the balance of payments. The results of the 
remaining simulations, which help improve our understanding of the models workings 
only marginally, are located in Appendix VI. In order to investigate the extent to which 
wage rigidies are critical in getting significant real effects from external shocks, I also 
consider the short-run version of the augmented model.  
                                                 
25 The last simulation gives an impulse in the investment income component of the current account and in 
the capital account, as it changes the dollar-denominated value of assets denominated in local currency.  
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It is found that the factor market distortions introduced at the end play an important role. 
As a consequence, and in order to get a clear sense of the net contribution of the 
financial factors, the factor market distortions are also introduced into the non-financial 
model (―Real model, short run version‖) and the experiments are run on this version. 
Additionally, the experiments are carried on a variation of the short-run financial 
augmented model, where currency demand is made endogenous by specifying a simple 
transactions demand for money (             
                    , where 
  
        as reported from an econometric estimation carried out for Argentina for 
the period 1993-1999 (Canavese et al. 2001). 
5.1   Shock 1: 30 percentage points increase in perceived probability of default on domestic 
assets  
 
This shock sets pdefn,n‘ = 0.30 for every pair where n‘ (the liability holder) is a domestic 
institution. The figure below summarises the effects of the shock, according to the 
different models. It shows that, in all the financial models, the shock ends up leading to 
a contraction of the activity level, an increase in the unemployment rate and price 
deflation, with a significant economic contraction only in the short-run version of the 
augmented model, where GDP contracts 1.82 per cent and the unemployment rate 
increases 1.45 percentage points.  I next describe the main transmission channels for 
this shock in each model.  
 
Figure 5-2 Macro effects of 30 p.p. increase in perceived probability of default on domestic assets
26
   
  
 
                                                 
26 Real GDP and domestic price level variations in percentages, unemployment rate variation in 
percentage points. 
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5.1.1 Real Model and Short-Run Real Model 
 
These models are essentially non-financial and as such do not account for the effect of 
changes in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets.   
 
5.1.2 Real Financial Model 
 
The shock reduces the expected return on domestic assets, increases the relative return 
on foreign assets and hence gives a signal that leads capitalist households to reallocate 
their asset portfolios, substituting away from domestic into foreign assets. This reduces 
the initial net capital inflow to the economy, slowing down the accumulation of 
international reserves of the central bank and cutting the current account deficit that the 
economy is able to finance. The withdrawal of deposits by capitalist households from 
domestic banks, in turn, reduces the banks‘ asset portfolio size, leading banks to cut 
their deposits abroad together with other asset holdings, leading to raise the external 
capital inflow to banks by 0.52%, only partially offsetting the reduction in the capital 
account superavit.   
 
Table 5-1 Balance of payments 
 
 
With a fixed nominal exchange rate, the reduction in the current account deficit is 
achieved through domestic deflation, which causes a depreciation in the real exchange 
rate and increases the country‘s trade superavit: the total value of exports increases and 
that of imports falls, thus increasing the share of exports and decreasing that of imports 
in aggregate demand, as shown in the following table.   
  Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 12.16 
Trade Balance 3.44 32.72 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 2.59 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 -3.14 
Investment Income -11.90 -0.82 
Interests -10.91 -0.97 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 0.77 
Capital Account 10.62 -12.16 
Non Financial Private Sector   7.50 -17.28 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 0.52 
  Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -12.16 
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Table 5-2 Aggregate demand component shares 
 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Absorption 98.20 -0.61 
Private Consumption 77.35 -0.58 
Fixed Investment 15.37 -0.03 
Public Consumption 5.49 0.00 
Exports 11.22 0.38 
Imports -9.43 -0.23 
GDP (C+I+G+E-M) 100.00 0.00 
 
With export prices fixed, producer prices fall proportionately less in the tradable sectors, 
providing incentives for the economy to mobilise resources out of construction and 
private services sectors toward the sectors producing tradable commodities. This shift 
leads to an increase in the shares of the primary sector and industry in total value added, 
which in turn allows for the increase in exports and import substitution, as noted above.  
 
Table 5-3 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 0.07 
Industry 18.0 0.05 
Construction 5.5 -0.01 
Private Services 61.6 -0.11 
Public Services 7.1 0.00 
Total 100.0 FIXED 
 
The fall in domestic prices lowers the demand for factors at given nominal wages and 
leads to cuts in the nominal wage of every factor
27
 and marginal cuts in the use of 
formal workers.  
 
Table 5-4 Factor use 
 
Base (mill. 
individuals) 
% change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 -0.01 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 -0.02 
 
With the growing primary sector a particularly intensive user of informal unskilled 
workers, real wages end up changing in their favour. 
 
                                                 
27 Not tabulated. 
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Table 5-5 Real wages 
 Base % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82*  -0.02 
Formal Unskilled 9.29*  -0.01 
Informal Unskilled 9.29*  0.20 
Capital 0.20 (%) -0.05 
        *In thousands of Argentinean pesos per year per worker. 
   
 
The reduction in the central bank‘s international reserves leads to contract the monetary 
base by 2.64 per cent, and to drop real liquidity in the economy even after accounting 
for the 0.76 per cent fall in the CPI, so that bank rates shift upward. The return on equity 
falls in every sector except the primary one which, being highly export-intensive, is 
fairly insulated from the falls in revenue caused by domestic deflation.  
 
Table 5-6 Rates of return 
  Base (%) p.p. change   
Bonds 48.7 0.53  
Deposits 23.0 0.22  
Equity, primary 20.7 0.16  
Equity, industry 20.6 -0.07  
Equity, construction 21.2 -0.30  
Equity, private services 23.5 -0.29  
Loans 35.0 0.34  
 
The falls in domestic prices, wages, employment and output lower the tax base for 
direct and indirect taxes and public revenue by 0.73 per cent, as shown in the following 
table. As a result, both the public deficit and the public sector supply of bonds increase; 
the price of the latter lowers and its rate of return increases (0.53 p.p. - Table 5-6). In turn, 
the higher rate paid by the public sector on its bonds has an immediate reinforcing effect 
on the public sector deficit, which shows a final increase of 1.14 per cent. The increase 
in the public deficit is balanced by higher private savings (reflecting the investment-
driven savings assumption), which lowers private consumption demand as evidenced in 
the fall of the share of consumption (-0.58 p.p.) in aggregate demand in Table 5-2. 
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Table 5-7 Public sector finance 
 
 
Base (B$) % change 
Total Revenue  21.18 -0.73 
  Direct Taxes 9.50 -0.74 
  Indirect Taxes 11.68 -0.72 
Total Expenditure 53.65 0.19 
  Consumption 10.52 -0.77 
  Transfers  12.11 FIXED 
  Domestic Interest Payments 16.91 0.17 
  Foreign Interest Payments 13.25 1.25 
  Investment 0.85 -0.77 
Total Financing 32.47 1.14 
  Non-Financial Private Sector   11.99 0.36 
  Bank 2.40 -1.87 
  Central bank 16.09 FIXED 
  Rest of the World 1.99 FIXED 
 
These changes in turn lead to a marginal increase in the income share of informal 
unskilled workers that, in parallel to a fall in dividend payments due to domestic 
deflation, marginally reduces the share of capitalist households and raises that of the 
unskilled households (both by 0.08 p.p.).   
 
Table 5-8 Factor income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Formal Skilled 13.2 0.00 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 -0.01 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 0.03 
Physical Capital 35.0 -0.02 
 
 
Table 5-9 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 0.00 
Unskilled 64.6 0.08 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.08 
 
To sum up, in this model the increase in the perceived probability of default on 
domestic assets generates a capital outflow that leads to a real devaluation. This, in turn, 
leads resources to shift to the tradable sectors, without significantly affecting the 
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domestic activity level, and slightly shifting income distribution in favour of the 
unskilled RHG and against the capitalist RHG.  
5.1.3 Real Financial Augmented Model 
The deposit contraction generated by the shock reduces the supply of working capital 
loans by banks (1.16 per cent
28
), in turn negatively affecting the productivity of and the 
producers‘ demand for real factors, besides the negative effect of falling prices on factor 
demand and use. The economic contraction is larger than in the real financial model, but 
is still negligible: the effects on the use of formal workers (-0.03 per cent skilled, -0.06 
per cent unskilled
29
), on the unemployment rate (0.04 p.p.) and on total output (-0.06) 
are relatively insignificant. 
 
Besides, the contraction of the capital inflow worsens the capital account balance. With 
investment income relatively unaffected, the economy is forced to significantly improve 
its trade balance. This calls for a real devaluation that gives incentives for the economy 
to mobilise factors to the tradable sectors, allowing exports to rise and imports to fall, as 
shown in the following table.    
 
Table 5-10 Balance of payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
With regard to distribution, real wages increase for working capital (driven by its supply 
contraction) and for the informal unskilled (as before) (Table 5-11), driving changes in 
factor income shares (Table 5-12).  
                                                 
28 Not tabulated. 
29 Not tabulated. 
  Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 12.27 
Trade Balance 3.44 33.05 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 2.58 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 -3.22 
Investment Income -11.90 -0.84 
Interests -10.91 -0.99 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 0.81 
Capital Account 10.62 -12.27 
Non-Financial Private Sector   7.50 -17.44 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 0.55 
  Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -12.27 
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Table 5-11 Real wages 
 Base % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82* -0.06 
Formal Unskilled 9.29* -0.03 
Informal Unskilled 9.29* 0.15 
Physical Capital 0.20 (%) -0.19 
Working Capital 0.35 (%) 2.28 
                                   *In thousands of Argentinean pesos per year per worker. 
 
Table 5-12  Factor income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Formal Skilled 13.2 0.00 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 -0.01 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 0.03 
Physical Capital 31.7 -0.05 
Working Capital 3.3 0.04 
Total 100.0 FIXED 
 
At the household level, the income share of the unskilled increases, and that of capitalist 
households falls in similar magnitudes to those in the real-financial model: the 
contraction of the income share of physical capital more than offsets the working capital 
share increase, as the share of the former in factor income is much larger (31.7% vs. 
3.3%), as shown in Table 5-12.  
Table 5-13 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 0.00 
Unskilled 64.6 0.08 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.08 
 
Overall, and as in the real financial model, the shock generates a capital outflow with 
marginal effects on the activity level (-0.06 per cent) and the unemployment rate (+0.04 
p.p.). It also has a deflationary effect (CPI lowers 0.76 per cent), and leads to a slight 
fall in the capitalist RHG income share and a slight raise in that of the unskilled RHG in 
the same magnitudes as in the previous model (0.08 p.p.).  
 
5.1.4 Real Financial Augmented Model, Short-Run Version 
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In its short-run version, this model suggests that there are indeed significant short-run 
effects on unemployment (+1.45 p.p.) and the activity level (-1.82 per cent), together 
with deflation in the order of magnitude seen in the previous models (0.72 per cent).   
 
Table 5-14 Macro indicators 
 
    Base change 
Real GDP  189.86*  -1.82% 
Unemployment rate ** 14.0 1.45  
CPI  1.00 -0.72% 
            * In billions of Argentinean pesos 
                                  ** Base in percentage terms, change in percentage points 
 
As in the standard version of this model, the capital outflow forces the economy to 
improve its trade balance (Table 5-15) by moving resources towards the tradable 
sectors, and reduces the availability of working capital in the economy, causing a fall in 
the productivity of, and demand for, real factors.  
 
Table 5-15 Balance of payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
However, in the present model this leads to quantity rather than price adjustments: with 
physical capital capacity utilisation being flexible, the use of the physical capital stock 
falls by more than 2 per cent; and with wage curves that leave the nominal wages of 
formal workers essentially fixed, employers‘ use of formal workers shrinks (1.95 per 
cent skilled, 2.27 per cent unskilled) (Table 5-16). In the short run, the increase in the 
perceived probability of default generates thus a significant cut in the use of formal 
  Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 16.61 
Trade Balance 3.44 51.17 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 2.96 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 -6.22 
Investment Income -11.90 -2.99 
Interests -10.91 -3.54 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 2.96 
Capital Account 10.62 -16.61 
Non-Financial Private Sector   7.50 -23.88 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 2.51 
  Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -16.61 
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labour, physical capital and working capital (1.91%), resulting in a significant 
contraction in the activity level (1.82 per cent).  
 
Table 5-16 Factor use 
 Base*   % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 -1.95 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 -2.27 
Physical Capital 288.65 -2.02 
Working Capital 17.15 -1.91 
   *Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos 
 
The contraction of the economy reduces firms‘ profits and lowers the return on equity in 
every sector, as shown in Table 5-17. The contraction also significantly reduces the 
demand for working capital at given nominal wage and leads to falls in the nominal 
remuneration of working capital, bank loans (-0.48 p.p.) and bank deposits (-0.32 p.p.). 
Public revenue falls with the contraction of the economy more severely than before, 
which in turn causes an increase in the government deficit and in the supply of public 
bonds, which leads to a fall in the price of bonds and hence an increase in their return of 
1.79 p.p. 
 
Table 5-17 Rates of return 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Bonds 48.7 1.79 
Deposits 23.0 -0.32 
Equity, primary 20.7 -0.28 
Equity, industry 20.6 -0.66 
Equity, construction 21.2 -0.35 
Equity, private services 23.5 -0.78 
Loans 35.0 -0.48 
 
Household income distribution moves in the same direction as in the previous models, 
driven now not only by the sector reallocation of production, but also by the real wage 
increase for formal workers (whose nominal wage is rigid in the short run): the 
unskilled RHG increases its income share and the capitalist one decreases its own by 
0.09 p.p., as the negative effect on equity return earned by capitalist households is 
larger. 
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Table 5-18 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 0.00 
Unskilled 64.6 0.09 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.09 
 
To sum up, in this model the capital outflow mobilises resources to the tradable sectors 
with similar distributional effects to in the previous financial models. However, there is 
now an additional relevant transmission channel at work: formal labour wage rigidity. 
In contrast to the previous models, this leads the capital outflow to significantly reduce 
the activity level in the short-run. 
 
The results of this model are laid out in Figure 5-3. 
5.1.5 Real Financial Augmented Model, Short-Run Version, Endogenous Currency Holdings 
 
As can be seen in the following table, the short-run effects when currency holdings are 
explained in terms of transactions demand are similar than when currency holdings are 
simply kept exogenous. Real GDP falls 1.76 per cent (instead of 1.82 per cent), the 
unemployment rate increases 1.41 p.p. (instead of 1.45 p.p.), and the CPI falls by 0.71 
per cent (instead of 0.72 per cent). 
Table 5-19 Macro indicators 
 
    Base change 
Real GDP  189.86*  -1.76% 
Unemployment rate ** 14.0 1.41  
CPI  1.00 -0.71% 
            * In billions of Argentinean pesos 
                                  ** Base in percentage terms, change in percentage points 
 
The balance of payments with non-residents suffer variations in the same direction than 
when households keep the currency holdings constant, and with magnitudes which are 
quite close to the previous model variation. For example, the increase in the probability 
of default perceived by domestic actors ends up reducing the superavit of the balance of 
payments by 16.44 per cent instead of 16.61 per cent.  
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Table 5-20 Balance of payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As in the previous version of the model, factor use falls for formal workers, physical 
capital and working capital, with magnitudes which are only slightly smaller. This is 
essentially due to the fact that as the prices faced by consumers fall (as in the previous 
model), households nominal demand for currency also fall slightly (0.64 per cent for the 
skilled RHG, 0.60 per cent for the unskilled RHG, and 0.78 per cent for the capitalist 
RHG
30
), allowing households to mitigate their reduction of deposits in domestic banks, 
and banks to mitigate their reduction of working capital loans to enterprises.  Compared 
to the previous version of the model, the productivity of the real factors is thus slightly 
larger, giving firms an incentive to slightly mitigate their reduction of factor use. 
Table 5-21 Factor use 
 Base*   % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 -1.88 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 -2.20 
Physical Capital 288.65 -1.95 
Working Capital 17.15 -1.72 
   *Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos 
 
In the end, the distribution of income among representative household groups changes 
as in the previous model version, with an increase in the share of the unskilled RHG and 
a fall in the one of the capitalist one, with the same magnitudes than in the previous 
version of the model.  
 
                                                 
30 Not tabulated. 
  Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 16.44 
Trade Balance 3.44 50.04 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 2.91 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 -6.06 
Investment Income -11.90 -2.79 
Interests -10.91 -3.30 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 2.88 
Capital Account 10.62 -16.44 
Non-Financial Private Sector   7.50 -23.53 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 1.83 
  Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -16.44 
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Table 5-22 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 0.00 
Unskilled 64.6 0.09 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.09 
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Figure 5-3 Transmission channels for a 30 p.p. increase in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets in the short run 
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5.2   Shock 2: 10 per cent fall in import taxes  
 
To deepen the investigation of the workings of the set of models, I next simulate a 
shock which is related to the trade account of the balance of payments. As can be seen 
in the following summary graph, a fall in import taxes – as in the previous shock – only 
has significant effects on the overall levels of activity and unemployment in the short-
run versions of the real and real-financial models, with the effects being larger in the 
case of the real-financial ones.  In the following, I describe the main transmission 
channels by which this shock ripples through the economy in each version of the model. 
 
Figure 5-4 Macro effects of 10 per cent fall in import taxes 
31
 
 
 
5.2.1 Real Model 
 
The original tariff rate uniformly affects imports across the board at the level of 5.7 per 
cent. The 10 per cent fall in import taxes lowers the import prices perceived by domestic 
buyers by 0.57 per cent and increases the ratio of imports to GDP (+0.13 p.p.) (Table 
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5-23). Also, through its direct effect on public revenue (-0.58 per cent), it increases the 
financing needs of the public sector (0.46 per cent).  
 
 
Table 5-23 Aggregate demand components shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Absorption 98.20 0.00 
Private Consumption 77.35 0.00 
Fixed Investment 15.37 0.00 
Public Consumption 5.49 0.00 
Exports 11.22 0.13 
Imports -9.43 0.13 
GDP (C+I+G+E-M) 100.00 0.00 
 
In order to increase imports, domestic purchasers substitute away from domestically 
produced goods, which generates excess supply of domestic goods and leads to a fall in 
domestic prices, still allowing for a fall in the relative price of imports (of 0.28 per 
cent). The fall in domestic prices, in turn, leads to an increase in the relative price of 
exports (0.23 per cent overall), giving producers an incentive to increase exports (export 
GDP share increases 0.13 p.p., leaving absorption unaltered), as shown in the following 
table. The capital account balance is unaffected in this model, which only accounts for 
the workings of the real sphere of the economy.  
Table 5-24 Balance of payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As a result of the increase in both imports and exports, the degree of openness 
(measured as the trade/GDP ratio) goes up (by 0.26 p.p.), and mobile factors marginally 
  Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 FIXED 
Trade Balance 3.44 -0.05 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 0.95 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 1.14 
Investment Income -11.90 0.01 
Interests -10.91 FIXED 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 0.16 
Capital Account 10.62 FIXED 
Non Financial Private Sector   7.50 FIXED 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 FIXED 
  Balance of Payment Result 2.16 FIXED 
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shift to the sectors producing export goods (the primary sector value-added share 
increases 0.012 p.p. and that of industry 0.002 p.p.)
32
.  
 
Table 5-25 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 0.012 
Industry 18.0 0.002 
Construction 5.5 0.000 
Private Services 61.6 -0.013 
Public Services 7.1 -0.001 
Total 100.0 0.000 
 
Given that the prices of imports fall by more than the price of domestically produced 
goods, the CPI (which includes imports) falls by more than the GDP deflator (0.27 vs. 
0.21 per cent, respectively), leading in turn to an increase in CPI-deflated factor wages, 
especially for those factors for which the real wage is allowed to vary freely to achieve 
market equilibrium (informal unskilled workers and physical capital). 
 
Table 5-26 Real wages 
 
 
Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82 0.02 
Formal Unskilled 9.29 0.02 
Informal Unskilled 9.29 0.13 
Capital 0.20 0.09 
*Labor wages in thousands of A$ per year, capital wages in percentage. 
 
The higher increases in the real wages of informal unskilled labour and capital increases 
their factor income shares slightly (by 0.01 per cent each) and reduces those of the 
formal factors (Table 5-27)
33
.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 Imports and exports in the same sector can co-exist given the presence of different varieties within each 
sector of activity that was accounted in the model. 
33 The relatively low elasticities in the formal wage curves (0.1) account for the small quantity effect in 
the real wage bill of the formal workers.  
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Table 5-27 Factor income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Formal Skilled 13.2 -0.01 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 -0.01 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 0.01 
Physical Capital 35.0 0.01 
 
 
Capitalist households, which receive dividends associated with the capital factor 
income, increase their share in household income, the (formal) skilled decrease theirs, 
and the unskilled keep their share constant given offsetting effects of changes in formal 
and informal unskilled factor income shares.   
 
Table 5-28 Household income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 -0.01 
Unskilled 64.6 0.00 
Capitalist 21.3 0.01 
 
Overall, in this model the degree of openness of the economy increases (0.26 p.p.), 
income distribution changes in favour of the capitalist households, and factor use, the 
unemployment rate and real GDP do not suffer significant variations. There are 
negligible expansions of factor use and the activity level, a result generated by the wage 
curve working in reverse: as the fall in the CPI increases real wages, it leads to lower 
the unemployment rates, increasing the employment and production levels.  
5.2.2 Real Model – Short Run 
 
As in the original version of the real model, and by the same transmission channels, the 
tariff reduction leads to a fall in the price of imports, and increases in imports and 
exports as shares of aggregate demand. However, differently than in that version, there 
are contractions in factor use (commented below) that reduce household income and 
households consumption, in absolute terms
34
 and as a share of aggregate demand, as can 
be seen in the following table.  
 
 
 
                                                 
34 Not tabulated. 
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Table 5-29 Aggregate demand components shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Absorption 98.20 -0.01 
Private Consumption 77.35 -0.07 
Fixed Investment 15.37 0.04 
Public Consumption 5.49 0.02 
Exports 11.22 0.13 
Imports -9.43 0.13 
GDP (C+I+G+E-M) 100.00 0.00 
 
With the increase in exports and the fall of consumption as shares of aggregate demand, 
factors shift out of the private services sector and into the primary (export-oriented) 
sector. In parallel, the increase in imports leads to a fall in the share of the industrial 
sector in value added, which produces import-substitutes in a relatively intensive way.  
Table 5-30 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 0.03 
Industry 18.0 -0.02 
Construction 5.5 0.01 
Private Services 61.6 -0.04 
Public Services 7.1 0.01 
Total 100.0 0.00 
 
The fall in import prices leads to falls in output prices that reduce the factor demand at 
given nominal wages. In the case of formal workers, whose wages are nominally fixed, 
their real wages increase (0.16 per cent skilled, 0.21 per cent unskilled) and their 
employment level falls (0.26 per cent skilled, 0.36 per cent unskilled), as can be seen in 
the following two tables. The contraction of the industrial and private services sectors 
reduces the demand for physical capital in these sectors, leading to an overall fall in the 
rate of utilization of the physical capital stock (0.26 per cent). The commented reduction 
in the use of formal workers and physical capital reduces the productivity and hence the 
real wage of the informal unskilled workers, as can be seen in the following table.    
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Table 5-31 Real wages 
 
Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82 0.16 
Formal Unskilled 9.29 0.21 
Informal Unskilled 9.29 -0.21 
Capital 0.20 0.02 
*Labor wages in thousands of A$ per year, capital wages in percentage. 
 
Table 5-32 Factor use 
 Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 -0.26 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 -0.36 
Physical Capital 288.65 -0.26 
   
*Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos 
 
Accordingly, the factor income shares change in favour of the formal workers (driven 
by real wage increases that exceed those of the other factors), and against physical 
capital, which suffers a fall in its capacity utilization rate without a significant change in 
its real wage
35
.  
Table 5-33 Factor income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Formal Skilled 13.2 0.01 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 0.01 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 0.00 
Physical Capital 35.0 -0.02 
 
As a consequence, the distribution of income among representative household groups 
changes slightly in favour of the skilled. Given that the capitalist household has a higher 
share of nominally fixed income
36
, in a context of falling incomes it loses a smaller 
share than the unskilled one.  
 
Table 5-34 Household income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 0.003 
Unskilled 64.6 -0.002 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.001 
                                                 
35 The real wage of physical capital is constant against the GDP deflator, but varies in relation to the CPI.   
36 Interest flows are fixed in this model. 
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Overall, and by the transmission channels mentioned above, it can be seen that in this 
version of the real model the tariff reduction leads to a perceivable contraction of the 
factors use and the activity level and to a slight change in income distribution in favour 
of the skilled households that did not occur in the original version of the model.   
5.2.3 Real Financial Model  
 
When the workings of the financial sphere are included in the model, the real sphere 
works to a large extent similarly to the real model. The total import ratio increases (0.11 
p.p.), public revenues moves downwards (0.65 per cent) and the public deficit moves 
upwards (1.15 per cent). There are no significant changes in overall factor use, the 
unemployment rate or real GDP, with the major changes basically affecting output 
composition, wages and prices, but not the overall output level.  
 
There is some deflation in the domestic economy, and factor reallocation in favour of 
producing export goods, which together with higher imports contributes to an increase 
in the degree of openness (0.28 p.p.). Real wages increase, especially for physical 
capital and informal unskilled workers, again leading capitalist households to increase 
their income share and skilled ones to decrease theirs, as shown in the following table. 
 
Table 5-35 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1  -0.01 
Unskilled 64.6  0.00 
Capitalist 21.3  0.01 
 
In the financial side of the economy, CPI deflation increases real liquidity and leads to a 
fall in the returns on bank deposits (-0.02 p.p.) and loans (-0.03 p.p.). Primary 
producers, who increase their share of export output to reduce the pervasive effects of 
the domestic deflation on their profits, and who benefit from the fall in intermediate 
input prices, see their profits and equity return increase (+0.03 p.p.). The other sectors 
also benefit from the fall in input prices but are more harmed by direct import 
competition and/or a fall in output prices, seeing a fall in their profits and equity returns, 
as shown in the following table.    
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Table 5-36 Rates of return 
  Base (%) p.p. change   
Bonds 48.7 0.28  
Deposits 23.0 -0.02  
Equity, primary 20.7 0.03  
Equity, industry 20.6 -0.05  
Equity, construction 21.2 -0.06  
Equity, private services 23.5 -0.08  
Loans 35.0 -0.03  
 
 
The public sector, in order to finance a higher deficit, needs to pay a higher return on its 
debt (+0.28 p.p.). The changes in returns lead capitalist households to substitute away 
from non-primary equity into primary equity, public bonds and deposits abroad; and 
banks to substitute away from loans into deposits abroad.
37
 These changes affect the 
balance of payments with real-sphere consequences: the increase in the return on public 
bonds augments the net interest payment to non-residents (and residents) who hold 
domestic public bonds, and the increase in deposits abroad reduces the capital account 
superavit
38
 (as in Shock 1). To compensate for the increase in the payments to non-
residents, the economy needs to increase its trade superavit by 3.35 per cent, which calls 
for a higher fall in domestic prices and a more intense shift to the sectors producing 
export goods. 
Table 5-37 Balance of payments    
 
Base 
(B$) 
% change 
Current Account -8.46 0.55 
  Trade Balance 3.44 3.35 
    Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 1.21 
    Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 0.80 
  Investment Income -11.90 -0.58 
    Interests -10.91 -0.65 
    Profits and Dividends -0.99 0.26 
Capital Account 10.62 -0.55 
  Non-Financial Private Sector 7.50 -0.82 
  Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
  Commercial Banks 1.13 0.28 
Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -0.55 
 
                                                 
37 Not tabulated. 
38 The additional interest inflow only partially offsets the effects of the increase in the return on public 
bonds on the net interest payments. 
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Overall, the real financial model provides a structural adjustment story which is 
conceptually similar to that of the real model, adding changes in financial portfolios 
which end up leading to an increase in net exports that affect output composition. There 
are no significant effects on the activity level, and income distribution changes in a 
similar way to that in the real model, benefitting capitalist households.  
5.2.4 Real Financial Augmented Model  
 
When the productive function of working capital is taken into account, the deflation 
generated by lower import prices – and corresponding demand substitutions - leads to a 
small increase in the (real) supply of working capital (0.15 per cent). This allows the 
economy to increase production only marginally above the level resulting from the 
previous model (real GDP grows 0.022 per cent instead of 0.015 per cent), given the 
relatively small share of working capital in value added. With an inelastic demand for 
working capital
39
, the increase in its supply leads in turn to a proportionally larger fall in 
its real wage (0.18 per cent), as shown in the following table. As in the previous model, 
the real wages of the other factors shift upwards, especially for informal unskilled 
workers and physical capital.  
 
Table 5-38 Real wages 
 Base % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82* 0.03 
Formal Unskilled 9.29* 0.02 
Informal Unskilled 9.29* 0.18 
Physical Capital 0.20 (%) 0.13 
Working Capital 0.35 (%) -0.18 
                                   *In thousands of Argentinean pesos per year per worker. 
 
The fall in the real wage of working capital lowers the financial cost of physical 
investment more than in the previous model, and induces firms to increase their physical 
investment, crowding out private consumption and leading in turn to an increased 
demand for the construction sector. The value-added shares of primary and industrial 
production increase, through the same transmission channels as in the previous model.  
 
 
                                                 
39 Elasticities in the production function are between 0.2 and 0.8, as explained in the calibration section. 
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Table 5-39 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change
40 
Primary 7.9 0.02  
Industry 18.0 0.01 
Construction 5.5 0.01 
Private Services 61.6 -0.03 
Public Services 7.1 0.00 
Total 100.0 0.00 
 
The factor reallocation, as before, makes it possible to increase exports and thus to 
improve the trade balance, compensating for the capital outflow generated by the 
generalised fall in the returns on domestic assets, as analysed for the previous model.  
 
Table 5-40 Balance of payments 
 
Base 
(B$) 
% change 
Current Account -8.46 0.64 
  Trade Balance 3.44 3.12 
    Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 1.20 
    Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 0.83 
  Investment Income -11.90 -0.44 
    Interests -10.91 -0.51 
    Profits and Dividends -0.99 0.24 
Capital Account 10.62 -0.64 
  Non-Financial Private Sector 7.50 -0.95 
  Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
  Commercial Banks 1.13 0.25 
Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -0.64 
 
To sum up, the effect of including money in the production function on the activity level 
is of second order, partly due in turn to the small share of working capital in total value 
added (3.3%). The fall in the cost of financing physical investment shifts this aggregate 
demand component upwards. The distributional results at the level of representative 
household groups are similar to those in the previous model, as shown in the following 
table.  
 
 
 
                                                 
40 A rounding error avoids the sum of the percentage point changes summing zero. 
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Table 5-41 Household income shares 
  Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 -0.01 
Unskilled 64.6 0.00 
Capitalist 21.3 0.01 
 
5.2.5 Real Financial Augmented Short-Run Model  
 
When short-run rigidities in the factor markets are accounted for, the fall in factor 
demands at given nominal wages leads to a generalised fall in factor use. The use of 
formal skilled workers falls by 0.63 per cent, that of formal unskilled workers by 0.77 
per cent, that of physical capital by 0.64 per cent, and that of working capital by 0.09 
per cent. This, in turn, generates a significant increase in the unemployment rate (0.49 
per cent) and a sizable contraction of the activity level (0.58 per cent).  
 
Table 5-42 Factor use 
 Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 -0.63 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 -0.77 
Physical Capital 288.65 -0.64 
Working Capital 17.15 -0.09 
*Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos 
 
As in the previous model, the shock leads to a capital outflow which calls for an 
increase in the aggregate demand share of net exports, which is in turn allowed by a fall 
in that of private consumption. Besides, as the real wage of working capital falls 
(0.93%)
41
, the cost of physical investment shifts downwards, allowing fixed investment 
to increase its share in aggregate demand.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
41 Not tabulated. 
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Table 5-43 Aggregate demand components shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Absorption 98.20 -0.18 
Private Consumption 77.35 -0.37 
Fixed Investment 15.37 0.14 
Public Consumption 5.49 0.05 
Exports 11.22 0.25 
Imports -9.43 0.06 
GDP (C+I+G+E-M) 100.00 0.00 
 
At the sector level, the primary sector increases its share consistently with the increase 
in exports, construction increases its share to satisfy the demand for new physical 
capital, and the public sector share increases given the combination of fall in domestic 
output and exogenous public expenditures, as shown in the following table.  
 
Table 5-44 Sector value-added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 0.08 
Industry 18.0 -0.02 
Construction 5.5 0.04 
Private Services 61.6 -0.13 
Public Services 7.1 0.03 
Total 100.0 0.00 
 
The increase of the primary sector share in value-added drives the factor demand toward 
unskilled workers. This, in combination with the increase in the real wage of formal 
workers (generated by the CPI deflation), allows the unskilled RHG to marginally 
increase its income share, to the detriment of skilled and capitalist RHGs, as shown 
below.  
Table 5-45 Household income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 -0.002 
Unskilled 64.6 0.003 
Capitalist 21.3 -0.001 
 
To sum up, in the short run the fall in import tariffs leads to a domestic price drop that 
raises real factor wages. This leads firms to lower their factor use, generating a sizable 
contraction of the activity level. Furthermore, the domestic price fall in turn reduces 
profits of domestic enterprises in most sectors, leading to a capital outflow that 
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generates a real depreciation of the domestic currency and gives producers an incentive 
to mobilise factors to increase exports. The corresponding sector reallocation, in 
combination with the increase in real wages for the formal workers –who have 
nominally fixed wages in the short run –  ends up increasing the income share of the 
unskilled RHG in detriment of that of the remaining RHGs. A diagram with the most 
relevant transmission channels is laid out in Figure 5-5 
5.2.6 Real Financial Augmented Model, Short-Run Version, Endogenous Currency Holdings 
As can be seen in Figure 5-4, the results at the macro level are essentially the same than 
in the version of this model with exogenous currency holdings. Also as in that version, 
the income distribution changes slightly in favour of the unskilled representative 
household group. Interestingly, and differently than in the previous model, as the 
nominal incomes of the households fall (in the range of 0.62 – 0.66 per cent), their 
currency holdings fall, too (in the range of 0.20 – 0.21 per cent), freeing some financial 
wealth to enter into the bank in the form of deposits and increase their supply of 
working capital to firms. However, the increase in working capital is quite small in 
relative terms (less than 0.1%), and as a consequence the generated fall of the activity 
level is not too different from the previous version of the model (0.56 per cent here, 
0.58 per cent with exogenous currency demand
42
).  
5.3   Conclusions  
 
The inclusion of the financial dimension – endogeneising the evolution of a matrix of 
financial assets and liabilities among institutions and their returns – without either wage 
rigidities or a working capital channel does not cause the macro results in the real 
sphere to change significantly in shocks related either to the trade or the capital account 
of the balance of payments. However, while one would have expected that the inclusion 
of a transmission channel in the tradition of ―money in the production function‖ by itself 
would cause the financial outcomes of the capital and trade account shocks to 
significantly affect the overall level of production and the unemployment rate, this only 
proved to be the case in the presence of strong wage rigidities. One of the reasons for 
the insufficiency of the working capital transmission channel, by itself, to significantly 
affect production, lies in its size, as measured by the contribution of working capital to 
total value-added in the calibrated model. The other lies in the relative stability of the 
                                                 
42 Not tabulated. 
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endogenous capital flows, as I will show in the next section where, in the context of 
applying the model to investigate the effects of Argentina‘s liberalisation experience, I 
will conduct sensitivity analysis on the elasticity of substitution among assets in the 
portfolio of the capitalist household.  
The incorporation of wage rigidities in the real and the real-financial model lead 
macroeconomic outcomes (activity level, employment and price level changes) to 
change in the same direction. However, these changes are significantly smaller in the 
case of the real model. This is due to the fact that the short-run real model does reflect 
that when the price level falls, the real wages of the formal workers increase and the 
employment and output levels fall, but ignores an additional transmission channel that 
works in the same direction. The mentioned contraction of the activity level tends to 
reduce the returns of the domestic financial assets, generating capital outflows that call 
for an improvement of the trade and current balances, which in turn call for a real 
depreciation in the form of a fall in domestic prices that feeds the increase in real wages 
and the fall in employment and output levels.  
The incorporation of endogenous households‘ currency holdings along the lines of 
transactions demand is an interesting variation of the short-run real-financial-augmented 
model. Its outcomes suggest that, for the case at stake, making currency demand 
endogenous does not affect in a significant way the models results. Following the 
principle of Occam‘s razor, for the rest of this dissertation, and in order to account for 
the short-run transmission from the volatility of capital flows to that of the activity level 
during the liberalisation experience in Argentina (St. Fact C8) in a relatively simple 
way, I will focus the analysis on the short-run version of the real financial augmented 
model with exogenous currency demand. 
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Figure 5-5 Transmission channels for a 10 percent fall in import tariffs in the short run 
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Short-run application: 
liberalisation in Argentina 
 
This part applies the final model built in Part I to investigate the effects of liberalisation 
in Argentina during its currency board (Chapter 6), and links the model to micro-
simulations, applying the layered model to investigate the full distributional effects of 
the capital outflows suffered by Argentina near the end of the currency board (Chapter 
7).   
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Chapter 6 Analysis of the effects of trade and 
financial liberalization in a CGE framework 
 
In this chapter I seek to shed light on the short-run stresses generated by trade and 
financial liberalisation in Argentina during the Currency Board (1991-2001), and to 
derive policy lessons. I do so by providing a concise description of how the Argentinean 
economy evolved during the Convertibility Plan (April 1991-December 2001), and by 
identifying in the process a series of stylised facts. After explaining how these facts are 
accounted for in the model exercise, I conduct a set of experiments investigating the 
short-run effects of the main external shocks faced by the country during the Currency 
Board. Besides, I conduct sensitivity analysis on a set of model parameters and validate 
the model‘s calibration against econometric estimates for Argentina. I conclude the 
chapter by summing up the results of the sensitivity analysis, evaluating the effects of 
the identified shocks in Argentina, and deriving policy implications. 
6.1   Argentina’s economy during the currency board  
 
Following a history of hyperinflation with annualised four-digit inflation rates during 
the 1980s, Argentina saw a resurgence of inflation at the beginning of 1991. Given that 
the nominal exchange rate was perceived as a main signal in the process of local price 
formation, in order to stabilise the economy the Argentinean authorities responded by 
implementing a currency board regime, whereby the local currency was pegged to the 
US dollar (St. Fact C1). By implementing this peg, the government expected the 
domestic inflation rate to converge with inflation at the international level and gradually 
restore the country‘s international competitiveness.  
 
The government set the parity in February and gave it law status in April 1991
43 
under 
the Law of Convertibility. The Law also prohibited price indexation, allowed contracts 
and payments in external currency and obliged the national monetary authorities to back 
the monetary base with international reserves (Cavallo and Cottani 1997)
44
 (St. Fact C2). 
                                                 
43 In February the conversion rate was fixed at 10.000 australes for 1 dollar. In April 1 the Law 23.298 
(self-baptised ―Convertibility Law‖) set a new currency (the Argentinean peso), with a conversion of 1 
peso to 10.000 australes, fixing the conversion rate at 1 peso for 1 dollar.  
44 However, room was made for flexibility. The international reserves, which served as the backup of the 
monetary base, included - with a roof of 20 per cent of the total - external-currency-denominated public 
debt securities. This allowed the Central bank to issue pesos with a backup of public debt securities. The 
limit was later increased to 30 per cent with the Tequila crisis (1995). 
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In this way, the Convertibility Plan severely limited the available macroeconomic policy 
instruments, affecting the public sector ability to pursue monetary expansion, fiscal 
deficit monetisation, and exchange rate policies
45
. However, the authorities believed 
that ―years of fiscal and monetary indiscipline had resulted in hyperinflation‖ (Cavallo 
and Cottani 1997, p.17), so that the cost of losing some autonomy in the conduct of 
economic policy was acceptable.   
 
The stabilisation plan was adopted together with a broader package of reforms, which 
included trade and capital account liberalisation and a series of measures aimed at 
reducing the interference of the public sector in the economy
46
. 
 
Regarding the trade sphere, at the end of the 1980s Argentina had implemented some 
unilateral liberalisation. In January 1991 the government took further steps to deepen 
the process by introducing a 22 per cent uniform tariff rate for most of the tariff 
universe (Berlinski, Kume, and Vaillant 2006, p.10). While trade liberalisation was 
general, it was more pronounced for the Mercosur area (St. Fact C3). In March, under 
the Asuncion Treaty, a free trade area was formed with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay 
(Mercosur area), to take full effect from the beginning of 1995. It was stated in its 
article 5 that: ―during the transition period, the main instruments for the constitution of a 
Common Market will be: a program of trade liberalisation, which will consist of tariff 
reduction (…) progressive, linear and automatic, accompanied by the elimination of 
non-tariff restrictions or measures with equivalent effects, as well as other restrictions to 
trade among the conforming States‖. For the area outside Mercosur, a common external 
tariff was agreed, with multiple exceptions and a convergence path to the common 
external tariff. The agreed average tariff for the extra zone was, for agricultural 
products: 10-12 per cent, for capital goods 12-16 per cent, for consumption goods 18-20 
per cent (Berlinski 1998, 2004; Berlinski, Kume, and Vaillant 2006). During the 
process, trade policy also changed in relation to exports, so that initial export taxes 
became export reimbursements (as detailed in Shock 1). 
 
                                                 
45 The scope of use of the former two instruments becomes tightened to the result of the balance of 
payments. The last instrument becomes only available by modifying the legislation. 
46 A Policy Matrix accounting for the evolution of Capital Account Policy, Other Monetary and Financial 
Policies, Trade Policy, Fiscal Policy, Privatisations and Deregulations, and Labour Market Policy is 
displayed in Appendix. 
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Concerning the financial sphere, its opening included a reduction in restrictions of 
mobility of all forms of capital, with equal treatment to national and foreign capital; free 
entry of direct and portfolio investment, elimination of the barriers to the entry of 
foreign banks, free bank emission of negotiable financial securities in foreign currency 
and unrestricted entry of foreign capital in pension funds (Bustelo 2002; Damill, 
Frenkel, and Maurizio 2002) (St. Fact C4).   
 
Quantitative measures of trade and capital account liberalisation suggest that significant 
liberalisation occurred in Argentina in the period immediately before and at the outset 
of the Convertibility Plan. Escaith and Paunovic (2004), expanding work done by Lora 
(1997) and Morley et al (1999), provide a trade openness index and a capital account 
openness index for the period. The former is a normalisation of a simple average of the 
average level of tariffs and the average dispersion of tariffs. The latter is a 
transformation of the average of four components: i) sector controls on foreign 
investment, ii) limits on profits and interest repatriation, iii) controls on residents 
borrowing abroad and iv) controls on capital outflows, with the sources for these 
components being the IMF‘s Balance of payments Arrangements and independent 
information from various World Bank country memoranda. The normalisations mean 
that the indices are always in the [0,1] interval, with the index increasing with the 
degree of openness
47
. As acknowledged by Morley et al (1999), these indices are only 
proxies for actual trade and capital account openness: they neglect non-tariff trade 
barriers, and subjectively translate verbal descriptions of capital account controls into 
indices. However, they do look at public sector efforts (rather than outcomes) to 
implement economic liberalisation. They give a clear indication of the degree of 
liberalisation in the period surrounding the start of the Convertibility Plan: while the 
index for trade openness was 0.692 for 1988, it was already 0.917 in 1992 and 0.927 in 
2000; while the capital account openness index was 0.400 in 1988, it was already 0.980 
in 1992 and 0.982 in 2000. 
 
With regard to the outcomes of the Convertibility Plan, as stated by Dr. Domingo 
Cavallo, the Ministry of Finance who put the Plan in place, it was a ―useful tool to stop 
                                                 
47 For each dimension (trade and capital account), and with r being the raw indicator, M (m) being the 
maximum (minimum) raw indicator across the 18 LAC countries considered in the 1970-2000 period, the 
actual indicator is generated with the I=(M-r)/(M-m) formula.  
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hyperinflation in Argentina‖ with ―resounding success‖ (Cavallo and Cottani 1997, 
p.17). However, together with trade liberalisation, inflation preceding and at the first 
years of the plan left the economy relatively uncompetitive. As documented by Damill 
et al (2002, p.19), the real exchange rate at the beginning of the Plan (measured in terms 
of the domestic and the US CPI) was significantly lower than in the previous period (42 
per cent lower than the level prevailing in the 1986-1988 period; 44 per cent lower than 
that prevailing in the 1986-1990 period; and 83 per cent of that in the 1990 Q4-1991Q1 
period), and the domestic currency continued appreciating during the course of the Plan. 
The relatively appreciated exchange rate, together with trade liberalisation, hurt tradable 
activities, as acknowledged by Cavallo (Cavallo and Cottani 1997, p.18), leading to a 
structural shift of production and factors away from tradable goods. It also led to 
external trade deficits that characterised the Plan from its second year onward. The trade 
deficit worsened further as a result of capital account inflows, as the latter contributed 
significantly to the expansion in the level of domestic activity and imports. 
 
During the Plan, the economy was hit by large capital account inflows and outflows (St. 
Fact C5) which played a dominant role in the short-run macroeconomic dynamics of the 
country. These inflows and outflows were largely determined by developments in the 
international financial markets. During the first three years of the Convertibility Plan, 
the returns on financial investments in the developed world were low. This and an 
unusually large IMF loan resulted in large positive private and official capital flows to 
the country (Damill, Frenkel, and Maurizio 2002, p.22). In turn, these inflows 
contributed to a significant increase in the levels of external debt which, together with 
the increasing current account deficits, increased the external financial fragility of the 
country. With the 1994 US Federal Reserve interest rates increase, the capital inflows 
were reduced and then reversed. With the significant external loan package coordinated 
by the IMF in 1995 acting as a catalyst for additional funding (Cavallo and Cottani 
1997, p.19), the capital inflow was restarted. Then, with the contagion of other financial 
crises (East Asian, Russian, Brazilian), the capital inflow was again reduced and then 
reversed. 
 
The periods of high capital inflows (1991-1994 and 1996-1998) generated positive and 
negative effects: on the positive side, they allowed to expand the international reserves 
held by the central bank, the monetary aggregates and domestic credit, lowering the 
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domestic interest rates and leading through demand and supply channels to expansions 
of the activity level; on the negative side, they led to a worsening of the international 
investment position of the country, with expansion of the public and private external 
debt and foreign holding of firms, and a consequent increase in net investment income 
paid to non-residents. By appreciating the domestic currency in real terms, capital 
inflows also led to a worsening of the country‘s trade deficit (St. Fact C6). This led to 
persistent current account deficits (commented above) and increasing net investment 
income outflows. Then, when the economy was hit by contractions of the capital 
inflows (and capital outflows), the balance of payment turned into deficit, and the 
monetary and activity level suffered a contraction. Independently of these cycles, 
Argentinean firms (especially, small and medium ones) faced tight financial constraints 
during the whole period (St. Fact C7) (Fanelli, Bebczuk, and Pradelli 2002). 
 
Overall, during the Convertibility Plan the country received a significant net capital 
inflow that was partly used to finance the increasing current account deficit and partly 
for domestic financial deepening. The capital flows were particularly volatile and, in the 
relative absence of available macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary and exchange rate) 
instruments to absorb the shocks, the volatility was transmitted to the activity level (St. 
Fact C8). 
 
As the external financial fragility of the economy increased, the private sector perceived 
higher risks in the devaluation of the domestic currency and default of domestic debts. 
To hedge against currency and country credit risk, the private sector increasingly 
accumulated external assets in its portfolio (St. Fact C9), thus reducing devaluation and 
default risks at the cost of lowering the expected return by investors and reducing the 
international reserves and liquidity of the country. The domestic financial transactions 
were increasingly dollarised – thus allowing the holders of foreign-currency-
denominated assets to pass the devaluation risk to the liability holders. The dollarisation 
was asymmetric (i.e. its degree was different on the asset and liability sides of the 
banks), which meant the emergence of sizeable currency mismatches and thus of costs 
of leaving the Convertibility Plan, in terms of balance sheet effects. When sustained 
capital outflows led to unbearable external and internal credit contractions, and in the 
context of political disturbances, the public authorities were forced to abandon the Plan. 
It ended in December 2001 when the Finance Minister Domingo Cavallo terminated the 
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monetary and exchange regime that he had inaugurated ten years before and established 
controls and restrictions on the foreign exchange transactions. 
 
The two capital flow cycles described above generated corresponding well-defined 
cycles in the activity level and in employment rates, with the latter accompanied by a 
significant downward trend. Specifically, the real appreciation of the domestic currency 
together with trade liberalisation led to a high labour-capital wage ratio, labour being 
essentially a non-tradable production factor and capital a tradable one. This led to 
imports and the gradual introduction of physical capital into the production process, 
implying in turn the adoption of a labour-saving technology characteristic of the 
developed countries that generated these imports (Altimir and Beccaria 2000; Bisang 
and Gomez 2000; Damill, Frenkel, and Maurizio 2002). This process reduced labour 
demand and affected the total hours worked, real wages and labour income. In the 
relative absence of social safety nets, these changes worsened income distribution. As 
argued and econometrically tested by Damill et al (2002), the adjustment of the relations 
between employment and output, which took place during 1991-1996, significantly 
drove the full-time employment rate down. As suggested by Milanovic and Squire 
(2005), the mentioned incorporation of technology into the production process was not 
neutral, biasing the demand for labour toward more educated workers (St. Fact C10). 
 
As described by Altimir and Beccaria (2000) and econometrically tested by Damill et al 
(2002), wages varied following general patterns across different sectors, strongly 
influenced by the unemployment rate, in a way consistent with wage curves derivable 
from insider-outsider or efficiency wage theories (Blanchflower and Oswald 1994). The 
abovementioned changes in the factor market severely affected income distribution 
(Goldberg and Pavcnik 2007, p.40). Specifically, the distribution worsened over this 
period, essentially driven by the increase in the education premium at the 
tertiary/university level and by the direct and indirect effects of unemployment on 
labour factor income (Altimir and Beccaria 2000), something not acknowledged by the 
authorities. 
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6.2   Stylised facts regarding the country (Cn) 
 
The stylised facts identified above are captured in the model in the following way. The 
Currency Board (C1) is captured with a fixed nominal exchange rate. The central bank‘s 
backup of the monetary base with international reserves (C2) is captured in terms of 
flow in the central bank‘s portfolio equation (72). The formation of Mercosur (C3), 
together with the reduction of import taxes to Extra-Zone and export reimbursements, 
are captured in Shock 1 (see below). The reduced restrictions on the mobility of all 
forms of financial capital (C4) are captured, letting non-residents hold deposits at 
domestic banks, domestic public bonds and equity and letting some domestic economic 
agents (banks and capitalist households) change their external asset positions. The 
presence of capital inflows and outflows (C5) is captured in Shocks 2 and 3 (below), 
respectively. The capital inflows impacting negatively on the current account and trade 
balance (C6) is captured in the equation relating the current and the capital account of 
the balance of payments (107). The binding character of working capital (C7) is 
captured by including working capital in the production function with a relatively low 
minimum wage. The volatility of capital flows being transmitted to the activity level 
(C8) is captured in the model, as capital flows are linked to the volume of bank loans, 
which – via the working capital channel – affect the activity level. The increase in 
external assets held by economic actors as the Currency Board Plan approached its 
collapse (C9) is captured in Shock 3. Finally, the model captures the complementarity 
between skilled labor and physical capital in the production function. However, given 
the static nature of the application, the physical capital stock is not allowed to vary, 
hence the corresponding increase in the skilled premium (C10) is not captured
48
.  
 
6.3   Shocks reflecting the main external shocks affecting Argentina  
 
To represent the main external shocks that hit Argentina during the Currency Board 
Regime, the following shocks are considered: 1) trade liberalisation with export 
reimbursement; 2) an increase in non-residents‘ holdings of domestic assets; and 3) an 
increase in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets. The purpose of the 
experiments is to identify their main effects on welfare in Argentina (including the 
activity level and income distribution) and derive implications for the use of policy 
                                                 
48 Making the model dynamically recursive is out of the scope of the dissertation.   
122
  
instruments, including the use of conventional macro policy instruments and the 
regulation of capital movements. 
6.3.1 Shock 1: Trade liberalisation with export reimbursement  
 
This shock comprises a combination of import tariff elimination (to Mercosur), import 
tariff reduction (to Extra-Zone), and conversion of export taxes to the Extra-Zone into 
export subsidies. The tariff rates at the beginning and end of the period are 
proportionately adjusted to be consistent with the SAM values. Specifically, they are 
adjusted to reflect the fact that the implicit tariff rate as derived from the ratio between 
import tariff revenue and import value in the SAM is 5.7 per cent, and that between 
export tax revenue and export value in the SAM is 1.8 per cent for primary goods and 
5.9 per cent for industrial goods. Tariffs are completely eliminated for imports from 
Mercosur. The Extra-Zone import tariff rates become 0.8 per cent for primary goods 
and 4.5 per cent for industrial goods. At the start, taxes to exports only are applied to the 
Extra-Zone. Exports to the Extra-Zone later became subsidised, at 0.8 per cent for 
primary goods and 3.8 per cent for industrial goods.   
 
The changes in trade taxes generate falls in public revenue (5.5 per cent) and in import 
prices - especially for Mercosur imports. Extra-Area export prices - as perceived by 
producers - increase, especially for industrial goods, which witness the highest export 
reimbursements.  As export prices increase and a higher share of production is allocated 
to exports, the market of domestic goods witness excess demand and the prices of 
domestic goods rise, although still allowing for an increase in the relative price of 
exports (4.5 per cent). The increase in domestic prices generates a rise in the CPI (1.5 
per cent) which, together with the increase in export prices, shifts the producer prices 
and in turn the GDP deflator upwards (2.5 per cent).  
 
The fall in public revenue increases - by 3.9 p.p. - the rate of return that the government 
needs to pay to finance its debt, generating in turn an increase in its payments to 
residents and non-residents which opens a savings gap that is filled by households. 
Households increase their savings by sacrificing consumption. Skilled and unskilled 
households channel their savings into deposits at domestic banks, allowing banks to 
increase their loans. Capitalist households increase their holdings of equity, bonds and 
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deposits abroad, reducing their deposits in domestic banks and generating a capital 
outflow from Argentina. As the country witnesses a capital outflow and payments to 
non-residents of dividends and interest increase, binding foreign reserves force the 
country to significantly increase its trade superavit (by 40.1 per cent). 
 
Table 6-1 Balance of payments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The increase in producer prices has a series of effects on the factor markets: the increase 
in the relative price of industrial exports shifts factors to the industrial sector, raising its 
share of production, as shown in the following table. The share of the private service 
sector is especially reduced, given that a high share of private consumption (which 
shrinks) is allocated to it.   
 
 Table 6-2 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 -0.11 
Industry 18.0 0.53 
Construction 5.5 -0.12 
Private Services 61.6 -0.23 
Public Services 7.1 -0.06 
Total 100.0 FIXED 
 
These producer price increases also lead to an increase in factor demands at given 
nominal wages which generates an increase in the level of use of formal workers, in turn 
allowing the unemployment rate to fall (1.70 p.p.) and real GDP to increase (1.1 per 
 Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 0.60 
Trade Balance 3.44 40.13 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 21.66 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 18.15 
Investment Income -11.90 -11.18 
Interests -10.91 -11.71 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 -5.34 
Capital Account 10.62 -0.60 
Non-Financial Private Sector 7.50 -1.11 
Public Sector 1.99 FIXED 
Commercial Banks 1.13 1.72 
Balance of Payment Result 2.16 -0.60 
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cent); and an increase in the nominal and real (CPI-deflated) wages of informal 
unskilled workers, physical capital and working capital. The increase in the CPI and the 
capital outflows reduce the availability of working capital in real terms. As mobile 
factors move to the industrial sector, the demand for physical capital falls in the other 
sectors, making the capacity utilisation of physical capital in these sectors fall, leading 
to an overall fall in capacity utilisation of 0.1 per cent. This only partially offsets the 
effect of the increase of the employment level on the activity level, with a final increase 
of the activity level of 1.1%.  
 Table 6-3 Factor use 
 Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 0.86 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 2.93 
Physical Capital 288.65 -0.11 
Working Capital 17.15 -2.38 
  *Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos 
 
Table 6-4 Real wages 
 Base % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82* -1.24 
Formal Unskilled 9.29* -1.31 
Informal Unskilled 9.29* 2.03 
Physical Capital 0.20 (%) 3.48 
Working Capital 0.35 (%) 7.54 
                                   *In thousands of Argentinean pesos per year per worker 
 
Income distribution shifts in favour of those factors whose real wages increase more 
(physical and working capital) and against formal workers. With these increases in the 
income shares of physical and working capital, the income share of the capitalist RHG 
shifts upward.    
Table 6-5 Factor income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Formal Skilled 13.2 -0.32 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 -0.18 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 0.00 
Physical Capital 31.7 0.41 
Working Capital 3.3 0.09 
Total 100.0 FIXED 
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Table 6-6 Household income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 -0.27 
Unskilled 64.6 -0.11 
Capitalist 21.3 0.38 
 
In short, and by the transmission channels just described, diagrammed in Figure 6-1, in 
the short run trade liberalisation cum export reimbursements allowed the activity level 
to shift upwards (1.1%). However, it also increased the current deficit of the public 
sector (15.1%), led to capital outflows that worsened the balance of payments with non-
residents (0.6%), generated some inflationary pressures and allowed the capitalist RHG 
to increase its share in national income (by 0.4 p.p.).  
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Figure 6-1 Transmission channels for trade liberalisation with export reimbursement   
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6.3.2 Shock 2: Increase in non-residents holdings of domestic assets 
 
Non-residents‘ holdings of domestic assets increased dramatically during the Currency 
Board regime. Those of domestic bonds increased from an initial value of 27.2 B$ to a 
final one of 87.2 B$; those of deposits at domestic banks from 7.9 B$ to 22.8 B$; and 
those of equity in domestic firms from 11.0 B$ to 38.9 B$, as derived from the 
country‘s Balance of payments with non-residents for the 1991-2001 period.49 The 
associated percentage changes are captured in this shock. Given that the model was 
calibrated using yearly flows (and not those for a decade), the percentage changes in the 
endogenous flows of the model resulting from the shock overestimate the actual effect 
which one would expect to observe during a given year. However, the results are useful 
for the purpose of understanding the main stresses generated by the abundant capital 
inflows entering the Argentinean economy during this period. This shock increases the 
level of net capital inflows, which contributes significantly to the accumulation of 
international reserves of the central bank and allows the economy to temporarily finance 
a significant current account deficit.  
 
Table 6-7  Balance of payments 
 
 
 
With the nominal exchange rate fixed, the increase in the current account deficit is made 
possible through domestic inflation (the price of domestic goods increases by 51 per 
cent), which causes an appreciation of the real exchange rate and leads to a shift in the 
                                                 
49 Not tabulated.  
 Base (B$) % change 
Current Account -8.46 -1,230 
Trade Balance 3.44 -2,686 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 -81 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 414 
Investment Income -11.90 -97 
Interests -10.91 -23 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 -915 
Capital Account 10.62 1,230 
Non-Financial Private Sector 7.50 856 
Public Sector 1.99 2,918 
Commercial Banks 1.13 746 
Balance of Payment Result 2.16 1,230 
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country‘s foreign trade from an initial trade superavit position to a large trade deficit: 
the export value falls, and the import value increases, causing the aggregate demand 
share of net exports to fall and leaving scope for an increase in final consumption.  
 
Table 6-8 Aggregate demand component shares 
 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Absorption 98.20 30.09 
Private Consumption 77.35 31.81 
Fixed Investment 15.37 -0.54 
Public Consumption 5.49 -1.18 
Exports 11.22 -9.99 
Imports -9.43 20.11 
GDP (C+I+G+E-M) 100.00 0.00 
 
 
With export prices fixed, producer prices increase proportionately less in the tradable 
sectors, providing incentives for the economy to mobilise resources out of the sectors 
producing tradable commodities towards non-tradables, especially private services, 
which have a high share in final consumption. 
 
Table 6-9 Sector value added shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Primary 7.9 -4.16 
Industry 18.0 -3.16 
Construction 5.5 0.17 
Private Services 61.6 7.39 
Public Services 7.1 -0.24 
Total 100.0 FIXED 
 
 
These capital inflows significantly expand the working capital available in the economy, 
causing a rise in the productivity of, and demand for, the real factors. With the nominal 
wages of the formal workers essentially fixed, the price increases drive their real wages 
down and increase their use. As the mobile factors move out of the tradable sectors, the 
oldest vintages of the physical capital stock in the tradable sectors stop being utilised, 
lowering the overall rate of capacity utilisation of the physical capital stock by 6.3 per 
cent, only partially offsetting the growth of the activity level. The producer price 
increases lead to an increase in the demand for, and the wages of, informal unskilled 
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workers and physical capital, with physical capital demand being increased in the 
expanding non-tradable sectors.   
 
Table 6-10 Factor use 
 Base* % change 
Formal Skilled 1.43 4.35 
Formal Unskilled 7.39 20.27 
Physical Capital 288.65 -6.26 
Working Capital 17.15 81.42 
   *Workers in millions of individuals. Capital in billions of Argentinean pesos. 
 
Table 6-11 Real wages 
 Base % change 
Formal Skilled 16.82* -16.36 
Formal Unskilled 9.29* -10.45 
Informal Unskilled 9.29* 5.71 
Physical Capital 0.20 (%) 41.23 
Working Capital 0.35 (%) -61.93 
                                   *In thousands of Argentinean pesos per year per worker. 
 
The changes in factor use lead to a significant reduction in the unemployment rate (11.6 
p.p.) and a significant increase in the activity level (6.6 per cent).   
 
Table 6-12 Macro indicators 
 
 
Base Change 
Real GDP 189.86* 6.56 
Unemployment rate ** 14.0 -11.58 
CPI 1.00 46.34 
            * In billions of Argentinean pesos 
                                  ** Base in %, change in percentage points 
 
The expansion of the economy contributes to an increase in firms‘ profits and in the 
return on equity in every sector, as shown in Table 6-13. The capital inflow, by 
significantly increasing the supply of working capital, leads to a significant fall in its 
real wage, generating a reduction in the nominal remuneration of bank loans (5.2 p.p.) 
and deposits (3.4 p.p.). As commented below, the public revenue increases with the 
expansion of the economy, thus contributing to a lowering in its deficit and its supply of 
public bonds, leading in turn to an increase in the price of bonds and hence a fall in their 
return. 
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Table 6-13 Rates of return 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Bonds 48.7 -33.47 
Deposits 23.0 -3.42 
Equity, primary 20.7 11.03 
Equity, industry 20.6 24.99 
Equity, construction 21.2 40.75 
Equity, private services 23.5 55.71 
Loans 35.0 -5.21 
 
Income distribution among factors and households is driven by the outstanding increase 
in the real wage of physical capital, which lifts the income share of physical capital by 
6.0 p.p.
50
 and the income share of capitalist households by 4.0 p.p., with the fall in the 
real wage of working capital only partially offsetting the growth of the latter. 
 
Table 6-14 Household income shares 
 Base (%) p.p. change 
Skilled 14.1 -2.48 
Unskilled 64.6 -1.50 
Capitalist 21.3 3.98 
 
To sum up, the model captures how the set of capital inflows received by the 
Argentinean economy during its Currency Board allowed the economy to boost its 
activity level (6.6%) at the expense of a real exchange rate appreciation (31.1%) that 
reallocated factors in the production of non-tradables, leading to worsen the trade and 
the current account balances of payments with non-residents. The inflow allowed 
financing temporarily the public sector deficit. In the distributional sphere, it led to 
increase the income share of the capitalist RHG (4.0 p.p.). The transmission channels 
are diagrammed below in Figure 6-2. 
 
 
                                                 
50 Not tabulated. 
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Figure 6-2 Transmission channels for an increase in the non-residents holdings of domestic assets   
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6.3.3 Shock 3: Increase in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets   
 
This shock captures the increase in the probability of default on domestic assets 
perceived by domestic actors.
51
 By attributing the observed difference between the 
return on public bonds and the risk-free world interest rate as the probability of default 
on domestic bonds, the probability of default increased by 78 p.p. during the period.
52
 
The shock is captured as a 60 p.p. increase, giving that larger values make the model 
crash
53
 and that part of the observed excess in the return on public bonds over world 
interest rate may be due to the presence of expected devaluation in the case of local-
currency denominated bonds.  
 
Given that the relevant transmission channels for this shock are similar to those 
described for the first shock of Chapter 5 (where the same parameter increases by 30 
p.p.), I describe very concisely here the results. The diagram of the transmission 
channels for the present shock is laid out in Figure 6-3, including the magnitudes 
involved. It suggests that the non-linearities present in the CGE model play an important 
role in the generation of the results: the endogenous variables here tend to move in the 
same direction than in Chapter 5, but with the associated changes more than doubling 
the previous ones.  
 
An increase of 60 percentage points in the perceived probability of default on domestic 
assets leads to a strong change in capital flows (the capital account superavit shrinks by 
48.9%) and a real devaluation (with a 2.4% fall in the CPI) that allows the trade and the 
current account balance to improve. The shock causes international reserves to fall, 
reducing the monetary base and the supply of working capital in the economy. With 
fixed nominal wages for formal workers, their real wages rise, leading the employment 
level to fall, and the rate of unemployment to increase by 4.8 percentage points. The fall 
in factor use generates a contraction of the activity level (of 6.0%), which in turn hits 
negatively the public sector revenue (by 7.7%). Given the change in the structure of 
                                                 
51 The capital flows determined by non-residents are exogenous in the model. 
52 Obtaining ∆pdef=pdef2001-pdef1991 with rbt*(1-pdeft)=rwt, with t=1991, 2001; pdef=perceived 
probability of default; rb=return on domestic public bonds; rw=risk-free world interest rate. 
53 The reason seems to relate to the neoclassical nature of the model, which makes the model crash when 
price changes are insufficient to re-establish market equilibria.  
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production associated to the real depreciation and the increase in the real wages of 
formal workers, the income share of the unskilled RHG rises 0.16 p.p., to the detriment 
of the share of the capitalist RHG.   
6.4   Sensitivity analysis  
 
This sensitivity analysis is performed with the dual purpose of assessing the model‘s 
robustness and validating it against econometric estimates. For an increase in the 
perceived probability of default on domestic assets, I vary the elasticity values in the 
capitalist household portfolio, the import-domestic Armington, and the export-domestic 
CET functions, as shown in the following table. The model is shown to be robust to 
elasticity changes for small shocks, but when the model is hit by strong shocks, i.e., the 
enormous capital inflows witnessed by the country as captured in Shock 2, the model 
has a strong tendency to crash when elasticity values are varied. Either lowering the 
Armington or the CET elasticity values or increasing the capitalist household portfolio 
elasticity values tends to make the model crash, something which does not happen with 
the original version of the RFA model, which suggests the possibility that the wage 
rigidities imposed here to capture the short-run reaction of the economy may be 
compromising its robustness.   
 
The following table shows the effects on selected variables of an increase of 30 
percentage points in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets, varying the 
elasticity of the financial portfolio shares of the capitalist household (originally at 1.05), 
that of the export-domestic destination CET function, and that of the domestic-import 
Armington function (both originally at 4.5).  
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Table 6-15 Sensitivity analysis on a set of elasticities for an increase in the perceived probability of 
default on domestic assets 
Changes* Capitalist portfolio 
elasticity 
CET 
elasticity 
Armington 
elasticity 
1.001 1.05 2.0 0.5 2.25 4.5 0.5 2.25 4.5 
Exports 0.23 2.96 -48.91 .. 1.84 2.96 6.25 4.17 2.96 
Imports -0.56 -6.22 -85.86 .. -10.64 -6.22 -5.76 -5.96 -6.22 
Capital account 
NFPS 
-1.10 -23.88 -56.99 .. -29.76 -23.88 -31.01 -26.39 -23.88 
Price of domestic 
goods 
-0.07 -0.80 16.20 .. -1.51 -0.80 -1.66 -1.12 -0.80 
Real GDP -0.18 -1.82 4.31 .. -2.93 -1.82 -3.34 -2.36 -1.82 
Tradable value-added shares 
Primary 0.02 0.26 -1.70 .. 0.31 0.26 0.47 0.33 0.26 
Industry 0.00 0.00 1.67 .. 0.01 0.00 -0.14 -0.05 0.00 
Implicit elasticities with respect to real exchange rate 
Exports 3.45 3.72 3.02 .. 1.22 3.72 3.77 3.73 3.72 
Imports 8.43 7.79 -5.30 .. 7.05 7.79 3.47 5.33 7.79 
*_Changes in percentage terms, except for shares, which are in percentage points.  
 
If the elasticity in the financial portfolio is reduced, the effect of the relative drop in the 
expected return on domestic assets in the capital account balance shrinks, together with 
its effect on trade flows, domestic prices, activity level and sector shares. Increasing this 
elasticity changes the model results dramatically and is ―out of the domain‖ of the model 
in the sense that it leads to sign reversals in relevant model results and to fail in the intent 
to reflect that capital outflows end up generating falls in the activity level, as mentioned 
in Chapter 1, Section ―Effects of capital account openness on growth‖. When the 
elasticity in the financial portfolio of the capitalist household takes a value of 2, the 
magnitude of the capital outflow increases substantially and the supply of working capital 
falls significantly. The latter generates increases in the remuneration of working capital 
and in the price at which output is produced and sold. In turn, the increase in the output 
price leads to raise the demand and the use of formal workers and allows the overall 
supply of goods to increase. The increase of the remuneration of working capital 
generates some sector re-allocation of production. In particular, given the relatively 
intensive use of working capital by the primary sector vis-à-vis the industrial one, the 
production cost increases ceteris paribus more in the former, and factors and production 
move out of the primary sector and into the industrial one. With the primary sector being 
more export-intensive than the industrial one and the industrial sector being more import-
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intensive than the primary one, the production reallocation ends up improving the trade 
balance via import-substitution instead of via raising exports.     
 
If the elasticity in the CET function is reduced, the outflow calls for a higher real 
depreciation, in the form of a drop in domestic prices, with a higher positive effect on real 
wages and hence a larger negative effect on the activity level, and a shift of part of the 
adjustment in the trade balance from exports expansion to imports contraction. Finally, a 
fall in the Armington elasticity also increases the real depreciation, exacerbating the 
negative effect on the activity level, and shifting the bulk of the adjustment, in contrast, 
from import contraction to export expansion, with associated changes in the share of the 
primary sector (export intensive) and the industrial sector (import intensive) in domestic 
value-added.   
 
The implicit elasticity of imports and exports to changes in the real exchange rate is 
calculated, dividing the endogenous percentage changes in each by those in the real 
exchange rate. It is clear that the elasticity in the Armington function affects the implicit 
elasticity of imports to changes in the real exchange rate. However, it is also clear that for 
a given Armington elasticity, this implicit elasticity depends on parameters which are 
extraneous to the import function: with an Armington elasticity of 4.5, different 
elasticities in the CET function and the capitalist portfolio asset shares generate implicit 
elasticities of imports for the real exchange rate in the [-5.30, 8.43] range. Most of the 
resulting values greatly exceed econometric estimates for the country during the 
Convertibility Plan: Damill et al. (2002, p.38) reports an elasticity of 0.244, and Catao 
and Falcetti (2002) report elasticities in the [0.7, 0.8] range. This could indicate that the 
elasticity parameters in the model should be revised downward. However, this excess of 
import elasticity in the model compared to the econometrically estimated version may be 
also due to the lack of use in these regressions of a system of simultaneous equations, 
which would have accounted for the endogeneity of the variables explaining imports. 
Besides, it remains unidentified which of the elasticity parameters present in the model 
should eventually be revised, as different combinations of elasticity parameters would 
provide it with an import elasticity matching an econometrically estimated one.  
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6.5   Conclusions   
 
It has been shown that the model is highly responsive to the elasticities in the import-
domestic Armington function, in the export-domestic CET function, and in the portfolio 
demand of the capitalist household, and that it tends to generate implicit elasticities of 
imports to changes in the real exchange rate that exceed those estimated with 
econometric tools, with part of the excess probably reflecting that the general equilibrium 
effects are ignored in these econometric estimations.  
 
Trade liberalisation–cum-export reimbursement and capital inflows (Shocks 1 and 2) 
have expansionary effects on the activity level, and capital outflows (Shock 3) 
contracting ones. The main transmission channels are 1) shifts in labour demand derived 
in turn from a change in real wages in the formal labour market, with labour demand 
increasing in shocks 1 and 2 and falling in shock 3; and 2) shifts in the availability of 
working capital – rising in shock 2, and shrinking in shock 3. Given that Argentina 
received an overall net capital inflow during the Currency Board, liberalisation seems to 
have had a positive cumulative effect on the activity level in Argentina. However, the 
model also suggests that the volatility of capital flows was significantly transmitted in the 
short run to the activity level, so that capital account liberalisation seems also to have led 
to an increase in the volatility of social output in Argentina. 
 
Regarding the effect on income distribution, trade liberalisation and capital inflows in the 
short run increased the income share of the capitalist RHG, while capital outflows had the 
opposite effect. Given the net capital inflow received by the country, one would expect 
the share of the capitalist RHG to have increased overall due to liberalisation, leading to 
increased inequality, at least with measures that give a greater weight to the incomes in 
the upper part of the income distribution (e.g. GE2).  
 
When trying to compare the results to those from other CGE models, it can be seen that 
the IMMPA model was not applied to Argentina. It was applied in Brazil, but given that 
137
  
 
it assumes that the supply of foreign capital is perfectly elastic – something that does not 
seem to be a realistic assumption for Argentina - the comparison is not straightforward. 
In that application of IMMPA (Agénor et al. 2003), the central bank lifted the interest 
rate on rediscounts, generating a similar increase in the cost of funds, where the main 
transmission channel is a fall in labour demand and hence a fall in the income share of 
the non-capitalist RHGs, and a lift in that of the capitalist RHG. In other words, in the 
IMMPA model capitalists are able to avoid most of the burden of the economic 
contraction. As I will show in the next section, this result is also found in the present 
model when it is linked through the factor market to microsimulations, bypassing the use 
of RHGs in the generation of distributional indicators.   
 
Carolina Diaz Bonilla‘s thesis (2005) investigates the effects of trade liberalisation on 
income distribution in Argentina during the Convertibility Plan, but in her model the 
capital income is not used to classify households into RHGs, which means that the 
change in income shares between capitalists and other households is not investigated. In 
any case, the distributional results seen when using a CGE model with representative 
households are not detailed, and it seems worthwhile to link the CGE model with a 
household income model using household-level data, as is done in next section.   
 
The above analysis leads to a set of policy implications. To mitigate the volatility of 
capital flows, which is transmitted to the activity level, the costs and benefits of 
regulating international capital flows should be investigated, taking stock of the available 
theoretical and empirical evidence, including that surveyed by John Williamson, 
Stephany Griffith-Jones and Ricardo Gottschalk (2005) and Neil McCulloch and Gracia 
Pacillo (2010).  
 
To avoid long-lasting current account disequilibria with non-residents, as derived in the 
model from capital inflows and observed in the country during the Currency Board, the 
country‘s authorities need to preserve the exchange rate and fiscal and monetary policies 
in their set of available instruments. This is a lesson which Argentina learned late in 2001 
when, after facing a series of external crises, its authorities decided to derogate the 
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Convertibility Law, moving into an administered exchange rate regime which has 
allowed the country to significantly raise its competitiveness, and making discretionary 
use of monetary policy to counteract the effect of international capital flows on the 
activity level, even at the cost of generating inflationary pressures. 
 
Last, to the extent that trade liberalisation and other shocks cause the productive structure 
of the economy to change, the reallocation of workers formerly employed in shrinking 
sectors may take time. This is not acknowledged in the model, which assumes full 
mobility of workers among segments. Yet in practice (as observed in Argentina) 
structural changes may generate employment problems, and during the transition it may 
be necessary to implement an extensive unemployment benefit program for which the 
public sector needs to assure resources in advance.  
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Figure 6-3 Transmission channels for a 60 p.p. increase in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets 
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Chapter 7 Analysis of the effects of capital outflows 
in a top-down CGE-microsimulations framework 
  
7.1   Introduction 
  
The CGE model used in the previous chapter was based on representative household 
groups (RHGs). As such, on its own, and as argued by Anne-Sophie Robilliard, François 
Bourguignon and Sherman Robinson (2008)
54
 – RBR from now on – it does not allow us 
to fully account for the observed households and individuals‘ heterogeneity or to evaluate 
changes regarding the full income distribution.  
  
To overcome these limitations, in this chapter I link the CGE model with a 
microsimulation model (MSM), thereby incorporating households and individuals‘ 
heterogeneity and thus allowing for a better distributional analysis. As described by 
Bourguignon and Spadaro (2006, p.78), the seed of microsimulation as an instrument for 
economic analysis was planted by Orcutt (1957), and since the early 1980s the use of 
MSMs has been encouraged by the rise of large and detailed datasets on individual agents 
and the continuing increases in, and falling costs of, computing power. As explained by 
Carolina Diaz Bonilla (Diaz Bonilla 2005, p. 87-89), early microsimulation studies were 
mainly focused on wage distributions: Almeida dos Reis and Paes de Barros (1991) 
considered the effect of education on wage distribution in Brazil; Juhn et al. (1993) 
looked at wage differentials in the US from 1963 to 1989 and Blau and Khan (1996) 
sought to explain why US wage differentials systematically exceeded those of other 
OECD countries during the 1980s. The next stage of microsimulations was focused on 
broadening their application beyond wage distributions – as did Bourguignon and 
Ferreira (2003), who analysed the impact of different taxes on income distribution at 
household level. In the third (present) stage, household data is combined with data at a 
higher level (sector, market, or economy-wide) allowing, among other things, to simulate 
the effects of policies and other shocks on a sample of economic agents (individuals, 
                                                 
54 I especially thank Anne-Sophie Robilliard for providing me with the Stata code developed by her and 
Vivi Alatas for the microsimulations module of the mentioned paper on Indonesia. 
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households, firms) at the individual level, thereby permitting the evaluation of the full 
distributional impact of these shocks.  
 
At present, efforts to link CGE models to microsimulations to study the distributional 
consequences of macroeconomic shocks and policies are an area of great interest (Davies 
2009, p.49). The link can be made either by fully integrating them – as in Cogneau and 
Robilliard (2006) and Cockburn (2006), where information on sampled agents is 
integrated into the CGE model – or by ―layering‖ the two models in what is called the 
―top-down‖ approach, whereby the CGE model (a level above actual individuals and 
households) is allowed to inform the microsimulation model. As Davies suggests, while 
the integrated approach is theoretically more transparent, the layered approach is also 
interesting and promising, and has a relative advantage when the concern is with short-
term distributional impacts in a setting where realism is at a premium and theoretical 
niceties are less important (Davies 2009, p.53 and 56). Besides, the layered approach 
allows us to by-pass the problem of identifying the heterogeneity of factor endowments 
and preferences at the level of single households or individuals (Bourguignon, Robilliard, 
and Robinson 2004, p.3). 
 
As explained in RBR, layered microsimulation models can be subdivided into arithmetic 
and behavioural. Arithmetic ones assume that the distribution of income within (RHG) 
groups is exogenous and constant, and ignore behavioural responses. Behavioural 
microsimulations account for the changes in both between- and within- (RHG) groups‘ 
inequality and consider behavioural responses (typically, consumption demand and 
labour supply). The usefulness of the latter in the analysis of public policies and shocks 
mainly involves their ability to fully take into account the heterogeneity of the economic 
agents observed in micro-datasets. They allow us to investigate the effects on individuals 
and households with existing combinations of characteristics that cannot be apprehended 
through typical cases. They help to identify with precision who are likely to be winners 
and losers following a reform or shock, thus providing crucial information on welfare 
effects.    
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In this layered behavioural approach, Ganuza, Paes de Barros and Vos (2001) build a 
micro-simulation model that selects at random the individuals who change labour status 
and/or sector. In contrast, RBR build a micro-simulation model that econometrically (and 
not fully randomly) model the way rationing occurs in the labour market – that is, as a 
function of the observed and unobserved characteristics of the individuals supplying 
labour. In RBR, then, the main purpose of the MSM is to select individuals who are 
barred from (or let into) jobs, thus allowing selection to depend on individuals‘ 
heterogeneity.  
 
In this chapter I link, in a layered way, the CGE model with a partly econometric 
microsimulation model. The latter includes a household income generation model that 
follows the specification of the CGE model. The macro-level CGE results for a given 
shock provide updates for the levels of employment in each labour market segment, 
average wages in these segments, relative prices, and capital incomes
55
. The macro-level 
results are transferred down to the micro-level household income generation model, 
providing new individual employment status, wages and capital incomes, which in turn 
inform distributional indicators and figures that can be evaluated. As in RBR, the 
selection of the individuals who are fired (or hired) when there is a change in labour 
demand is based on econometric analysis.  
 
Carolina Diaz Bonilla (2005) models the sector allocation of individuals in ways that 
depart from the RBR model. This chapter follows RBR in that it compares the 
microsimulated distributional results by applying different techniques (behavioural and 
arithmetic microsimulations, as RBR do). However, it departs from RBR‘s methodology 
due to two extensions: capital incomes, which are exogenous and fixed in RBR MSMs, 
are endogeneised here, and the transmission channels communicated from the CGE 
model to the microsimulation module (joint in RBR) are separated into 1) employment, 
2) wages and prices and 3) capital income effects.    
                                                 
55 Differently than in Diaz Bonilla (2005), I have chosen to endogenise capital income even though these 
incomes are perceived to be underestimated in the Argentine Permanent Household Survey. Letting capital 
income be exogenous would have led us to ignore a channel which, in this case, is relevant from a 
distributional point of view.  
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To illustrate the approach, I look at the distributional effects of the capital outflow 
suffered by Argentina in the period surrounding the end of the Convertibility Plan. 
Specifically, I capture the distributional effects of the drop in non-residents‘ deposits at 
domestic banks, amounting to 35.0 per cent in the period December 2000 – December 
2001, from 32.9 billion dollars to 21.4 billion dollars, and separate the transmission 
channels involved. This shock is especially interesting given that the large and sustained 
capital outflows led the Argentinean government to abandon the Convertibility Plan – 
first by devaluing the exchange rate (December 2001) and then by letting the local 
currency float (February 2002) – and led to an economic crisis that included a short-run 
worsening of social indicators, including unemployment rates and the poverty and 
inequality indices (Frenkel and Rapetti 2006).    
 
Departing from the work of RBR, I improve the process of determining the 
unobservables affecting the selection of who is fired (or hired) when labour demand 
changes occur; I take account of sample selection bias in the wage equations by adapting 
the two-step Heckman procedure for consistency with the logit function used to explain 
employment; I improve the Newton algorithm process used to adjust the household 
income model after a macro shock, by allowing it to get closer to the macro target 
without sacrificing speed and, for the evaluation of poverty and distributional changes, I 
extend the set of indicators and graphs used. Specifically, I use international and national 
methodologies for setting the poverty line, include Lorenz Curves at household level, and 
graphically consider the changes in household per-capita income by classifying the 
households not only in percentiles but also in ventiles, and by comparing their results.  
 
In the microsimulations, the following steps are followed: 1) a household income model 
is specified consistent with the CGE model; 2) the specified model is estimated; 3) 
specific CGE macro outcomes are generated and communicated to the model; 4) these 
CGE outcomes are attributed at the micro level using behavioural and arithmetical 
microsimulations, which generates new distributions of employment status, wages, 
capital incomes and household incomes; 5) distributional indicators and graphs are 
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prepared and evaluated, throwing light on the magnitude of the channels illuminated by 
the behavioural (as opposed to the traditional arithmetical) approach, and the 
distributional effects of capital outflows in Argentina.  
7.2   The household income model 
 
The household income model defines the total nominal income of each household as a 
non-linear function of the observed and unobserved characteristics of the household and 
its members. The model is composed of a household income identity, which separates out 
labour and non-labour income; an indicator function that determines the labour status of 
the individuals supplying labour; an equation that determines wages for the individuals at 
work; and an equation that sums up the non-labour income components. Next, I will 
discuss the specification of these equations, explaining its consistency with the modelling 
of the factor markets in the CGE model in question.   
7.2.1 Household income identity  
 
Nominal household income is simply the sum of nominal labour and non-labour income 
of the individuals in the household.  
    ∑           
   
                
where: 
   : nominal income of household h 
   : dummy variable identifying labour status (1 for employed, 0 otherwise) of 
individual i in household h  
  : nominal wage of working individual i in household h  
   : non-labour income of individual i in household h 
7.2.2 Employment status of individuals supplying labour 
 
For the MSM to be consistent with the modelling of the labour market in the stylised 
macro CGE model to which it is linked, the characteristics of the latter need to be 
consistently translated into the former. This task is undertaken as described in the 
following table:  
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Table 7-1 Consistency between the macro and micro models 
Macro model Micro model 
The labour market is segmented into 
formal skilled, formal unskilled and 
informal unskilled components, with no 
mobility among them in the short run. 
 
Individuals supplying labour are assigned 
to one of these segments and once assigned 
remain there. 
The labour supplies are exogenous and 
fixed in the short-run period under analysis.  
Only individuals supplying labour in the 
base simulation supply labour after the 
simulations.  
 
In the informal segment there is full 
employment.  
 
All individuals informally employed 
remain so.  
 
In the formal segments there is some 
unemployment. 
 
The unskilled unemployed individuals are 
located into the formal segment.  
Individuals supplying labour in the formal 
segments need to be assigned among 
employed and unemployed alternatives in 
each simulation.  
 
For individuals supplying labour in the formal labour segments, the assignment in terms 
of employed vs. unemployed is done according to some criterion the value of which is 
specific to the individual (   
 ). As in RBR, a view of the labour market as rationed 
suggests we refrain from calling this criterion value ―utility‖, since employment and 
unemployment are not outcomes depending on a free decision taken by the individuals 
supplying labour, but an outcome of the job rationing in the labour market. For a given 
individual, his/her criterion value of being employed must exceed that of being 
unemployed in order to become employed. As there, the criterion value follows the 
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additive random utility model (ARUM): it has a deterministic (observed by the analyst) 
and a random component, both being completely known by the individuals
56
: 
       (   
     ̅̅ ̅̅
 
)      (      
        ̅̅ ̅̅
 
)        
where: (Amemiya and Shimono 1989, p.14) 
   : dummy variable identifying labour status (1 for employed, 0 otherwise) 
  : observed characteristics of labour suppliers affecting employment status  
  : intercept affecting the criterion value of being employed in segment s 
  : slopes in effect of observed characteristics on criterion value of being 
employed in segment s 
  : unobserved determinants of employment status
57
 
   
   criterion value for the employment alternative of individual i 
   ̅̅ ̅̅
 
  criterion value for the unemployment alternative 
7.2.3 Wage determination 
 
Wages of employed individuals (strictly, their logs) are explained as a function of 
personal and household characteristics, with a residual capturing unobserved earning 
determinants and, probably, measurement errors. The coefficients of the equations are 
allowed to differ by labour segment, allowing observable characteristics to affect wages 
in different magnitudes across segments.   
       
     
                         
where: 
  : nominal wage of working individual i 
  : characteristics of working individual i and his/her household 
  : intercepts in log-wage earning equation in segment s 
  : slopes in log-wage earning equation in segment s 
    unobserved determinants of log-wage of individual i
58
 
                                                 
56 In Amemiya and Shimono, where the focus is on the labour supply decision, ―utility is completely known 
to the individual but is a random variable for the econometrician‖ (Amemiya and Shimono, 1989, p.14). 
Here, as in RBR, ―utility‖ is replaced by a ―criterion value‖, as the focus is on whether the individual gets a 
job given his/her labour supply.  
57 Assuming absence of measurement errors. 
58 Assuming absence of measurement errors. 
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7.2.4 Non-labour income 
 
Non-labour income is the sum of dividend earnings, the net interest flow earned, and a 
residual element (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  ) that captures all other sources of income, all in nominal terms. 
With     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅   being exogenous and fixed in the CGE, it is kept as such in the micro model. 
                     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅                   
where: 
   : non-labour income of individual i 
     : dividend earnings of individual i 
     : net interest flow earned by individual i  
     ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ : other incomes of individual i  
 
This completes the specification of the household income model consistently with the 
modelling of the factor market in the CGE model for Argentina.   
7.3   Estimation of the model 
 
Every element in the household income model must be determined, which implies the 
sequential observation of variables in the household survey (                      
                    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ), econometric estimation of the parameters in the employment 
(   and   ) and wage (   and   ) equations, and attribution of unobservables in those 
equations (      
     ̅̅ ̅̅
 
      ).  
 
7.3.1 Observation of variables in the household survey 
 
The household survey used to gauge labour and non-labour incomes, employment status, 
and covariates for the employment and wage equations, is the October 2001 wave of the 
Permanent Household Survey (PHS, ―EPH‖) carried out by the National Institute of 
Statistics and Census (INDEC), which gathers information on individual socio-
demographic characteristics, income sources and labour indicators, and provides sample 
weights indicating the number of individuals or households represented by each 
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individual or household in the sample, once corrected for missing data. This wave of the 
survey covers 29 urban areas (all the urban areas with more than 100,000 inhabitants), 
accounting for 87.2 per cent of the country‘s population.  
 
The survey classifies individuals into employed, unemployed or inactive (i.e. neither 
working nor actively searching for a job). It thus allows for the identification of 
individuals at work and individuals supplying labour (including the employed and the 
unemployed).  The survey has also information on gender, education (completed level 
and years of education), age, marital status
59
, regional dummies, a household head 
indicator and number of children (individuals with age not exceeding 14 years old), 
which potentially affect the employability of the individuals and so are useful to provide 
covariates for the employment status equation (  ).    includes work experience of the 
individual, which is proxied by the age minus the years of education minus the obligatory 
age of start of education.    is given by    once the household head indicator and the 
number of children have been excluded, variables which are perceived as affecting the 
employability of labour suppliers but not having an effect on the wages of the individuals 
at work, and provide reasonable instruments for testing the presence of sample selection 
bias due to incidental truncation, as explained in next section
60
. The survey allows for the 
categorisation of individuals into skilled and unskilled, the former being those who have 
completed high school. Formal workers are identified as those contributing to social 
security, with work risk insurance and/or compensation if they are fired. Finally, each 
sampled household is categorised into one of the representative household groups (RHG): 
households whose capital income exceeds labour income are classified as capitalist ( ). 
Non-capitalist households whose household head finished secondary school are 
categorised as skilled
61
( ). The rest of the households are categorised as unskilled ( ).    
(Gray 1997; Korenman and Neumark 1991) 
                                                 
59 Marital status is reported to affect performance and wages by Korenman (1991, p.282) when analyzing 
evidence on white males. One of the most robust findings in human capital wage equations has been that 
married men earn more than men who never marry (Gray, F, 1997, p. 482).  
60 Finding a perfect instrument is virtually impossible given that observed variables tend to affect labor 
demand both in relation to whether an individual is hired and how much he or she is eventually paid. 
61 In the case of missing information for the household head, the skill level of other members of the 
household was evaluated, starting with the partner of the household head.   
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7.3.2 Econometric estimation of the parameters in the model 
 
To estimate the effect of the mentioned covariates             on employment status and 
(log) wages, respectively, econometric estimations are conducted, determining the values 
of the (         and   ) parameters in the model. 
 
Parameters in the employment equation.    Parameters    and    in equation (2) are estimated 
using segment-specific binomial logit functions in the formal labour market, i.e. 
assuming that, in each of these segments, the unobservables are identically and 
independently distributed (IID) and come from a logistic    . Logit is preferred to probit 
given the property satisfied only by the former, by which the average in-sample predicted 
probability equals the sample frequency, which makes the link between the coefficients 
in the segment-specific logit functions and employment rates at macro level more direct. 
Unemployment is taken as the base category for conducting the binomial logit estimation. 
 
From the original 15,221 formal skilled and 7,238 formal unskilled workers present in the 
micro database, the model is run on 14,574 skilled and 6,858 formal unskilled workers, 
the reduction in observations by and large due to missing data on years of education. In 
both segments, the overall significance of the model is not rejected and completed 
education level, experience, marital status, household head and number of children in the 
household are significant determinants of the employment status at the 1% level. Their 
effects are positive, except for number of children in the household, which has a negative 
effect. The positive effect of experience is reduced with each increase in its value.  
 
As a by-product of the estimation of this equation for the household income model, 
impact and marginal effects are estimated, with benchmarks being married males heading 
households in Great Buenos Aires who have not completed the educational level 
achievable inside their skill categories
62
 and have mean experience (17.7 years for the 
skilled, 25.9 years for the unskilled). The probability of being employed is 90.2 per cent 
for the skilled benchmark and 55.5 per cent for the unskilled one. Providing both 
                                                 
62 This level is primary for unskilled and university for skilled. 
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individuals in the benchmark with covariates with positive effects on their employment 
status reduces the gap between their employment probabilities. For example, ceteris 
paribus, completing education level (primary school for the unskilled, university for the 
skilled) increases the probability of being employed by 17.6 p.p. for the unskilled and 5.8 
p.p. for the skilled, closing the probability gap by 11.8 p.p. An additional year of 
experience increases the probability of having a job by 2.5 p.p. (unskilled) and 0.8 p.p. 
(skilled). Heading a household increases the probability of being employed by 14.6 p.p. 
(unskilled) and 2.7 p.p. (skilled). Being married increases it by 15.7 p.p. (unskilled) and 
4.3 p.p. (skilled). Belonging to a larger household is associated with a lower probability 
of being employed (1.1 p.p., unskilled and 0.5 p.p., skilled)
63
. There are regional 
differences in both labour segments: for skilled individuals, the probability of being 
employed is smaller in La Pampa and Great Buenos Aires; for unskilled individuals, the 
employment prospect is (20.7 p.p.) better in Patagonia than in Great Buenos Aires. Being 
male significantly increases the likelihood of being employed only for the unskilled (5.8 
p.p.).   
 
Parameters in the wage equation.    Separate regressions are run to estimate the parameters of 
the wage equation for each labour market segment. In the labour segments where 
unemployment is allowed (the formal ones), the wage equation is potentially subject to 
the presence of sample selection bias, by which the unobservables in the OLS estimation 
of the wage equation are correlated with those in the employment status equation, hence 
biasing the OLS estimates of the wage equation. This form of sample selection bias is 
known as ―incidental truncation‖ (Wooldridge 2003,p560-2), by which we observe log-
wages only for those at work i.e. the truncation of observed wages is incidental in the 
sense that it depends on another variable: employment status.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
63 This is consistent with the World Bank 1999 Poverty Assessment on Argentina finding that poor 
households tend to be larger.  
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Table 7-2 Explanation of employment status in formal labour market segments 
Binomial Logit CDF:        |    
  
     
 
    
     
  
 
 Variable   Formal skilled Formal unskilled  
 Coef  dy/dxM  Coef  dy/dxM 
MaleD 0.0393 
(0.0560) 
0.0035 
(0.0050) 
0.2333 
(0.0651) *** 
0.0581 
(0.0162) 
MarriedD 0.4145 
(0.0643)*** 
0.0431 
(0.0071) 
0.6360 
(0.0586) *** 
0.1573 
(0.0142) 
Household HeadD 0.2747 
(0.0691)*** 
0.0270 
(0.0071) 
0.5901 
(0.0666) *** 
0.1462 
(0.0161) 
Completed Education LevelD 0.9702 
(0.0705)*** 
0.0583 
(0.0054) 
0.7799 
(0.0825) *** 
0.1762 
(0.0204) 
Experience 0.0900 
(0.0072)*** 
0.0079 
(0.0008) 
0.0997 
(0.0083) *** 
0.0246 
(0.0020) 
Experience squared -0.0013 
(0.0001)*** 
-0.0001 
(0.00001) 
-0.0014 
(0.0001) *** 
-0.0003 
(0.00003) 
Number of children -0.0613 
(0.0133)*** 
-0.0054 
(0.0012) 
-0.0483 
(0.0116) *** 
-0.0119 
(0.0028) 
Region NorthwestD 0.1752 
(0.0830)* 
0.0144 
(0.0069) 
0.1277 
(0.0884) 
0.0313 
(0.0216) 
Region NortheastD 0.3896 
(0.1037)*** 
0.0293 
(0.0077) 
0.0793 
(0.1052) 
0.0195 
(0.0258) 
Region CuyoD 0.3618 
(0.1060)*** 
0.0275 
(0.0079) 
0.1742 
(0.1057) 
0.0425 
(0.0257) 
Region PampaD 0.0674 
(0.0749) 
0.0057 
(0.0065) 
-0.0770 
(0.0800) 
-0.0190 
(0.0198) 
Region PatagoniaD 0.6654 
(0.1056)*** 
0.0449 
(0.0072) 
0.9434 
(0.1000) *** 
0.2071 
(0.0220) 
Constant 0.5730 
(0.0996)*** 
  -2.5913 
(0.1637) *** 
  
 
N 14,574   6,858   
McFadden-R
2
 0.0952   0.1252   
Prob >    0.0000   0.0000   
 Base category: unemployed. Standard errors between parenthesis. 
*: significant at 10% level.  **: significant at 5% level.  ***: significant at 1% level.   
D: dummy variables 
M: marginal and impact effects reported by segment for a married male heading a household in Great 
Buenos Aires who has not completed education level corresponding to his skill category (primary for 
unskilled, university for skilled) and has mean experience (25.9 years for unskilled, 17.7 years for skilled). 
 
 
In the case of employment status being explained by a probit model, the standard OLS 
regression        
     
    ,     |      becomes        
     
  
         , where        is the inverse Mills ratio coming from the probit model i.e. 
minus the ratio of the standard normal     and     valued at the index function for each 
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individual      
     
  , and where ρ is its associated coefficient in the log-wage 
equation. To detect and eventually correct for the selection bias, the widely used two-step 
Heckman procedure 1) computes       using probit and 2) includes it as a regressor in 
the OLS equation to test the significance of the sample selection bias. If the null of lack 
of significance of sample selection bias (      ) is rejected, the additional regressor 
      is included in the OLS regression to avoid the mentioned bias in the OLS estimates.  
 
In this case, the 2-step Heckman procedure is adapted since the logistic distribution 
function (rather than the normal distribution) was used to estimate the employment status 
equation. The inverse Mills ratio is substituted by minus the ratio between the logistic 
    and    . Its     is given by 
   
     
. Its     is the derivative of the     respect to   . 
Hence,     (
   
     
)
 
 
(   )
 
(     )    (     )
 
(     )
  
          
        
 
      
        
       
    
              . Then the analogous to the inverse Mills ratio becomes 
            
            
    
                  with       being the predicted 
probability of the base outcome (unemployment) for each individual.  
 
 
From the original 13,226 skilled, 3,732 formal skilled, and 10,559 informal unskilled 
employed individuals, the model is run on 10,627 skilled, 3,386 formal unskilled and 
8,636 informal unskilled, again the reduction in observations by and large due to lack of 
data on years of education. In all segments the overall significance of the model is not 
rejected. Sample selection bias in the wage equation of the formal segments could not be 
rejected and thus was corrected for by the adoption of the two-step procedure
64
. There are 
significant regional differences in wages. For example, a skilled individual working in La 
Pampa would expect to earn 3.38 per cent less than someone with the same observable 
characteristics working in Great Buenos Aires. In every labour segment, ceteris paribus, 
males earn more than women, and those who have completed education level enjoy 
higher wages than the rest, with the differences being statistically significant though quite 
                                                 
64 The same result showed up when checking using the traditional 2-step Heckman procedure. 
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tiny. For example, for a skilled individual, keeping other characteristics constant, being 
male increases the predicted wage by 0.35 per cent on average. Experience has a 
premium only in the formal skilled and informal unskilled segments, which decrease on 
it, with the maximum being around 35 years of experience for the skilled and 41 years of 
experience for the informal unskilled
65
. There is a significant marital status premium in 
the skilled and informal unskilled segments. 
7.3.3 Attribution of unobservables.  
 
The unobservables in the employment equation and the wage equation 
(      
     ̅̅ ̅̅
 
      ) need to be attributed in order to complete the determination of the 
elements in the household income model.   
 
To impute the unobservables    and    
 ,    values need to be drawn randomly from the 
inverse of a logistic     and be consistent with the observed employment status: the     
for every employed individual should be such that his/her criterion value for employment 
exceeds that for unemployment (   
   ̂     ̂
       ̅̅ ̅̅
 ) and for every 
unemployed individual his/her criterion values of employment does not exceed that limit, 
    
   ̂     ̂
        ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ). In RBR Stata code, the    are drawn randomly from 
the mentioned    , but the consistency with the observed employment status is not 
assured. I extended the code following Fields and Soares (2004,p249-250) explanation in 
their application to Malaysia: for individuals whose criterion value implied by the 
randomly generated residual is inconsistent with the observed employment status, their 
unobservables   are generated again, and the process is repeated until all individuals 
have criterion values consistent with their observed labour status
66
.  
 
  
                                                 
65 This comes from maximising log W = a.EXP + b.EXP2 + C  respect to EXP, with W being wage, EXP 
being experience, a and b being the estimated coefficients of experience and its square for each labour 
segment, and C being all other log-wage determinants. 
66 The randomness at stake does have an impact on the distributional result of the microsimulation. The 
impact proved to be rather small, what is consistent with the variability of the criterion values tending to be 
dominated by that of its deterministic component, as coming from comparing the standard deviations of 
   
               (1.60). 
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Table 7-3 Explanation of log wages by labour market segment 
 
Variable Formal 
skilled 
Formal 
unskilled  
Informal 
unskilled  
Male 0.3538 0.1800 0.4347 
 
(0.0140)*** (0.0241) *** (0.0164) *** 
Completed Education Level 0.3692 0.1027 0.2563 
 
(0.0229)*** (0.0365)*** (0.0223 *** 
Experience 0.0209 0.0033 0.0406 
 
(0.0031) *** (0.0045) (0.0021) *** 
Experience squared -0.0003 -0.00001 -0.0005 
 
(0.0005) *** (0.00006) (0.00003)*** 
Married 0.0594 -0.0386 0.1753 
 
(0.0166) *** (0.0251) (0.0175) *** 
Region Northwest -0.5441 -0.2794 -0.3334 
 
(0.0226) *** (0.0273) *** (0.0273) *** 
Region Northeast -0.6392 -0.3000 -0.4162 
 
(0.0273) *** (0.0324) *** (0.0308) *** 
Region Cuyo -0.5720 -0.2731 -0.3440 
 
(0.0283) *** (0.0333) *** (0.0319) *** 
Region Pampa -3.3764 -0.1500 -0.1115 
 
(0.0214) *** (0.0253) *** (0.0261) *** 
Region Patagonia -0.0891 0.0713 0.2595 
 
(0.0277) *** (0.0374) * (0.0320) *** 
Inverse Mills Ratio 2.3143 0.8279   
 
(0.1990) *** (0.1296) ***   
Constant 6.2963 6.2981 4.4198 
 
(0.0705) *** (0.1614) *** (0.0420) *** 
N    10,627       3,386       8,636 
R2 0.3182        0.2240       0.2109 
Prob>F   0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
*: significant at 10% level.  **: significant at 5% level.  ***: significant at 1% level.   
Standard errors between parentheses. 
 
The criterion value associated with unemployment can be set arbitrarily: while RBR and 
Fields and Soares (2004) set the criterion value for the ―unemployed‖ alternative at zero 
(  ̅̅ ̅̅    ), I set it for convenience at the mean of the index function of the employed 
alternative (  ̅̅ ̅̅      ̂     ̂
  ). This meant that instead of waiting for hours without 
Stata getting a set of consistent criterion values, the process was successfully completed 
with less than 100 iterations.  
    𝑖 =  
𝑠 +  𝑖 
𝑠 +  ( 𝑠 +  𝑖 
𝑠) +  𝑖                  (3) 
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Unobservables    affecting the log wage are needed to impute potential wages for all the 
active individuals, and were imputed strictly following RBR. For individuals at work 
with a positive reported wage, it is imputed as the residual of the OLS regression (once 
sample selection bias was accounted for). For those unemployed or at work with a 
reported null wage, it is randomly attributed from a normal distribution with mean zero 
and a standard deviation which is given by the estimated residuals of the OLS regression.  
7.4   Communication of CGE macro outcomes 
 
At this stage, the household income model is ready to receive macro information from the 
macro CGE model. I turn now the attention to the CGE model. Given the focus of this 
chapter, I will explain briefly how the macro shock is simulated, the main transmission 
channels at stake and how the communication from the CGE model to the household 
income model is made.  
 
The real-financial-augmented-short-run (RFAS) CGE model previously developed, 
which explicitly models the financial mechanisms and accounts for short-run wage 
rigidities, is calibrated for the year 2001. In doing this, the 1991 already built SAM is 
updated to 2001 by imposing data available for 2001 on nominal GDP, aggregate demand 
components, activity shares in value added and tax receipts – to value added, labour 
payments, profits, import taxes and export taxes – as informed by the National Accounts 
2001. The SAM is then made consistent by using the cross-entropy programme 
developed by Sherman Robinson and Scott Mc Donald, which treats every cell in the 
SAM as being specified with an error support set, and specifies a prior for each error 
distribution. Figures for labour supplies and unemployment rates in the different 
segments of the labour market, Rates of return on financial assets, and the currency 
supply – which are not in the SAM, which only captures flows – were also updated to 
2001.  
 
The capital outflow is then simulated, the main transmission channels at stake highlighted 
and estimates of changes in relevant macro variables presented for subsequent 
communication to the micro model. Deposits of non-residents at domestic banks fell 
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approaching the end of the Currency Board regime by 35.0 per cent, from 32.9 billion 
dollars (December 2000) to 21.4 billion dollars (December 2001). The transmission 
channels are shown in the diagram below, and are similar in general to those found for an 
increase in the perceived probability of default on domestic assets in the previous chapter.  
The shock essentially leads to a contraction of the economy, with falls in the use of 
formal skilled and unskilled labour ( ̂           ̂         ), falls in labour 
nominal wages for formal skilled, formal unskilled and informal unskilled ( ̂   
        ̂           ̂         ), and falls in the price of primary and 
industrial goods ( ̂          ̂        ), tiny falls in dividends earned by 
residents (    ̂        ) and net interest earned by domestic households (    ̂  
      ). All the RHGs (skilled, unskilled and capitalist) suffer nominal incomes losses: 
(  ̂           ̂           ̂        )
67
. 
 
To decompose the behavioural microsimulation effects in order to understand the 
cumulative effects of the macro changes in the employment level, relative prices and 
capital incomes and then to compare the results against traditional arithmetic 
microsimulations, first the CGE model is allowed to increasingly inform the 
microsimulation model in different simulations as shown in the following figure: it 
communicates macro changes in 1) the employment levels in the formal segments, 2) 
nominal wages and prices and 3) capital incomes. The CGE also informs RHGs incomes 
changes (  ̂    ̂    ̂ ), thus allowing to conduct traditional arithmetic 
microsimulations (Sim.4, RHG) which provide a comparison point for the behavioural 
microsimulations.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67
 The relatively large fall in the income of the capitalist RHG is an unintended result of the model 
described in a previous chapter. The capital outflow reduces the money base and, for the banks‘ reserve 
ratio to remain constant, the deposits of the capitalist households turn negative. This makes the interest 
flowing from the  banks to them on their deposits become negative, and their total income fall significantly. 
The behavioural microsimulations conducted here allow us to avoid this problem with the generation of 
household income counterfactuals. 
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Figure 7-1 Behavioural microsimulations 
 
 
7.5   The attribution of the changes at micro level 
 
Changes are first attributed for employment and wage changes (Simulations 1 and 2), 
then also for capital income changes (Simulation 3), and finally for household income 
changes (Simulation 4).   
7.5.1 Simulations 1 and 2 
 
The household income model is used to generate micro changes consistent with the set of 
macro changes communicated from the CGE model. Households‘ and individuals‘ 
observed and unobserved characteristics need to remain unchanged. However, the 
parameters in the household income model need to change in order to generate micro 
results consistent with the equilibrium of aggregate markets in the CGE model in terms of 
employment levels and average wages (Simulations 1 and 2). Following the methodology 
designed by RBR, the changes in the parameters are made assuming ―neutrality‖ with 
respect to individual characteristics i.e. changing the intercepts of the equations     and 
    of the household income model. The neutrality holds in the following sense: 
changing the intercepts   of the log wage equations generates a proportional change of all 
wages in each labour-market segment, and changing the intercepts   of the logit model 
implies that, for each individual, the relative change in his/her ex-ante probability of 
being employed depends only on his/her initial ex-ante probability rather than on his/her 
individual characteristics. 
 ̂  ,  ̂   
 ̂  ,  ̂  ,  ̂  ,  ̂𝐴 ,  ̂  
    ̂,     ̂ 
Sim.1
Sim.2
Sim.3
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Figure 7-2 Transmission channels for a 60 per cent fall in the domestic deposits held by non-residents 
 
↓non-residents deposits 
at domestic banks
(35.0%)
↓capital account balance
(66.2%)
↑current account 
balance (66.2%)
↑trade 
balance 
(75.9%)
↑exports  
(10.1%)
↓imports  
(17.4%)
real 
depreciation 
with ↑ 
price of 
tradables
(3.4%)
↓ producer 
prices 
(2.0%)
↓ working 
capital 
supply 
(2.6%)
↓ working 
capital real 
wage (4.4%)
↓ domestic 
interest 
rates (1.4 
p.p. 
deposits, 
2.1 p.p. 
loans)
↑unemployment rate 
(2.8 p.p.)
↓use of formal workers 
(6.2% skilled, 6.5% 
unskilled) and physical 
capital (6.5%)
↑real wage of formal 
skilled (1.8%), formal 
unskilled (2.1%) and 
informal unskilled (7.2%) 
workers.
↑share of 
tradables in 
value added 
(1.0 p.p.)
↓activity level
(5.4 p.p.)
↑households 
savings
↓households 
consumption 
(11.3%)
↓public revenue 
(6.4%)
↓public savings 
(4.7%)
↑income share of 
unskilled (0.25 p.p.) and 
↓ that of physical 
capital (0.28 p.p.)
↑income share of 
unskilled RHG (0.83 p.p.) 
and ↓ that of capitalist 
RHG (0.83 p.p.)
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To implement the needed changes in the equation intercepts, let us call the set of 
intercepts row vector                        , the original macro figures      
(                           ), the macro targets column vector  
     
    
     
    
     
    
  ‘, with its elements given by   
           ̂        
  
         ̂  ,      and     being the employment rate
68
 and the average nominal 
wage for each labour market segment in the sample once sample weights have been 
accounted for, and  ̂  and ̂  the associated percentage changes coming from the CGE 
model.  
 
The problem is to find an   vector consistent with the       macro target vector. This 
leads to a system of non-linear equations with as many equations as unknowns (5). The 
solution can be searched using the Newton‘s (also known as Newton-Raphson‘s) 
method, which works by finding successively better approximations to the root of a 
real-valued function or system of equations that is continuous and differentiable in the 
interval going from the initial guess to the root (Iserles 1996,p95-6). For a real-valued 
function with only one argument, as illustrated in the following graph, one starts with an 
initial guess (  ) which should be reasonably close to the true root ( ). The value of the 
function and its derivative are evaluated there (      and       ) and used to get a new 
guess      given by the x-intercept of the tangent to the function evaluated at   . 
Algebraically, the new guess is given by         
     
      
 . The process is iterated 
until convergence to the root is reached.  
Figure 7-3 Newton’s method 
 
                                                 
68 Defined as the ratio between employed individuals and individuals supplying labor in the segment. 
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In the present case, the Newton's method is used to solve not one equation but a system 
of equations, which amounts to finding the zeroes of continuously differentiable 
functions           . Instead of a simple derivative, one needs to get a Jacobian 
matrix   with all the possible combinations of partial derivatives of the elements of      
respect to the elements of  : 
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The departure point for the implementation of the Newton algorithm was given by the 
code used in RBR. The original code presented a problem: once the macro target was 
relatively close (but the distance to it exceeded the tolerance), the intercepts started to 
move up and down without reducing with each simulation the distance to the target. To 
avoid this problem, I adjusted the algorithm so that it is able to approach the target at a 
relatively high speed but when the target is passed, i.e. when the macro figure is below 
(above) the target before the step, but above (below) it after the step, the algorithm 
reduces the step by which the intercept in the equation is adjusted.  
 
In more detail, the Newton algorithm was conducted in the following way: 
1. The maximum number of iterations for the algorithm 𝑖    was set, as well as the 
tolerance Euclidean distance     between the final      and the target       macro 
figure, and a      diagonal matrix which regulates the size of the steps given when 
changing the different intercepts in each iteration. 
2.      was computed for the original intercepts  .   
3.       target was assigned using the CGE outcomes.   
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4. A vector  𝑖              was computed, as well as its Euclidean distance to 
the origin:  𝑖𝑠  √ 𝑖     𝑖  . 
5. If  𝑖𝑠  exceeds     and while number of iterations is below or equal to 𝑖   : 
a. Compute the Jacobian matrix   and its inverse     
b. Compute vector   𝑖           𝑖   
c. Decrease   by   𝑖   
d. Compute      
e. Calculate  𝑖        𝑖𝑠   
f. If  𝑖𝑠  changes sign (i.e. if the target was ―missed‖), half the      diagonal 
matrix element  
6. The outcome intercepts   and the Euclidean distance of macro values to target  𝑖𝑠  
are reported, as well as the labour income of each individual (zero for those 
unemployed). 
 
As pointed out by Iserles (1996,p95-6), the computation of a Jacobian matrix and the 
solution of a linear system in each iteration makes the Newtonian technique costly. 
However, for small systems of equations as the one at stake, the solution is reached 
relatively fast.  With the commented adaptation in the algorithm, a maximum of 100 
iterations allowed, an original dump factor of 0.5, and a tiny target distance (1*10
-6
), the 
algorithm hits the iteration limit (100 iterations) in less than 5 minutes per simulation, 
arriving at simulated intercepts that allow the percentage variations in employment rates 
and average wages to be replicated at two decimal points of precision. As expected,     
and     fall to allow employment levels to shrink. However,    ,     and     do not 
fall systematically, which reflects that some individuals with wages exceeding the 
average wage in the associated labour segments are fired, making the average wage fall, 
ceteris paribus, and calling for wage increases for those still employed in order for the 
average wages not to fall more than is indicated by the macro target.   
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Table 7-4 Estimated and simulated intercepts of labour and wage equations 
Intercept Regression Simulation 1 Simulations 2 & 3 
    0.5730 0.4746 0.4746 
    6.2963 6.2942 6.2903 
    -2.5913 -2.6634 -2.6634 
    6.2981 6.2941 6.2935 
    4.4198 4.4198 4.3450 
 
7.5.2 Simulations 3 and 4 
 
The adjustment of individual capital incomes (Simulation 3) and household incomes 
(Simulation 4) is pretty straightforward, as it is performed arithmetically. The capital 
incomes are adjusted in simulation 3 using the percentage changes    ̂     ̂ coming 
from the CGE model. For simulation 4, the income of each sampled household is 
adjusted using the income change of the RHG associated to that household (  ̂    ̂  
or   ̂  . 
7.6   Income distribution, poverty and welfare effects at household level 
 
For microsimulations regarding individual incomes (SIM1-SIM3), simulated incomes at 
the individual level are translated at the household level making use of the household 
income identity     and -before- of the non-labour income equation (4). Then, to 
evaluate the income distribution, poverty and welfare effects of the capital outflow 
using household level data, I use the following set of tools: an average income indicator, 
inequality indicators (Gini and General Entropy), poverty indicators (Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke using different poverty lines) and graphs looking at the percentage changes 
in income by ventiles and percentiles of household per capita income, taking account of 
sample weights
69
.  
 
Four different poverty lines are used to calculate the FGT indicators: the dollar-a-day 
and 2-dollar-a-day poverty lines, and those used by the National Statistics Office in 
Argentina (INDEC): extreme and moderated poverty lines. In the base scenario, where 
                                                 
69 Original frequency weights are proportionately adjusted upwards keeping the total sum of weigths 
constant given that some households are dropped from the sample, as explained below. 
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the dollar and the Argentinean peso are traded in a one-to-one relation, household 
specific dollar-a-day and 2-dollar-a-day poverty lines are computed as 30 times the 
household size, given that the recollection period is one month.  
 
INDEC‘s methodology to define the poverty line is based on adult equivalents in the 
households and estimated consumption needs. The number of adult equivalents in each 
household is calculated by summing the adult equivalent of each individual in the 
household, which is in turn a function of the gender and age of the individuals (an 
―Adult Equivalent‖ table provided by INDEC was used). The household-specific 
INDEC poverty lines are then generated reflecting constant economies of scale in 
consumption (as INDEC methodology states), by simply multiplying the number of 
adult equivalents in the household times the value of the poverty lines per adult 
equivalent as informed by INDEC for October 2001 (A$ 61.02 for the extreme one and 
A$ 150.11 for the moderated one).  
 
The poverty lines are adjusted in simulations 2 to 4 in the light of changes in 
commodity prices  ̂   ̂ , which affect the value of the INDEC poverty lines, weighting 
the price changes following the official poverty line methodology (27.5 per cent for 𝐴 
and 72.5 per cent for  )70.   
 
The indicators and graphs are then prepared for the income distribution vector in the 
benchmark and the simulations, adjusting for sample frequency weights. By analysing 
the simulated incomes based on the 21.795 of the 22.991 households that were 
originally in the database
71
, and using their associated sample weights, it is found that 
household per capita income falls more than 3 per cent mainly due to the fall in 
employment levels (SIM1) and not as much (only around 1 per cent) due to the fall in 
wages (SIM2), a result in turn coming from the wage rigidity captured in the CGE 
model. Changes in capital income (SIM3) are tiny (as informed from the CGE output). 
Overall, household per capita income falls 4.4 per cent in the behavioural 
microsimulations (SIM3), below the 5.4 per cent in the arithmetic ones based on 
representative household groups (RHG), the difference capturing the different weights 
                                                 
70 The official moderated poverty line comes from multiplying the extreme poverty line (the price of a 
Basic Food Basket) by the inverse of the Engel coefficient, which is kept fixed.  
71 Households with one or more individuals not reporting wage covariates were dropped, and frequency 
weights for the remaining households were proportionately adjusted.  
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that factor incomes have in household incomes in the CGE model and in the micro 
database.   
 
The cumulative effects of employment, wages and capital income changes (Simulation 
3) consistently lead to increases in every inequality and poverty indicator for every 
poverty line. The Gini coefficient increases from 48.9 to 49.8. However, with the 
average income falling from A$ 309.1 to A$ 295.5, the average expected difference 
between two individuals randomly taken falls around 2 per cent (from A$ 302.3 to A$ 
294.3)
72
. The increases in the Gini are due to the loss of jobs and to a lesser extent to the 
reduction of labour wages. The Entropy Index shows a similar behaviour, but starts at a 
higher level than the Gini and increases by more than it given that the Entropy Index 
gives a higher weight to the upper tail of the income distribution, and that the 
households in the upper tail of the distribution have an income which significantly 
differs from the rest
73
 and do not suffer the significant income fall affecting the rest of 
the households. Arithmethic microsimulations, unable to capture the effect of the loss of 
jobs on individual incomes, lose a large part of the action, and lead to conclude that 
inequality goes down, independently of the inequality indicator used (the Gini falls from 
48.9 to 48.7 and the Entropy Index from 63.9 to 63.2). Independent of the 
microsimulation at stake, the changes in inequality are too small to be visualised in a 
Lorenz curve (Figure 7-4). 
  
In the behavioural microsimulations, as per capita income falls and inequality increases, 
the poverty headcounts, the poverty gaps and the poverty severity indices rise for the 
different poverty lines, reflecting increases in the share of the households below the 
poverty line, the average difference between the income of the poor households and the 
poverty line, and income inequality among the poor households. For all these indicators 
and with all the poverty lines at stake, the increase is mainly due to the employment fall, 
though there are some slight increases due to the wage fall, and there is no change at all 
due to the capital income changes.  
 
                                                 
72 The expected difference between two individuals randomly chosen is given by twice the Gini 
coefficient times the average income (Ray, 1998). 
73 Not tabulated. 
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For the middle and upper percentiles of household per capita income, the employment 
effect on income proves to be larger than the wage effect, both effects being negative. 
However, for the first 30 centiles, the wage effect is larger than the employment effect. 
As clearly shown in Figure 7-5 and Figure 7-9, it is the distribution of lost jobs the one 
basically shaping the income changes after a threshold given by the 30
th
 centile. 
Though, as shown in the same figures for those at the bottom of the distribution the 
wage effect is typically larger than the employment effect, reflecting that jobs lost affect 
their income less severely than wage falls. The analysis of income changes in terms of 
percentiles allow to see a higher degree of heterogeneity than the analysis in terms of 
ventiles. (Ray 1998) 
Capital income changes are insignificant
74
, which is hardly surprising given the tiny 
changes in capital income communicated from the macro model. Finally, Figures 7-7 
and 7-11 give a clear indication of the power of behavioural microsimulations to capture 
the heterogeneity of income changes in different parts of the income distribution due to 
a macro shock, as opposed to arithmetic microsimulations, which would give us the 
impression that the shock has a pretty homogenous effect and that its slight 
heterogeneity leads to a more progressive income distribution.    
 
Figure 7-4 Lorenz curves 
                                    
 
 
 
 
                                                 
74 This is the reason why in Figures 7-6 and 7-10 only a single line can be seen.  
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Table 7-5 Per capita income, inequality and poverty by simulation 
 
Indicator BASE SIM1 SIM2 SIM3 SIMRHG 
Per capita income 309.1 298.6 295.5 295.5 292.4 
Inequality 
  Entropy Index (α=2)
75
 63.9 66.7 67.8 67.8 63.2 
  Gini Index 48.9 49.5 49.8 49.8 48.7 
Poverty 
Official Extreme Poverty Line 
Head-Count Index (P0) 11.5 12.8 12.9 12.9 11.8 
Poverty Gap Index (P1) 6.7 7.9 8.0 8.0 6.8 
Poverty Severity Index (P2) 5.4 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.5 
      
Official Moderated Poverty Line 
Head-Count Index (P0) 31.1 32.9 32.8 32.8 31.9 
Poverty Gap Index (P1) 15.2 16.6 16.7 16.7 15.5 
Poverty Severity Index (P2) 10.4 11.7 11.7 11.7 10.6 
US$ 1-a-day Poverty Line 
Head-Count Index (P0) 7.3 8.6 8.9 8.9 7.7 
Poverty Gap Index (P1) 5.2 6.4 6.5 6.5 5.3 
Poverty Severity Index (P2) 4.6 5.8 5.8 5.8 4.7 
US$ 2-a-day Poverty Line 
Head-Count Index (P0) 14.1 15.6 16.1 16.1 15.1 
Poverty Gap Index (P1) 8.0 9.2 9.5 9.5 8.3 
Poverty Severity Index (P2) 6.1 7.3 7.5 7.5 6.3 
 
 
 
 
7.7   Conclusions 
 
By linking the CGE model to a behavioural microsimulation module in a layered way, 
the approach takes full account of the observed households‘ and individuals‘ 
heterogeneity and is useful to evaluate the short-run effects of macro policies and 
shocks on the full income household distribution, capturing the presence of job 
rationing. Departing from the state-of-the-art work by RBR, I took account of the 
presence of sample selection bias in a consistent way in the wage equation, 
                                                 
75 α=2 such that zero income cases can be captured in the index 
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endogeneised the capital income in the household income model, improved the 
algorithm used to adjust the individual labour status and wages of the individuals, and 
extended the set of distributional and poverty indicators and graphs used.    
 
 
The household income model built here allows for an explicit representation of the 
actual combination of income sources within sampled households and, weighting 
appropriately, of the represented population. The link of the CGE model with this micro 
model allows thus to see how macro phenomena affect individual jobs and income 
sources, and to look at the relative importance of the different transmission channels by 
which the CGE model communicates to the microsimulations model.      
 
 
The conclusion of RBR, by which the selectivity of labour market rationing is the 
channel through which economy-wide phenomena have the most distributional impact 
(Bourguignon and Spadaro 2006, p.95), was confirmed here for most of the household 
groups (ventiles or percentiles). However, for the first groups, it was found that the 
wage changes affect them more than employment changes. Backing up these points, the 
relative importance of the employment channel was quantified and shown graphically, 
filling an existing gap in the literature. As in RBR, it was found that the distributional 
effects coming from behavioural microsimulations are larger than those found 
conducting the traditional RHG approach. 
 
The analysis which was conducted (and especially its visual inputs, Figures 7-7 and 7-
11, give a clear indication of the power of behavioural microsimulations to capture the 
heterogeneity of income changes in different parts of the income distribution due to a 
macro shock, clearly having an advantage for this purpose in comparison to arithmetic 
microsimulations. Arithmetic microsimulations seem to miss a large part of the action in 
this case, as they ignore the effect of the employment level fall on the income of the 
individuals who lose their jobs, a link which proves to be key in the distributional 
effects of the illustrated macro shock.  
 
The capital outflows were found to lead to a fall in the employment level that, in 
absolute terms, exceeded 226 thousand jobs. This, in turn, shifted 77 thousand 
households in the country into poverty, a result robust to different poverty lines used. 
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Besides, it made the income inequality indicators shift up, generating an increase in the 
Gini coefficient of almost 1 percentage point.   
 
To a certain extent, this suggests that the capital flows allowed by capital account 
liberalisation in Argentina had a significant impact on poverty and distribution in the 
country, and that the large and volatile capital flows hitting the Argentine economy 
during the nineties led to an increase in the vulnerability of households to poverty, with 
capital outflows reducing households‘ income, shifting a number of them below the 
poverty line and increasing inequality, and capital inflows putting the inverse process in 
motion.    
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Figures. Percentage changes in household per capita income and employment by income ventile 
 
          Figure 7-5 Income simulations 1 and 2 by ventiles      
         Figure 7-6 Income simulations 2 and 3 by ventiles 
                                        
          Figure 7-7 Income simulations 3 and RHG by ventiles              
Figure 7-8 Income and employment simulation 3 by ventiles  
 
                                  
   Figure 7-5 Income simulations 1 and 2 by ventiles     Figure 7-6  Income simulations 2 and 3 by ventiles 
Figure 7-7 Income simulations 3 and RHG by ventiles             Figure 7-8  Income and employment simulation 3 by ventiles 
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Figures. Percentage changes in household per capita income and employment by income percentile 
 
 
Figure 7-9 Income simulations 1 and 2 by percentiles 
                                  
 
 
Figure 7-10 Income simulations 2 and 3 by percentiles 
                                       
 
 
Figure 7-11 Income simulations 3 and RHG by percentiles 
Figure 7-12 Income and employment simulation 3 by percentiles
Figure 7-9 Income simulations 1 and 2 by percentiles   Figure 7-10  Income simulations 2 and 3 by percentiles 
Figure 7-11 Income simulations 3 and RHG by percentiles             Figure 7-12  Income and employment simulation 3 by percentiles 
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Conclusions  
The conclusions of the dissertations are grouped under the following headings:  1) 
modelling; 2) the effects of liberalisation on poverty and inequality in Argentina; 3) 
policy implications, and 4) further research.   
C1. On modelling 
 
With a straightforward adaptation of the real-focused IFPRI Standard model, one finds a 
structural adjustment story where external shocks and policies hit the structure of 
production of a developing economy and its income distribution. The story is internally 
consistent and essentially neoclassical, with optimising agents and flexible prices. As 
has been shown, the effects on income distribution essentially depend on whether the 
shock mobilises resources to the tradable or the non-tradable sectors, and on the factor-
use intensity of these sectors. No significant effects on the activity level of the economy 
show up. 
 
However, if one is interested in the short-run effects of these shocks on activity levels, 
then the inclusion of relations that are conventional in macro models and a modification 
in the production function helps. By allowing the model to capture 1) nominal rigidities 
embedded in the essence of traditional Keynesian theories of fluctuations according to 
David Romer (Romer 1996), 2) the relations present in the IS-LM model, 3) the 
financial assets and liabilities held by the economic actors and 4) working capital as a 
substitutable factor in the production function, real and financial external shocks lead 
not only to changes in the composition of aggregate demand, as analysed by Robinson 
(1991), but significantly affect unemployment and output in a magnitude and through a 
channel which is not captured by the simple incorporation of rigidities in the real model. 
Paraphrasing Adam and Bevan (1998), financial inclusion together with complementary 
devices allow the model to answer relevant questions such as: 1) how do expected 
defaults on domestic assets affect the economy? and 2) are the short-run effects of 
different capital flows affecting the economy differently?   
 
The sensitivity analysis of the elasticities of the model versions that capture ―money in 
the production function‖ suggests that the incorporation of nominal rigidities, while 
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allowing financial and real shocks to have significant effect on the activity level, come 
at the cost of reducing the robustness of the model to changes in its elasticity 
parameters. As acknowledged by Robinson (1991) and Adam and Bevan (1998), this 
financial inclusion adds richness to the model specification, allows us better to capture 
the macroeconomic phenomena and policy instruments and, as emphasised by Adam 
and Bevan (1998), enables us to address additional questions. However, this dissertation 
illustrates the costs associated with including portfolio considerations in terms of data 
requirements, and the corresponding tendency of the models to crash.  
 
The use of behavioural microsimulations shows that changes in income distribution 
within the representative household groups matter, and confirms evidence found by 
RBR in Indonesia that using the standard approach based on representative household 
groups leads researchers to ignore significant transmission channels by which macro 
shocks affect income distribution and poverty, thus missing a large part of the action. 
Allowing for job rationing in the microsimulation approach enables us to capture the 
effect of the drop in employment on the income of the individuals who lose their jobs, a 
link which proved to be key in the distributional effects of the illustrated macro shock.  
 
In determining the unobservables affecting the selection of who is fired (or hired) when 
labour demand changes occur, an iterative process is needed for them to be consistent 
with the observed employment status of the individuals. Sample selection bias in the 
wage equations should be accounted for in order to avoid biasing the parameter 
estimates of the wage equation. If a logit function is used to explain employment, the 
two-step Heckman procedure should be adapted for consistency with the logit function. 
When adjusting the household income model parameters for consistency with the macro 
variables after a macro shock with a Newtonian algorithm, its steps should shrink when 
the macro target is close, to make it possible to increase the precision with which the 
macro target is achieved without sacrificing speed. For the evaluation of poverty and 
distributional changes, international and national methodologies for setting the poverty 
line and Lorenz Curves can be usefully applied, together with a graphic consideration of 
the changes in household per-capita income. Finally, when investigating the importance 
of different transmission channels in the total effect of macro shocks on income 
distribution – e.g. employment status changes, wage and price changes, and capital 
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income changes – it seems useful to separate out these transmission channels, as has 
been done here.  
 
C2. On the effects of liberalisation in Argentina 
 
The opening of the capital account of the balance of payments allowed Argentina to 
receive significant capital inflows (in 1991-1994 and 1996-1998). As captured in Shock 
2, they made it possible to expand the international reserves held by the central bank 
and monetary aggregates and domestic credit, lowering domestic interest rates and 
leading through demand and supply channels to an expansion of the activity level. By 
worsening the international investment position of the country – with expansion of the 
public and private external debt and foreign holdings of firms – they increased the net 
investment income paid to non-residents. Capital inflows led to increasing appreciation 
in the real exchange rate. As documented by Damill et al (2002, p.19), the real exchange 
rate at the beginning of the Plan appreciated significantly in relation to the previous 
period, and continued appreciating during the course of the Plan.  
 
In turn, the appreciated exchange rate together with import liberalisation boosted 
imports (especially those from Mercosur, as the results of Shock 1 suggest) and hurt 
tradable activities, as acknowledged by the former Ministry of Finance Dr. Domingo 
Cavallo (Cavallo and Cottani 1997, p.18), leading to a structural shift in production and 
factors out of tradable activities, and sustaining a persistent trade imbalance. The 
increase in the net investment income paid to non-residents combined with a trade 
imbalance led to recurring current account deficits. As domestic inflation eroded the 
real wages of skilled and unskilled workers, the income share of capitalist households 
increased, and income distribution in the country worsened.   
 
With time, the external financial fragility of the economy increased, and the private 
sector perceived a higher risk of devaluation of the domestic currency and default on 
domestic debts, to which it responded by increasingly accumulating external assets in its 
portfolio, as illustrated in Shock 3, avoiding default and devaluation risks at the cost of 
reducing the international reserves and liquidity of the country, with  corresponding 
contractions in working capital and output supply.  With volatile capital inflows and the 
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private sector allocating an important share of its financial assets abroad, Argentinean 
firms faced binding financial constrains at the end of the period, as pointed out by 
Fanelli, Bebczuk et al. (2002), and as reflected in the model. 
 
Overall, during the Currency Board the Argentinean economy witnessed two clear 
economic cycles. The first involved an expansion in the period 1991-1994 followed by a 
contraction during 1995. The second involved an expansion during 1996-1998, and a 
contraction which lasted beyond the collapse of the Currency Board in 2001. In the 
relative absence of available macroeconomic (fiscal, monetary and exchange rate) 
instruments to absorb the shocks, volatility was transmitted to the activity and 
employment levels, as Shocks 2 and 3 illustrate.  
 
These macro effects had a micro counterpart. As the behavioural microsimulations 
conducted here illustrate, the capital outflows are estimated to have caused more than 
75,000 workers to lose their jobs, and more than 30,000 households to fall below the 
poverty line, a result which is robust to the use of different poverty lines. Together with 
the increase in capital income that affected the upper part of the income distribution, 
this caused income inequality indicators to shift upward, though only marginally.  This 
suggests that the capital flows allowed by capital account liberalisation in Argentina led 
to an increase in the vulnerability of households to poverty, with capital outflows 
reducing households‘ income, shifting a number of them below the poverty line and 
increasing inequality among the poor.    
C3. On policy implications 
 
To a certain extent, this analysis of Argentina‘s experience with its Currency Board can 
be conceptualised as an illustration of the impossible trinity illuminated by Robert 
Mundell (1963) concerning 1) perfect capital mobility, 2) fixed exchange rates, and 3) 
domestic monetary autonomy. During the period 1991-2001, Argentinean authorities 
adopted capital account convertibility (which significantly increased capital mobility) 
and a fixed exchange rate regime, losing monetary autonomy and, in turn, significantly 
reducing their ability to play a counter-cyclical role in the economy. In order to recover 
this ability, and also to avoid potential long-lasting current account disequilibria with 
non-residents, the country‘s authorities need to keep exchange rate and aggregate 
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demand policies under their control, and reconsider the regulation of international 
capital flows.  
 
Argentina partly learned this lesson late in 2001. After facing a series of external crises, 
its authorities decided to derogate the Convertibility Law. They moved into an 
administered exchange rate regime which has allowed the country to significantly lift its 
competitiveness. Furthermore, they increased the discretionary use of monetary policy 
in order to counteract the effect of international capital flows on the activity level, even 
at the cost of generating inflationary pressures. 
  
However, to increase their margin of manoeuvre regarding exchange rate and monetary 
policy, the Argentinean authorities should reconsider the regulation of international 
capital flows. Implementing controls to outflows seem to be extremely problematic, as 
these controls are easily circumvented and encourage bribery (Edwards 1999). 
Following John Williamson, Stephany Griffith-Jones and Ricardo Gottschalk (2005), 
the guiding criteria for regulating inflows are effectiveness (it should have a stabilising 
effect), cost minimisation (it should not lead to reduce welfare-enhancing financial 
transactions) and cost of administration (it should not be too costly for either the 
government or the investors to comply with – or evade – regulations). The Chilean 
experience with controls on capital inflows during the period 1991-1998, for example, 
by which an unremunerated reserve requirement (encaje) on all loans contracted abroad 
was imposed, has originated an intense debate on its effectiveness. There is general 
agreement that it increased the maturity of the inflows received by the country 
(Williamson, Griffith-Jones, and Gottschalk 2005; Edwards 1999), but the extent to 
which it made it possible to avoid an overvaluation of its real exchange rate due to 
capital inflows (Edwards 1999) remains open to debate. In defining the regulation of 
foreign capital flows, the considerable volume of evidence related to the effectiveness 
of taxing foreign exchange transactions, i.e. ―Tobin‖ taxes, including studies on the 
Chilean experience and those surveyed by Neil McCulloch and Grazia Pacillo (2010), 
should be taken into account.  
 
Finally, regarding fiscal policy, it should be acknowledged that to the extent that trade 
liberalisation and other real and financial shocks lead the productive structure of the 
economy to change, the reallocation of workers formerly employed in shrinking sectors 
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may take time. This is not acknowledged in the short-run model discussed here, which 
assumes full mobility of workers among segments to avoid unnecessary complications, 
but in practice (as observed in Argentina) structural changes may generate employment 
problems and during the transition it may be necessary to implement an extensive 
unemployment benefit program for which the public sector needs to assure resources in 
advance.   
C4. Further research 
 
For the model to account for the economic cycles generated by external shocks, it 
should be made dynamic. In doing so, a serious consideration of formation of 
expectations should be undertaken, exploring potential synergies with Lance Taylor 
(2004) and New-Keynesian DSGE Models such as Blanchard and Gali (2007), which, 
by allowing the model to depart from its neoclassical core, could allow for strong 
external shocks to lead to quantity adjustments without making the model crash.  
 
Another potentially fruitful line of future research, as mentioned in RBR, would be to 
work on a more satisfactory integration between the macro and micro approaches to 
distributional issues, considering the extension of the transmission channels that link 
macro and micro models. 
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I. Matrix on the evolution of economic policies in Argentina  
  
 
 
 
Capital Account Policy Others Monetary and Financial Policies Trade Policy Fiscal Policy
Privatizations (default) / 
Deregulations
Elimination of 
restrictions on trading 
foreign currencies, 
completely abolishing 
exchange controls  
Rescheduling of public bonds Increase in taxes on exports 
Suspension of subsidies for industrial 
promotion
Suspension of refunds on exports
Increase in prices of public services (e.g. 
telephone)
Decrease in import tariffs (maximum tariff 
30%) 
State intervention in public companies 
and development of mechanisms for their 
privatisation
Abolition of import permission 
requirement
Generalisation of VAT (the largest 
source of fiscal income), and reduction of 
VAT rate from 15% to 13.5%. Decrease in 
rate of ProfitsTax
"Bonex Plan": compulsory conversion of fixed term deposits 
in banks to public bonds of long maturity denominated in 
dollars  
Rise in taxes on exports 
"Unique Cash (Register)" for public 
companies
Telephones
Reintroduction of refunds on exports
Reduction of number of areas of Central 
Administration 
Airlines
Decrease in import tariffs (maximum tariff 
24%). Elimination of payments in excess 
of declared rates ("sobretasas"). 
Rise in tax on company assets and in tax 
rate of VAT (to 15.6%). Enlargement of 
VAT base. Derogation of taxes on 
capital, on net wealth and other minor 
taxes.  
Petrochemicals
Negotiation for Mercosur Area, and 
Treaty of Integration, Cooperation and 
Development between Argentina and 
Brazil, defining the consolidation of a 
common market over five years 
Concession on petroleum and 
highways
1990
Financial institutions 
are obliged to make 
repayments of 
deposits in the original 
currency 
1989
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Capital Account Policy Others Monetary and Financial Policies Trade Policy Fiscal Policy
Privatizations (default) / 
Deregulations
April 1: Convertibility 
Law installs currency 
board regime, rigidly 
linking national 
currency ("peso") to 
dollar, completely 
liberalising the 
exchange market, 
allowing foreign-
currency-denominated 
contracts and strongly 
restricting capacity to 
manoeuvre in 
monetary policy.  
April 1: Use of adjustment by price index in contracts is 
explicitly prohibited by Convertibility Law 
Elimination of most taxes on exports 
Law related to the cancellation of public 
debts  
Initial Public Offering of 
telephone shares  
Taxes on stock market 
operations are 
eliminated
Decrease in import tariffs and 
introduction of 4 rates (0% raw inputs 
and machinery, 11% intermediate goods, 
22% most consumer goods and 35% 
electronic goods. These rates later 
become respectively 5%, 13%, 22%, 
35%), all plus "statistical" rate of 3pp
VAT increases to 16%; then to 18%. Tax 
on Personal Goods introduced.  
Concession on extractable fuels 
Banks and companies  
authorised to issue 
negotiable bonds in 
foreign currency and 
commercial papers
A temporary import regime is 
implemented
Nation-Provinces Agreement: transfer of 
some services (education, health, some 
social programmes) to provinces, with a 
financial compensation in return. 
Concession on trains    
All import quotas are removed, except for 
automobiles, which have a special regime 
From this year, low fiscal deficits are the 
rule (1pp of GDP vs. 4pp in the 80s)
Dissolution of public companies 
March: Treaty of Constitution of 
Mercosur, formalising the intention by 
Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay 
of forming a common market by the end 
of 1994, with free circulation of goods, 
services and production factors, setting 
a Common External Tariff and a common 
commercial policy, plus the coordination 
of macroeconomic policies and the 
harmonisation of legislation in relevant 
areas
Deregulation of freight transport 
1991
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Capital Account Policy Others Monetary and Financial Policies Trade Policy Fiscal Policy
Privatizations (default) / 
Deregulations
September: Central Bank assumes the obligation to keep 
reserves of at least 80% (or 70% in exceptional 
circumstances) of the monetary base, allowing in the 
remaining holdings of public bonds; imposes limits both on 
government's access to credit and Central Bank re-
discounts; independence of Central Bank. Limited system of 
deposit guarantees. Rules on payment default, risk 
diversification, capital requirements and reserve rate 
requirement for immediate availablility of deposits become 
more strict, exceeding international standards. 
Refunds on exports increase 
Agreement on Amplified Facilities with 
IMF 
Gas (transport and distribution) 
Law of Financial Entities reformed. 
"Statistical" rate for imports increase 
from 3% to 10% 
Amplification of VAT coverage. Increase 
in tax rate of Profits (from 20% to 30%) 
Water  
Bank legal reserves ("encajes") in dollars authorised 
Tariffs are scaled in 9 rates, from 0% (for 
capital goods not produced in Argentina, 
medical products and fuels) to 20% (for 
consumer goods) 
Nation-Provinces Agreement: a minimum 
transfer from Nation to Provinces is 
guaranteed.  
Electricity
Tariffs  reduced (maximum tariff becomes 
22%) 
Regularisation of debts to pensioners, 
giving them public bonds 
Iron and steel industries 
Progress in Mercosur's system of 
preferences  
Deregulation of mining, 
pharmaceutical products, 
automobile transport and ports 
law
Law of Investment 
Funds
Brady Plan: agreement by which public debt to banks is 
changed to long term bonds (up to 30 years) with a nominal 
value of just over 25 billion dollars, with reductions of 
capital and interest. 
Common External Tariff Agreement in 
Mercosur 
The pension regime is reformed: workers 
can now choose between staying in 
public distribution regime or channelling 
personal payments to individual savings 
accounts managed by private Pensions 
Manager,  which becomes a source of 
credit for public sector. Measures taken 
to reduce expenditures (to compensate 
for reduced incomes) 
YPF (Fiscal Oilfields)
Deposits of less than 30 days are prohibited Regime of free tax zones ("francas")  
Nation-Provinces Agreement: tax 
structures are coordinated 
Hydroelectric and thermal energy 
central statios
Application of anti-dumping precautions 
with quantitative restrictions and 
increases in tariffs 
Modification of tax on profits Electricity transmission 
Regime of "specialisation and 
restructuring", giving benefits of lower 
tariffs against exports  
Concession on trains and 
subways  
By Fiscal Administration Law, repatriation of argentineans 
resources abroad tax exempted is accepted
1993
1992
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Capital Account Policy Others Monetary and Financial Policies Trade Policy Fiscal Policy
Privatizations (default) / 
Deregulations
Law of financial 
entities is modified so 
that foreign capital 
enterprises are treated  
equally to national 
ones.  
Definition of Common External Tariffs
Employer taxes are reduced (see Labour 
Market)
Electric central stations  
New pensions regime comes into effect Electricity distribution 
Initial Public Offering on national 
gas company (transport and 
distribution)  
Modification of Organic Letter of Central Bank: capital 
requirements increase; banking reserves are converted into 
dollars; Central Bank is authorized to restructure the banks 
in problems; deposit guarantees are augmented; funds 
("fiduciarios") are created for dealing with liquidity 
problems. In general terms, prudential regulation increases. 
Export refunds are reduced: extra-
Mercosur get in the 2%-20% range: intra-
Mercosur agreement on progressive 
reduction 
VAT increase to a rate of 21%; the 
taxable base of Profits and Personal 
Goods is enlarged
Electricity centrals 
Common External Tariffs come into 
effect, with a few products exempted 
until 2001 (394 in Argentina, 324 in Brazil, 
439 in Paraguay, 960 in Uruguay from 
around 10,000 CIIU items). Capital goods 
may have different tariffs, but must 
converge to common ones.  
Bahia Blanca Petrochemicals
Increase in tariffs to imports 
Modification to Law of Financial Entities: legal framework 
applicable to the assets and liabilities of financial entities 
which are liquidated.  
Maximum refunds, extra-zone and intra-
zone, are modified 
Fuel tax increases. Taxable base of 
profits raised 
Provincial Banks 
Refunds on the production of capital 
goods are suspended 
The regime of family benefits is modified 
1994
1995
1996
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Sources: Heymann, D (2000) "Politicas de reforma y comportamiento macroeconomico" United Nations - EUDEBA, Buenos Aires; Altimir, O y L. Beccaria (2000) "El 
mercado de trabajo bajo el nuevo regimen economico en Argentina" United Nations - EUDEBA, Buenos Aires; Penido de Freitas, M.C, and D.Magalhaes Prates (2000), "La 
experiencia de apertura financiera en Argentina, Brasil y Mexico", Revista de la Cepal 70, downloadable from http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/;  www.infoleg.gov.ar on 
text of Laws and Decrees and Connell, A. (2001) "Los desafios del Mercosur ante la devaluacion de la economia brasilena", downloadable from 
http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/Estadisticas/8/LCL1498P/lcl1498e.pdf, http://www.mecon.gov.ar/informe/informe37/perspectiva.pdf 
Note: from 1977 the financial system is partially liberalized by elimination in this year of restrictions to entry of new institutions and expansion of bank nets by national or 
external institutions, with principle of national treatment to foreign banks (rules applicable to external institutions not less favorable than those applicable to national ones). 
Capital Account Policy Others Monetary and Financial Policies Trade Policy Fiscal Policy
Privatizations (default) / 
Deregulations
Mercosur: rules of 
operation for banks' 
dealings between 
member countries 
created
Liquidity requirements increase
Common External Tariffs are increased, 
"statistical" rate is derogated 
Increase in tax rate on profits to 35% Postal service
Tributary reform: VAT rate is reduced 
(from 21% to 10.5%) in the case of basic 
food; the VAT base starts to include new 
services: cable TV (tax rate 10.5%), pre-
paid medical services and graphic 
advertising (21%). Internal taxes 
increase.  
Airports
Interest on company debt taxed 
Mechanisms for transferring 
nuclear central stations are 
developed  
 
Congress approves selling of 
National Mortgage Bank 
Fiscal contraction at national and 
provincial level as an attempt to reduce 
the country risk
December: end of 
Convertiblity Plan
Financial transactions (debits and credits in current 
accounts) become taxed (Decreto 380/2001)
Exports refunds are increased, as a 
function of a so-called "convergence 
factor", which captures the difference of 
value between the dollar and a basket 
which is composed of half a dollar and 
half a euro. It is proposed to shift to an 
"extended convertibility" to a basket of 
dollar and euro (50% & 50%)  when their 
values converge
Fiscal contraction continues, eliminating 
exemptions to tax to profits and 
extending the VAT base
VAT reimbursement to exporters 
facilitated (Law 25.406)
1997/
1998
1999/
2000
2001
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II. Mathematical Statement of the Set of Nested Models
1 Real Model
1.1 Price formation
1.1.1 Domestic goods, imports and exports
QQc =∑
a
QINTc,a+∑
h
QHc,h+QIc+QGCc (1)
PMRc,r = pwmrc,r · (1+ tmrc,r) · exr c ∈CM (2)
PERc,r = pwerc,r · (1− terc,r) · exr c ∈CE (3)
PMc ·QMc =∑
r
PMRc,r ·QMRc,r c ∈CM (4)
PEc ·QEc =∑
r
PERc,r ·QERc,r c ∈CE (5)
1.1.2 Other prices
PQc ·QQc = PDc ·QDc+PMc ·QMc (6)
PXc ·QXc = PDc ·QDc+PEc ·QEc (7)
PAa =∑
c
θa,c ·PXACa,c (8)
PAa ·QAa = PVAa ·QVAa+PINTAa ·QINTAa (9)
CPI =∑
c
wcpic ·PQc (10)
PK =∑
c
capcompc ·PQc (11)
PINTAa =∑
c
icac,a ·PQc (12)
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GDPDEFL=
∑aPVAa ·QVAa
∑aPVA0a ·QVAa
(13)
1.2 Production and trade
RGDP=∑
a
PVA0a ·QVAa (14)
1.2.1 The production function
QXACa,c = θac ·QAa (15)
QXc = αacc ·∑
a
(δaca,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c
a,c )
−1
ρacc (16)
PXACa,c = PXc ·QXc ·∑
a′
(δaca′,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c
a′,c )
−1 ·δaca,c ·QXAC−ρ
ac
c −1
a,c (17)
QVAa = ivaa ·QAa (18)
QINTAa = intaa ·QAa (19)
QINTc,a = icac,a ·QINTAa (20)
QVAa = αvaa · (∑
f a
δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a,a )
− 1ρvaa f a= {FA1, IU,FU} (21)
QFFA1,a = α
g
FA1,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA1,a f = FS,K (22)
1.2.2 Trade
QQc = QXc = QDc c ∈ (CMN∩CEN) (23)
QQc = αqc ·
(
δqc ·QM−ρ
q
c
c +(1−δqc) ·QD−ρ
q
c
c
)− 1
ρqc c ∈ (CM∩CD) (24)
QMc
QDc
=
(
PDc
PMc
· δ
q
c
1−δqc
) 1
1+ρqc
c ∈ (CM∩CD) (25)
QXc = αtc ·
(
δtc ·QEρ
t
c
c +(1−δtc) ·QDρ
t
c
c
) 1
ρtc c ∈ (CE ∩CD) (26)
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QEc
QDc
=
(
PEc
PDc
· 1−δ
t
c
δtc
) 1
ρtc−1
c ∈ (CE ∩CD) (27)
QMRc,r = QMc · [PMRc,r · (α
m
c )
ρmc
PMc ·δmc,r
]
− 1ρmc +1 c ∈CM (28)
QERc,r = QEc · [ PERc,rPEc ·δec,r · (αec)ρec
]
1
ρec−1 c ∈CE (29)
1.3 Factor markets
Wf a ·WDISTf a,a =PVAa · (1− tvaa) ·QVAa ·∑
f a′
(δvaf a′,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a′,a )
−1 (30)
·δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a −1
f a,a f a= {FA1, IU,FU}
Wf ·WDISTf ,a =∑
FA1
(WFA1 ·WDISTFA1,a ·QFFA1,a) ·∑
f ′
(δgf ′,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ′,a )
−1 (31)
·δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a−1
f ,a f = FS,K
QKa,t = (1−δk) ·QKa,t−1+∆QKa,t−1 (32)
QFFK,a =CAPUT a ·QKa (33)
QFSFLUN = QFSFLFU +QFSFLIU (34)
QFSFLFU,t−QFSFLFU,t−1
QFSFLIU,t
= εmigw · log
(1−URFLFU,t) ·WFLFU,t
WFLIU,t
+ γmigw (35)
(1−UR f ) ·QFS f =∑
a
QFf ,a f ∈ FLF (36)
Wf
CPI
= γwf · (UR f −nur)ε
w
f f ∈ FLF (37)
QFSFLIU =∑
a
QFFLIU,a (38)
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YFf =∑
a
Wf ·WDISTf ,a ·QFf ,a (39)
WAVf =
YFf
∑aQF( f ,a)
(40)
1.4 Institutions: income, expenditure, and savings
1.4.1 Households
YHS =∑
f l
(shh fS, f l · (1− t f f l) ·YFf l)+FINT S,B−FINTB,S (41)
YHU =∑
f l
(shh fU, f l · (1− t f f l) ·YFf l)+FINTU,B−FINTB,U +TRNSFRU,G (42)
YHC =∑
e
DIVDe+ ∑
n=B,G,R
FINTC,n−FINTB,C (43)
SAVh = mpsh ·MPSADJ ·YHh (44)
EHh = YHh−SAVh (45)
PQc ·QHc,h = PQc · γmc,h+βmc,h · (EHh−∑
c′
(PQc′ · γmc′,h)) (46)
1.4.2 Enterprises
PROFBTe =∑
a
WFK ·WDISTFK,a ·QFFK,a+FINT e,B−FINTB,e+TRNSFRe,B (47)
TRNSFRES,B = PROFBTB (48)
PROFBTB =∑
n
(FINTB,n−FINT n,B) (49)
PROFATe = min((1− t pre) ·PROFBTe,PROFBTe)+TRNSFRe,G (50)
DIVTe = max(0,shrpe ·PROFATe) (51)
SAVe = PROFATe−DIVTe (52)
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DIVDe = SHEQDe ·DIVTe (53)
DIVEe = (1−SHEQDe) ·DIVTe (54)
1.4.3 Government
YG=∑
a
tvaa ·PVAa ·QVAa+ ∑
f∈ f l f
t f f ·YFf (55)
+∑
c,r
tmrc,r · pwmrc,r · exr ·QMRc,r+∑
c,r
terc,r · pwerc,r · exr ·QERc,r
+∑
e
max(0, t pre ·PROFBTe)+TRNSFRG,CB
TRNSFRG,CB = PROFBTCB (56)
PROFBTCB = FINTCB,B+FINTCB,R (57)
EG=∑
c
PQc ·QGCc+∑
n
TRNSFRn,G+∑
n
FINT b,G b= {C,R,B,CB} (58)
SAVG = YG−EG (59)
1.4.4 Non-residents
SAVR =exr ·∑
c,r
(pwmrc,r ·QMRc,r− pwerc,r ·QERc,r) (60)
+∑
e
DIVEe+∑
n
FINTR,n−∑
n
FINT n,R
+∑
n
(TRNSFRR,n−TRNSFRn,R)
1.5 Savings and investments
SAVTOT =∑
h
SAVh+∑
e
SAVe+SAVG+SAVR (61)
∆QKa = dqkna · [WFK ·WDISTFK,aRL ·PK ]
εIq a ∈ APRI (62)
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QIc = capcompc ·∑
a
∆QKa+qgic (63)
VIa = PK ·∆QKa a ∈ apri (64)
VIAG =∑
c
PQc ·qgic (65)
VIT =∑
a
VIa (66)
VIT = SAVTOT +WALRAS (67)
2 Financial extension (Real Financial Model)
CURRh+DEPh = LOANh+NFWh h= S,U (68)
CURRC+DEPC+ exr ·DEPDC+AHC = LOANC+NFWC (69)
DEPe = LOANe+EQTe+NFWe (70)
AB+REQRES=∑
dd
DEPdd+ exr ·DEPDC+RED+NFWB dd = h∪ e∪{R} (71)
exr · INTRES+PBOND ·BONDCB+RED=MB+NFWCB (72)
∑
h
CURRh+REQRES=MB (73)
2.1 Asset demand
exr ·DEPDC = k ·DEPC (74)
PBOND ·BONDC =ΘCG ·AHC (75)
EQDe =ΘCe ·AHC (76)
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DEPAC =ΘCR ·AHC (77)
ΘCG =
(δCG)
εC · [RB · (1− pde fC,G)]εC−1
QC
(78)
ΘCe =
(δCe )εC · (REe)εC−1
QC
(79)
ΘCR =
(δCR)
εC · [RW · (1− pde fC,R)]εC−1
QC
(80)
QC =(δCG)
εC · [RB · (1− pde fC,G)]εC−1+∑
e
(δCe )
εC · (REe)εC−1 (81)
+(δCR)
εC · [RW · (1− pde fC,R)]εC−1
EQTe = EQDe+EQEe (82)
SHEQDe =
EQDe
EQTe
(83)
REQRES= rr · (∑
dd
DEPdd+ exr ·DEPDC) dd = h∪ e∪{R} (84)
LOANl =ΘBl ·AB l = h∪ e (85)
PBOND ·BONDB =ΘBG ·AB (86)
exr ·DEPAB =ΘBR ·AB (87)
ΘBl =
(δBl )
εB ·RLεB−1
QB
(88)
ΘBG =
(δBG)
εB · [RB · (1− pde fB,G)]εB−1
QB
(89)
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ΘBR =
(δBR)εB · [RW · (1− pde fB,R)]εB−1
QB
(90)
QB =∑
l
(δBl )
εB · (RL)εB−1+(δBG)εB · [RB · (1− pde fB,G)]εB−1 (91)
+(δBR)
εB · [RW · (1− pde fB,R)]εB−1
2.2 Rates of return
log
MB
GDPDEFL
= εmy · log(RGDP)− εmr · log(RD)+ γLM (92)
RL=
RD
1− rr · (1+µ) (93)
BONDS=∑
b
(BONDb) b= {C,R,B,CB} (94)
RB=
1
PBOND
·RB0 (95)
REe =
PROFATe
EQTe
(96)
2.3 Interest flows
FINTdd,B = RD ·DEPdd dd = {S,U}∪ e∪{R} (97)
FINTC,B = RD · (DEPC+ exr ·DEPDC) (98)
FINTB,l = RL ·LOANl l = h∪ e (99)
FINTb,G = RB ·PBOND ·BONDb b= {C,R,B,CB} (100)
FINTda,R = RW · exr ·DEPAda da= {C,B} (101)
FINTCB,R = RW · exr · INTRES (102)
FINTCB,B = RRED ·RED (103)
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2.4 Balance of payments
exr ·CAB=−SAVR (104)
exr ·KAB=∑
e
(∆EQEe)+∆DEPR+∆VBONDR− exr∑
da
∆DEPAda (105)
∆INTRES=CAB+KAB (106)
CAB=−kI ·KAB (107)
2.5 Updates for financial stocks
∆NFWh,t = SAVh,t (108)
∆NFWe,t = SAVe,t−VIa,t (109)
PBOND ·∆BONDS=∑
c
PQc ·qgic−SAVG (110)
BONDSt = BONDSt−1+∆BONDSt (111)
BONDb,t = BONDb,t−1+∆BONDb,t b= {C,R,B,CB} (112)
∆VBONDb,t =PBONDt ·BONDb,t−PBONDt−1 ·BONDb,t−1 b= {C,R,B,CB} (113)
DEPR,t = DEPR,t−1+∆DEPR,t (114)
EQEe,t = EQEe,t−1+∆EQEe,t (115)
DEPAda,t = DEPAda,t−1+∆DEPAda,t da= {C,B} (116)
INTRESt = INTRESt−1+∆INTRESt (117)
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3 Augment (Real Financial Augmented Model)
QVAa = αvaa · (∑
f a
δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a,a )
− 1ρvaa f a= {FA1, IU,FA2} (118)
QFFA1,a = α
g
FA1,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA1,a f = FS,K,WK1 (119)
QFFA2,a = α
g
FA2,a ·∑
f
(δgf ,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a
f ,a )
− 1
ρgFA2,a f = FU,WK2 (120)
Wf a ·WDISTf a,a =PVAa · (1− tvaa) ·QVAa· (121)
∑
f a′
(δvaf a′,a ·QF−ρ
va
a
f a′,a )
−1 ·δvaf a,a ·QF−ρ
va
a −1
f a,a f a= {FA1, IU,FA2}
Wf ·WDISTf ,a =∑
f a
(WFA1 ·WDISTFA1,a ·QFFA1,a) · ∑
f ′,FA1
(δgf ′,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a
f ′,a )
−1 (122)
·∑
FA1
(δgf ,FA1,a ·QF
−ρgFA1,a−1
f ,a ) f = FS,K,WK1
Wf ·WDISTf ,a =∑
f a
(WFA2 ·WDISTFA2,a ·QFFA2,a) · ∑
f ′,FA2
(δgf ′,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a
f ′,a )
−1 (123)
·∑
FA2
(δgf ,FA2,a ·QF
−ρgFA2,a−1
f ,a ) f = FU,WK2
LOANE =∑
e
ΘBe ·AB (124)
QFSFW =
LOANE
GDPDEFL
(125)
(1−URW ) ·QFSFW = ∑
f w,a
QFf w,a f w= {WK1,WK2} (126)
WAVFW =
YFFW
∑ f w,aQFf w,a
f w= {WK1,WK2} (127)
WAVFW ≥ minwwk (128)
RL=WAVFW ·GDPDEFL (129)
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LOANe =
∑ f wQFf w,a
QFSFW
·LOANE e= a ∈ apri (130)
3.1 Short-run version
WKRa ·GDPDEFL=WDISTFK,a ·WFK a ∈ apri (131)
WKRa ≥ minwpk a ∈ apri (132)
CAPUTa ≤ 1 a ∈ apri (133)
Wf = γwf · (UR f −nur)ε
w
f f ∈ FLF (134)
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Sets
Name Definition
a Activities
apri Private activities
b Bond holders
c Commodities
cdc Commodities demanded domestically
cec Commodities dxported
cmc Commodities imported
cxc Commodities produced domestically
da Deposits abroad holders
dd Domestic deposits holders
e Enterprises
f Factors
fa f Factor aggregates
fb f Factors at Bottom of production function
flf f Formal labor factor
flu f Unskilled labor factor
fw f Uses of working capital in the production function
h Households
hsu Skilled and unskilled households
l Loan holders with firms disaggregated
lb Loan holders with firms aggregated
n Institutions
r Regions
t Time set
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Elements of sets referred in model equations
Name Definition
AG Public activity
B Commercial banks
CB Central bank
E Enterprise (supra-sector)
ES Private services enterprises
FK Physical capital factor
FLFU Formal unskilled labor
FLIU Informal unskilled labor
FLUN Unskilled labor
FW Working capital factor
G Government
C Capitalist household
R Rest-of-world
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Parameters
Name Definition
αacc Scale parameter for activities producing commodity c
αec Scale parameter for export destination CET function
αgf agg,a Scale parameter for factor aggregate function
αmc Scale parameter for import origin Armington function
αqc Scale parameter for import-domestic Armington function
αtc Scale parameter for export-domestic CET function
αvaa Scale parameter for CES value added production function
βmc,h Marginal share of consumption spending on commodity c by household
h
γLM Parameter in LM equation
γmc,h Subsistence consumption of commodity c by household h
γmigw Parameter for unskilled migration function to formal segment
γwf Parameter for wage curve equation
δaca,c Share parameter for activities producing commodity c
δBn,np Share parameter for bank’s CES utility functions on asset earnings
δec,r Share parameter for export destination CET function
δCn,np Share parameter for capitalist household’s CES utility functions on asset
earnings
δgf , f agg,a Share parameter for factor aggregate function
δk Depreciation rate of physical capital
δmc,r Share parameter for import origin Armington function
δqc Share parameter for import-domestic Armington function
δtc Share parameter for export-domestic CET function
δvaf ,a Share parameter for CES value added production function
εB Elasticity for bank’s CES utility functions on asset earnings
εC Elasticity for capitalist household’s CES utility functions on asset earn-
ings
εIq Semi-elasticity of investment with respect to real remun - real cost ratio
εmr Elasticity of money demand with respect to interest rate on deposits
εmy Elasticity of money demand with respect to real GDP
εmigw Elasticity for unskilled migration function to formal segment
εwf Elasticity of real wage with respect to changes in the unemployment
rate
θa,c Yield of commodity c per unit of activity a
µ Mark-up rate of banks to determine interest rate on loans
ρacc Exponent for activities producing commodity c
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Parameters (cont)
Name Definition
ρec Exponent for export destination CET function
ρgf agg,a Exponent for factor aggregate function
ρmc Exponent for import origin Armington function
ρqc Exponent for import-domestic Armington function
ρtc Exponent for export-domestic CET function
ρvaa Exponent for CES value added production function
capcompc Share of good c in composition of capital good
dqkna Parameter for investment function
exr Nominal exchange rate - local currency units per USD -
icac,a Intermediate input c per unit of aggregate intermediate of act. a
intaa Aggregate intermediate input coefficient
ivaa Aggregate value added coefficient
k Ratio between deposits in dollars and in local currency of capitalist
household
kI Sensibility of the current account deficit (superavit) to the capital ac-
count superavit (deficit)
minwwk Minimum average wage of working capital
mpsh Initial marginal propensity to save for households
nur Natural unemployment rate
pdefn,n′ Probability of default perceived by inst n about inst n’ payments
pedh Capitalist households dummy (1 for capitalist, 0 otherwise)
pwerc,r World price of export by commodity and region - in dollars
pwmrc,r World price of imports by region - in dollars
rr Cash reserve ratio on bank deposits
shhfh, f Share of household h in factor f income
shrpn Share of profits retained by enterprise n
terc,r Rate of tax on exports by region and sector
tf f Rate of direct tax on factors (social security tax)
tmrc,r Rate of tax on imports by region and sector
tprn Rate of tax to profits
tvaa Rate of VAT
wcpic CPI weights
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Variables
Name Definition
AB Banks return-responsive portfolio value (billions of LCU)
AH Households return-responsive portfolio value (billions of LCU)
BONDn Stock of public bonds by holder (billions of units)
BONDS Total stock of public bonds (billions of units)
CAB Current Account Balance (billions of dollars)
CAPUTa Capacity utilization in activity a (1.00 = 100%)
CPI Consumer Price Index (1.00 in benchmark)
CURRn Currency held by holder (billions of LCU)
CURRS Currency supply (billions of LCU)
VBONDn Value of public bonds by holder (billions of LCU)
DEPn Deposits in local currency at domestic banks by holder (billions of
LCU)
DEPAn Deposits abroad by holder (billions of dollars)
DEPDn Deposits in dollars at domestic banks by holder (billions of dollars)
DIVDn Dividends paid to residents by enterprise (billions of LCU)
DIVEn Dividends paid to non-residents by enterprise (billions of LCU)
DIVTn Dividends paid by enterprise (total) (billions of LCU)
EG Government current expenditure (billions of LCU)
EHh Households consumption expenditure (billions of LCU)
EQDn Equity held by residents disaggregated by sector (billions of LCU)
EQEn Equity held by non-residents disaggregated by sector (billions of LCU)
EQTn Equity disaggregated by sector (billions of LCU)
FINTn,n′ Interest flow paid to inst. n by inst. n’ (billions of LCU)
GDPDEFL GDP Deflator (1.00 in benchmark)
INTRES International reserves held by central bank (billions of dollars)
KAB Capital Account Balance (billions of dollars)
LOANn Bank loans by domestic recipient institution (billions of LCU)
MB Monetary base (billions of LCU)
MPSADJ Marginal propensity to save endogenous adjustment factor (scalar)
NFWn Financial wealth by institution (billions of LCU)
PAa Price of activity (1.00 in benchmark)
PBOND Price of bonds (1.00 in benchmark)
PDc Price of comm produced and sold domestically (1.00 in benchmark)
PEc Price of export (1.00 in benchmark)
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Variables (cont.)
Name Definition
PERc,r Price of export by region of destination (1.00 in benchmark)
PINTAa Price of intermediate aggregate (1.00 in benchmark)
PK Price of capital (1.00 in benchmark)
PMc Price of import (1.00 in benchmark)
PMRc,r Price of import by region of origin (1.00 in benchmark)
PQc Price of composite good (1.00 in benchmark)
PROFATn After-tax profits (billions of LCU)
PROFBTn Before-tax profits (billions of LCU)
PVAa Price of value added (1.00 in benchmark)
PXc Average output price (1.00 in benchmark)
PXACa,c Price of commodity c generated by activity a (1.00 in benchmark)
QAa Domestic output by activity (billions of units)
QB Harmonic mean in financial CES utility function of banks
QDc Quantity of domestic sales (billions of units)
QEc Quantity of exports (billions of units)
QERc,r Quantity of exports to region r (billions of units)
QF f ,a Quantity of factor f employed in act a (billions of units)
QFS f Quantity of factor f supply (billions of units)
QGCc Quantity of public consumption of comm c (billions of units)
QHc,h Quantity of comm c consumed by household h (billions of units)
QC Harmonic mean in financial CES utility function of capitalist house-
holds
QIc Quantity of private investment by sector of origin (billions of units)
QINTc,a Quantity of intermediate input c used by activity a (billions of units)
QINTAa Quantity of intermediate inputs used by activity a (billions of units)
QKa Physical capital stock in activity a (billions of units)
QMc Quantity of imports (billions of units)
QMRc,r Quantity of imports from region r (billions of units)
QHP Harmonic mean in financial CES utility function of capitalist household
(billions of units)
QQc Quantity of composite good c (billions of units)
QVAa Quantity of value added demanded by act a -gross of VAT and factor
taxes (billions of units)
QXc Quantity of commodity output (billions of units)
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Variables (cont.)
Name Definition
QXACa,c Quantity of commodity output by activity (billions of units)
RB Rate of interest on public bonds (1.00 = 100%)
RD Rate of interest on deposits at domestic banks (1.00 = 100%)
REe Rate of return on enterprise equity, by enterprise (1.00 = 100%)
RED Central Bank rediscount level (billions of LCU)
REQRES Required bank reserves (billions of LCU)
RGDP Real GDP (billions of units)
RL Rate of interest on domestic banks loans (1.00 = 100%)
RRED Rate of interest on Central Bank rediscounts (1.00 = 100%)
RW Risk-free world interest rate (1.00 = 100%)
SAVn Savings by institution (billions of LCU)
SAVTOT Total savings (billions of LCU)
SHEQDn Share of residents in equity (1.00 = 100%)
ΘBn Shares of financial assets in banks portfolio (1.00 = 100%)
ΘHPn Shares of financial assets in capitalist household portfolio (1.00 =
100%)
TRNSFRn,n′ Transfer to institution n by institution n’ (billions of LCU)
UR f Unemployment rate of factor f (1.00 = 100%)
URW Unemployment rate of working capital (1.00 = 100%)
VIa Value of investment by sector of destination (billions of LCU)
VIT Value of total investment (billions of LCU)
W f Nominal wage for factor f before factor tax payment and distorsions
(thousands of LCU)
WALRAS Walras variable -0 if agg savings = agg investment-
WAV f Average nominal wage for factor f before factor tax payment accounting
for distorsions (thousands of LCU)
WDIST f ,a Factor wage distorsion for factor f in activity a (scalar)
YF f Total factor income before taxes to factors by factor (billions of LCU)
YG Total government income (billions of LCU)
YHh Total household income after interest flow by household (billions of
LCU)
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III. Financial assets and liabilities by institution 
 
 
Households 
Assets Liabilities 
Domestic equity 
Public bonds  
Deposits at domestic banks 
Deposits abroad  
Cash holdings 
Domestic borrowing 
Financial wealth 
 
 
Firms 
Assets Liabilities 
Deposits at domestic banks Domestic equity 
Foreign equity 
Domestic borrowing  
 Financial wealth 
 
 
Government 
Assets Liabilities 
 ---- Public bonds  
 Financial wealth 
 
 
Commercial banks 
Assets Liabilities 
Loans to households 
Loans to domestic firms 
Public bonds 
Reserve requirements 
Deposits abroad 
Deposits at domestic banks 
Rediscounts 
Financial wealth 
 
 
 
Central bank 
Assets Liabilities 
Public bonds  
International reserves  
Rediscounts 
Cash in circulation 
Reserve requirements  
Central bank‘s debt with non-residents 
 Financial wealth 
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IV. Derivation of demanded asset shares
The problem of choosing asset shares to maximize a CES utility function on
asset earnings can be stated as:
Maxθi U = [
∑
i δi(RiθiA)
−ρ]−
1
ρ s.t.
∑
i θi = 1
where U=utility level, θi=share of asset i in asset portfolio, Ri=rate of return on
asset i, A=total portfolio value, and δi and ρi are the share and exponent parameters
of the CES function
Operating algebraically, the problem can be restated as:
Maxθi U = A[
∑
i δi(Riθi)
−ρ]−
1
ρ s.t.
∑
i θi = 1
which can be solved by maximising the following Lagrangian function:
L = A[
∑
i
δi(Riθi)
−ρ]−
1
ρ + λ(1−
∑
i
θi)
such that, focusing on two generic assets, i and j:
Lθi = −A
1
ρ
[
∑
i
δi(Riθi)
−ρ]−
1
ρ
−1δiR
−ρ
i (−ρ)θ−ρ−1i − λ = 0
Lθj = −A
1
ρ
[
∑
j
δj(Rjθj)
−ρ]−
1
ρ
−1δjR
−ρ
j (−ρ)θ−ρ−1j − λ = 0
and
Lλ = 1−
∑
i
θi = 0
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From the Lθi = 0 and Lθj = 0 conditions,
δiR
−ρ
i θ
−ρ−1
i = δjR
−ρ
j θ
−ρ−1
j
Isolating θj,
θj = θiδ
− 1
ρ+1
i R
ρ
ρ+1
i δ
1
ρ+1
j R
− ρ
ρ+1
j
Given that in a CES function the elasticity  = 1
ρ+1
,
θj = θiδ
−
i R
1−
i δ

jR
−1
j
And, given that the sum of the asset shares equals one, i.e.
∑
j θj = 1:
∑
j
θj =
∑
j
(θiδ
−
i R
1−
i δ

jR
−1
j ) = 1
Taking common factor θiδ
−
i R
1−
i ,
θiδ
−
i R
1−
i
∑
j
δjR
−1
j = 1
And, isolating θi, we get to the final formula which determines the asset shares
given the CES function parameters and the assets returns, where  should exceed 1:
θi =
δiR
−1
i∑
j δ

jR
−1
j
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V. Construction of a proto-SAM for Argentina 
 
The SAM cells were calculated in three main steps
76
. First I prepared an aggregated 
proto-SAM, a table where I aggregated activities, commodities, factors, households and 
enterprises into a single activity, a single commodity, etc, and where consistency is not 
assured: agents‘ sources of income do not necessarily match their uses. Second, I 
disaggregated the accounts in the proto-SAM, still without assuring consistency. 
Finally, I eliminated inconsistencies using Cross Entropy, as explained in Chapter II-4. 
Below, I explain the first two steps in detail.  
                                                 
76 While in theory any anomalies in the economy for the benchmark year might be transmitted to the 
model results, tainting the conclusions, Roberts (1994) examines the significance of this in a model of 
Poland by calibrating to five different benchmark years, and concludes that model results are robust to the 
choice of benchmark year. 
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Step 1. Construction of the aggregated proto-SAM: 
 
The construction is explained cell by cell, following the order in which the cells are calculated. The SAM is at 1993 prices, following National 
Direction of National Accounts (NDNA) data. When values are not originally in 1993 prices, they are converted using the GDP deflator as 
informed by NDNA. 
  
Cell  Estimation 
Taxes on value added  
 
Data provided under special request by the National Direction of Fiscal Research and Analysis (NDFRA, 
Chart Recaudación Nominal 1980-2006‘)77. 
Taxes on imports 
Taxes on exports 
Taxes on labour 
Taxes on profits 
Public consumption As informed in Table of Public Expenditure 1991-2001 (TPE), p. 25 in System of National Accounts (SNA). 
Public Investment Sum of ‗Capital Goods‘ and ‗Construction‘ items in TPE. 
  
                                                 
77 For tax to profits, data is not available for 1991 so 1992 data is used instead. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Public transfers to 
households 
Total public transfers to private sector times share of household sector in the transfers.  
Total transfers from ‗Transfers‘ item in TPE.  
Households‘ share estimated from data provided on request by NDNA for closest year with available data 
(1993). Specifically, calculated as the share in total public transfers of pensions, scholarships, transfers to 
cooperatives and to other cultural and social institutions.  
Public transfers to enterprises Total public transfers (informed in TPE) minus transfers to households.  
Value added at factor cost  GDP at basic prices as informed by SNA (Table Total Supply – Total Demand 1980-2005). 
Private consumption Calculated as GDP at market prices, times the domestic consumption share, minus the value of public 
consumption. 
GDP at market prices estimated as value added at factor cost plus indirect taxes (taxes on value added, 
imports and exports).  
Domestic consumption share taken from Chart I.1. Global Supply and Demand (GS&D) in SNA 
Private Investment GDP at market prices times investment share minus value of public investment.  
Investment share from GS&D. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Exports GDP at market prices times export share.  
Export share from GS&D. 
Imports  GDP at market prices times import share.  
Import share from GS&D. 
Gross production value Value added at factor cost, times the relation between gross production and value added at factor cost for the 
year closest to 1991, informed by NDNA (1993). 
Intermediate consumption Gross production value, minus value added at factor cost, minus taxes to value added. 
Households factor income  Share of labour in value added (included tax to labour) times value added at factor cost minus tax to labour, 
with mentioned share coming from NDNA data on income generation.
78
  
Enterprises factor income  Value added at factor cost, minus households factor income, minus tax on labour.  
 
 
  
                                                 
78 1993 proxy as closest year with available data for year of the SAM (1991).  
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Cell  Estimation 
Interest paid by households 
to banks 
Like other interest payments, these are calculated as a relevant interest rate times a relevant stock (at the 
closest available point to the middle of the year).  
Interest rate: rate on loans as in BCRA data: Document C7.2 ‗Tasas de interés bancarias‘ ‗Tasas activas‘.  
Stock: loans to households as in Financial Entities Balance – Mortgage and Personal Loans. 
Interest paid by enterprises to 
banks 
Interest rate: rate on loans 
Stock: excess of total bank loans to private sector over loans to households. Total bank loans as in Financial 
Entities Balance – Total Loans to Private Sector. 
Interest paid by government 
to foreign sector 
Interest rate: rate on bonds, coming from series on returns of Argentinean public bonds elaborated and 
provided upon special request by R. Schefer from CEMA.    
Stock: ‗External Position of Non-Financial Public Sector‘ in International Investment Position by Sector and 
Concept (IIP) elaborated by National Direction of International Accounts (NDIA). 
Interest paid by government 
to banks 
Interest rate: rate on bonds 
Stock: bonds held by commercial banks as in Financial Entities Balance – Credit to the Public Sector. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Interest paid by government 
to central bank 
Interest rate: rate on bonds 
Stock: central bank holdings of public bonds as in central bank balance – Sources of creation of the monetary 
base, Public Sector. 
Interest paid by government 
to households 
Interest rate: rate on bonds 
Stock: total public debt informed by NSNA, minus value of bond stocks held by other agents.  
Interest paid by foreign 
sector to domestic 
households 
Interest rate: risk-free world interest rate, as informed by US Federal Reserve for US government securities - 
Treasury bills (secondary market)", 6-month maturity, annualised.
79
  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h15/data.htm 
Stock: ‗External Assets of Non-Financial Private Sector‘ in IIP. 
Interest paid by foreign 
sector to banks 
Interest rate: risk-free world interest rate 
Stock: ‗External Assets of (non-central bank) Financial Sector‘ in IIP. 
Interest paid by foreign 
sector to central bank 
Interest rate: risk-free world interest rate 
Stock: ‗central bank foreign assets‘ as informed in IIP. 
                                                 
79 The one-year maturity bond was not used because it was discontinued during the analyzed period.     
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Cell  Estimation 
Interest paid by banks to 
households 
Interest rate: on deposits, taken from BCRA data: Chart IX. Annual interest rate on deposits for 60 or more 
days, monthly data, arithmetic average.  
Stock: Financial Entities Balance – Deposits of the Private Sector – ‗Cajas de Ahorro‘. 
Interest paid by banks to 
enterprises  
Interest rate: rate on deposits 
Stock: Financial Entities Balance – Total Deposits of the Private Sector minus households deposits. 
Interest paid by banks to 
foreign sector 
Interest rate: on deposits 
Stock: of ‗External Liabilities of Financial Sector (excluding central bank)‘ in IIP. 
Interest paid by banks to 
central bank 
Interest rate: on rediscounts, as informed by central bank 
Stock: central bank Balance – ‗Credit granted by the central bank to financial institutions‘. 
Transfer of profits from 
domestic banks to enterprises 
Residual from bank‘s current sources and uses of funds. 
Transfer of profits from 
central bank to government 
Residual from central bank‘s current sources and uses of funds. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Dividends paid to non-
residents 
‗Net utilities and dividends‘ account in the Balance of payments. 
Dividends paid to domestic 
households 
Payout times excess of enterprise incomes, over expenditures, minus dividends paid to non-residents.  
Payout rate informed by exchange market commission bulletin for 1991. 
Household savings Residual from household current sources and uses of funds. 
Enterprise savings Residual from enterprise current sources and uses of funds.  
Public savings Residual from government current sources and uses of funds. 
Foreign savings Residual from non-residents‘ current sources and uses of funds. 
Variation in central bank‘s 
foreign reserves 
Subtracting January 1991 from January 1992 stock value of ‗External Assets of central bank‘ as informed in 
IIP.  
Variation in domestic banks‘ 
deposits abroad 
Subtracting Jan. 1991 from Jan. 1992 stock value of ‗External Assets of (non-central bank) Financial Sector‘ 
in IIP. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Variation in non-residents‘ 
deposits at domestic banks 
Subtracting Jan. 1991 from Jan. 1992 stock value of ‗External Liabilities of Financial Sector (excluding 
central bank)‘ in IIP. 
Variation in non-residents‘ 
holdings of public bonds 
Subtracting Jan. 1991 from Jan. 1992 stock value of ‗External Position of Non-Financial Public Sector‘ in 
IIP. 
Variation in household‘s 
deposits abroad 
Subtracting Jan. 1991 from Jan. 1992 stock value of ‗External Assets of Non-Financial Private Sector‘ in IIP.  
Variation in property of 
enterprises by non-residents 
Subtracting Jan.1991 from Jan.1992 stock value of ‗External Liabilities of Non-Financial Private Sector‘ in 
IIP.  
Variation in households‘ cash 
holdings 
Subtracting Dec.1990 from Dec.1991 stock value of central bank Balance – Monetary circulation out of the 
financial system. 
Variation in banks‘ reserve 
requirements 
Subtracting Dec.1990 from Dec.1991 stock value of ‗Monetary base held into the financial system‘ – Central 
bank Balance.  
Variation in Central bank‘s 
holdings of public bonds 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value of  Central bank Balance – Sources of creation of the 
monetary base, Public sector. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Variation in households‘ 
deposits at domestic banks 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value in Financial Entities Balance – Deposits of the Private 
Sector – Saving Accounts. 
Variation in loans by 
domestic banks to 
households 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value in Financial Entities Balance – Credit to the Private Sector 
–Personal Loans and Mortgages. 
Variation in loans by 
domestic banks to firms 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value in Financial Entitites Balance - Total bank credit to private 
sector minus credit to households.  
Variation in firms‘ deposits 
at domestic banks 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value in Financial Entitites Balance – ‗Total deposits‘ and then 
subtracting ‗Variation in households‘ deposits at domestic banks‘. 
  
Variation in domestic banks‘ 
holdings of public bonds 
Subtracting  Dec 1990 from Dec 1991 stock value in Financial Entities Balance – Credit to the Public Sector. 
Variation in household‘s 
holdings of public bonds 
Calculated as residual to equilibrate incomes and expenditures of capital account government in the SAM. 
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Cell  Estimation 
Variation in property of 
enterprises by households 
Calculated as residual to equilibrate incomes and expenditures of capital account households in the SAM.  
Variation in rediscounts 
 
Calculated as residual to equilibrate incomes and expenditures of capital account Central bank in the SAM.  
 
 
Step 2. Disaggregation of the PROTO-SAM: 
Departing from the aggregated PROTO-SAM, accounts are disaggregated in the following cells as explained in the right-hand columns:  
Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Value added at 
factor cost  
Activities and Factors  1) Split across activities, using NSNA data on value added by sector of activity for closest 
year to 1991 (1993);   2) For each activity, following NDNA Data Chart Accounts of 
Income Generation for close available year (1993), split factor income into i) formal labour, 
ii) informal labour and iii) capital – physical and working, as in NSNA data;  3) Attribute i) 
and ii) by skill following income shares in Permanent Household Survey.  
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Gross Production 
Value: Supply 
matrix  
Activities and 
Commodities 
Split among activities following the proportion of activity-specific payments (for value 
added, intermediates and tax to value added) in total activity payments. Imputed to 
commodity by excluding secondary production from each activity (negligible given the low 
disaggregation level).  
Intermediate 
consumption  
Activities and 
Commodities 
Split into a two-step process. In Step 1 intermediate consumption is split across activities, 
following shares of activities in intermediate consumption as informed by NDNA (1993). 
In Step 2 activity-specific values are distributed across commodities following shares of 
intermediate inputs by activities in MIPAr97 Use Table at basic prices (Chart 3) 
80.
  
Private  
consumption 
Commodities and 
Households 
Split across commodities following commodity shares in column ‗Final Consumption‘ of 
Input-Output, and then across households following shares of (interest-adjusted) incomes.  
Private investment Enterprises & 
Commodities 
 
Split first across enterprises – following value-added shares - and then across commodities - 
following shares in ‗Gross Fixed Capital Formation‘ column of Input-Output Table (Chart 
12 MIPAr97). 
                                                 
80 Activities: of the 124 existent ones, primary is 1 to 14; industry is 15 to 92; construction is 96; public services are 113,114 and 116, private services are the remaining ones. 
Commodities: of the 195 existent ones, primary is 1 to 38; industry is 39 to 147; construction is 148; public services is 180 to 183, rest are private services. 
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Public consumption Commodities Split following shares in ‗Public consumption‘ column of Input-Output Table (Chart 12 
MIPAr97).  
Public investment Commodities Split following shares in ‗Gross Fixed Capital Formation‘ column of Input-Output Table 
(Chart 12 MIPAr97). 
Exports Commodities and 
Regions 
Split using export value data by sector (classified by CIIU revision 2 at 3 digits) and partner 
generated by Banco de Datos Estadisticos de Comercio Exterior
81
. 
Imports  Commodities and 
Regions 
Split using export value data by sector (classified by CIIU revision 2 at 3 digits) and partner 
generated by Banco de Datos Estadisticos de Comercio Exterior
82
. 
Taxes on value 
added 
Activities Split across activities following value-added shares. 
Taxes on labour Factors Split among formal (skilled and unskilled) workers according to their shares in income of 
formal labour. 
                                                 
81 Facilitated by Gonzalo Varela, University of Sussex. 
82 Facilitated by Gonzalo Varela, University of Sussex. 
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Taxes on imports Commodities and 
Regions 
Split accounting for region- and sector-specific data on tariff rates and import values. See 
section on time-specific data for details on tariff rates.   
Taxes on exports Commodities and 
Regions 
Split accounting for region- and sector-specific data on export tax rates and export values. 
See section on time-specific data for details on export tax rates.   
Taxes on profits Enterprises Following the value-added shares.  
Public transfers to 
households 
Households Attributed to the unskilled, who typically account for the bulk of these transfers. 
Public transfers to 
enterprises 
Enterprises Split following enterprises‘ value-added shares. 
Households factor 
income 
Households The after-tax income of the skilled is allocated to skilled households and the after-tax 
income of formal and informal unskilled (the second being untaxed) allocated to unskilled 
households.  
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Enterprises factor income  Enterprises and 
Factors 
Split following values of capital income by sector as informed in ‗Income 
Generation‘ Chart (NDNA).  
Enterprises receive the income of (physical and working) capital associated to the 
specific activity where they operate.  
Dividends paid to households Enterprises and 
Households 
Split according to value-added sector shares and attributed entirely to capitalist 
household. 
Dividends paid to non-residents Enterprises Split according to value-added sector shares.  
Household savings Households Split in proportion to (interest-adjusted) incomes. 
Enterprise savings Enterprises Split according to value-added sector shares.  
Interest paid by government to 
households  
Households Attributed to capitalist households.  
 
Interest paid by non-residents to 
households 
Households Attributed to capitalist households.  
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Interest paid by households to 
bank  
Households Split across households in proportion to  households‘ factor incomes, including 
labour payments and dividends. 
Interest paid  by banks to 
households 
Households Split across households in proportion to  households‘ factor incomes, including 
labour payments and dividends 
Interest paid by enterprises to 
bank 
Enterprises Split following activity-specific borrowed loans during the year as informed by the 
central bank Department of Monetary and Financial Statistics 
Interest paid by banks to 
enterprises  
Enterprises Split according to value added sector shares  
 
Variation in loans by domestic 
banks to firms 
Enterprises Split according to shares of ‗Loans by activities‘, information provided by the 
central bank Department of Monetary and Financial Statistics  
Variation in property of 
enterprises by households 
Enterprises and 
Households 
Split according to the shares of variation in loans by domestic banks to firms, 
assuming for simplification that the provision of financial capital by banks and 
households follow the same activity-level pattern. Attributed to capitalist 
households. 
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Cell  Disaggregated 
account/s 
Method of disaggregation 
Variation in property of 
enterprises by non-residents 
Enterprises Split according to the shares in Variation in loans by domestic banks to firms, 
assuming for simplification that the provision of financial capital by banks and 
non-residents follow the same activity-level pattern.  
Variation in firms‘ deposits   Enterprises Split according to value added sector shares.  
Variation in household‘s 
deposits abroad 
Households Attributed to capitalist households.  
 
Variation in households‘ 
holdings of public bonds 
Households Attributed to capitalist households.  
Variation in households‘ cash  Households Split in proportion to households‘ consumption levels. 
Variation in households‘ 
deposits at domestic banks 
Households Split in proportion to households‘ saving levels. 
Variation in loans by domestic 
banks to households 
Households Split in proportion to (interest-adjusted) incomes. 
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VI. Additional shocks   
 
Having described the results of simulating an increase in the perceived probability of 
default on domestic assets (T1) and a fall in the rate of tax on imports (K1) in Chapter 6, 
in this Appendix I report the results of the remaining simulations – which are shown in 
Table VI-1 below - highlighting the workings of the transmission channels present in 
the models and referring to the explanations given there, as needed.   
 
 
VI. 1 10 p.p. increase in risk-free world interest rate (RW) 
Real Model 
 This shock generates an interest inflow to the domestic economy paid to holders of 
deposits abroad - capitalist households and banks - that increases capitalist RHG 
incomes directly and indirectly as the banks’ profits are subsequently paid to them 
in the form of dividends. The increase in household income leads household 
consumption demand to increase, driving domestic prices up so that: 1) the real 
exchange rate appreciates, making net exports fall; 2) factor demands at given 
nominal wages increase, driving formal employment levels and all nominal wages 
up. The increase in employment, in turn, allows the level of economic activity to 
expand.  
 Increases in prices, wages, employment levels and activity levels widen the tax base 
and lead to a reduction in the public deficit.  
 The balance of payment with non-residents is unaltered overall. The additional 
inflow of interest received by the country is spent on payment for additional net 
imports and higher dividends to non-residents, the latter out of the increase in the 
nominal wage of physical capital.  
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Table VI-1 Results of Additional External Shocks 
 
* Relative deviations from base (%) except for shares and other rates, where absolute deviations from base are reported 
∆: In the balance of payments, following national accounts system, a + (-) means that the flow leads a country's international reserves holdings to 
increase (fall). 
Amount Unit R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA 
Balance of Payments ? 
Current Account -8.46 B$ .. 3.564 3.60 .. 23.42 21.49 9.37 8.04 8.10 13.03 13.77 13.92 -32.20 -34.16 -34.47 
Trade Balance 3.44 B$ .. 9.581 9.67 -221.07 -191.86 -184.41 22.90 17.28 17.51 31.82 35.28 35.55 -78.64 -83.64 -84.23 
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 B$ .. 0.753 0.75 -15.72 -13.75 -13.53 1.81 1.36 1.36 2.52 2.80 2.78 -5.96 -6.34 -6.29 
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 B$ .. -0.928 -0.95 23.38 20.17 19.01 -2.21 -1.66 -1.72 -3.06 -3.38 -3.46 7.88 8.37 8.55 
Investment Income -11.90 B$ .. -0.237 -0.24 63.93 72.14 68.61 0.04 0.72 0.70 0.06 -0.42 -0.39 -0.14 -0.09 -0.14 
Interests -10.91 B$ .. -0.280 -0.28 70.24 79.19 75.28 .. 0.75 0.72 .. -1.43 -1.40 .. 0.11 0.07 
Profits and Dividends -0.99 B$ .. 0.227 0.24 -5.39 -5.33 -4.77 0.49 0.40 0.42 0.68 10.71 10.74 -1.70 -2.35 -2.44 
Capital Account 10.62 B$ .. -3.564 -3.60 .. -23.42 -21.49 -7.47 -8.04 -8.10 -10.38 -13.77 -13.92 25.65 34.16 34.47 
Non-inancial Private Sector   7.50 B$ .. -5.063 -5.11 .. -32.50 -29.85 .. -1.38 -1.47 -14.69 -20.45 -20.67 .. 14.51 14.95 
Public Sector 1.99 B$ FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED 137.05 137.05 137.05 
Commercial Banks 1.13 B$ .. 0.129 0.14 .. -4.32 -3.71 -70.39 -66.62 -66.59 .. 6.45 6.48 .. -16.40 -16.47 
Public Deficit 11.99 B$ .. 0.333 0.36 -8.20 -15.47 -14.62 0.24 0.64 0.70 0.33 1.19 1.29 -0.87 -4.54 -4.74 
Price of domestic goods 1.00 $ .. -0.232 -0.23 5.31 4.56 4.24 -0.55 -0.42 -0.42 -0.77 -0.85 -0.84 1.90 2.04 2.00 
Real GDP 189.86 B$ .. -0.003 -0.02 0.06 0.05 -0.30 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.01 -0.07 0.02 0.02 0.16 
Factor use  
Formal Skilled  1.43 mill. Indi .. -0.002 -0.01 0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.07 
Formal Unskilled  7.39 mill. indi .. -0.006 -0.02 0.18 0.15 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 0.05 0.06 0.16 
Physical Capital 288.65 B$ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Working Capital 17.15 B$ .. .. -0.34 .. .. -6.74 .. .. -0.74 .. .. -1.17 .. .. 2.99 
Tradables Value-Added Shares 
  Primary 10.9 % .. 0.020 0.02 -0.43 -0.37 -0.36 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.07 0.08 -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 
Industry 25.8 % .. 0.015 0.02 -0.30 -0.25 -0.24 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.06 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 
Real Wages  
Formal Skilled 16.82 th$/indiv .. -0.005 -0.02 0.12 0.10 -0.16 -0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.06 0.04 0.04 0.15 
Formal Unskilled 9.29 th$/indiv .. -0.003 -0.01 0.09 0.07 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.08 
Informal Unskilled 9.29 th$/indiv .. 0.058 0.04 -1.29 -1.27 -2.00 0.16 0.10 0.06 0.22 0.22 0.17 -0.52 -0.47 -0.34 
Physical Capital 0.20 % of stock v. .. -0.014 -0.06 0.29 0.10 -1.20 -0.01 -0.03 -0.13 -0.02 -0.05 -0.19 0.07 0.15 0.51 
Working Capital 0.35 % of stock v. .. .. 0.66 .. .. 13.79 .. .. 1.44 .. .. 2.30 .. .. -5.46 
Factor Income Shares 
Formal Skilled 13.2 % .. -0.001 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Formal Unskilled 37.7 % .. -0.003 0.00 0.09 0.10 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Informal Unskilled 14.1 % .. 0.008 0.01 -0.19 -0.17 -0.21 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
Physical Capital 31.7 % .. -0.004 -0.01 0.08 0.05 -0.21 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.04 0.12 
Working Capital 3.3 % .. .. 0.01 .. .. 0.22 .. .. 0.02 .. .. 0.04 .. .. -0.09 
Household Income Shares 
Skilled 14.1 % .. 0.000 0.00 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.05 0.03 0.03 
Unskilled 64.6 % .. 0.024 0.02 -2.50 -2.45 -2.46 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 
Capitalist 21.3 % .. -0.024 -0.02 2.92 2.88 2.88 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.05 
Base 
Perceived prob. of  
default on domestic   
assets ?10 p.p. 
Risk-free world interest  
rate ?10 p.p. 
Deposits held by non- 
residents ?10% 
Equity held by non- 
residents ?10% 
Bonds held by non- 
residents ?10% 
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Table VI-1 (cont.) Results of Additional External Shocks  
 
* Relative deviations from base (%) except for shares and other rates, where absolute deviations from base are reported 
∆: In the balance of payments, following national accounts system, a + (-) means that the flow leads a country's international reserves holdings to 
increase (fall). 
Amount Unit R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA R RF RFA
Balance of Payments∆
Current Account -8.46 B$ .. 0.55 0.64 .. 0.02 -0.07 .. -0.96 -0.07 .. -10.84 -13.67 .. -89.12 -92.50
Trade Balance 3.44 B$ -0.05 3.35 3.12 0.08 1.04 1.28 -0.54 -8.34 -10.63 2.34 -44.88 -36.12 -39.61 -286.84 -279.40
Exports of Goods and NFS 21.51 B$ 0.95 1.21 1.20 0.75 0.83 0.84 15.07 14.47 14.35 24.38 20.88 21.49 -3.03 -19.98 -19.15
Imports of Goods and NFS 18.07 B$ 1.14 0.80 0.83 0.88 0.79 0.76 18.04 18.81 19.11 28.58 33.40 32.46 3.94 30.84 30.40
Investment Income -11.90 B$ 0.01 -0.58 -0.44 -0.02 -0.29 -0.42 0.16 1.73 3.03 -0.68 5.27 0.73 11.46 19.61 15.05
Interests -10.91 B$ .. -0.65 -0.51 .. -0.29 -0.44 .. 1.75 3.18 .. 6.64 1.62 12.56 23.17 18.05
Profits and Dividends -0.99 B$ 0.16 0.26 0.24 -0.28 -0.27 -0.25 1.86 1.57 1.38 -8.12 -9.77 -9.08 -0.74 -19.47 -17.89
Capital Account 10.62 B$ .. -0.55 -0.64 .. -0.02 0.07 .. 0.96 0.07 .. 10.84 13.67 .. 89.12 92.50
Non Financial Private Sector  7.50 B$ .. -0.82 -0.95 .. -0.03 0.09 .. 1.45 0.23 .. 16.09 19.98 .. 131.30 135.89
Public Sector 1.99 B$ FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED FIXED
Commercial Banks 1.13 B$ .. 0.28 0.25 .. 0.03 0.05 .. -0.62 -0.89 .. -5.04 -4.23 .. -34.61 -33.35
Public Deficit 11.99 B$ 0.46 1.15 1.12 0.19 0.46 0.49 -1.10 -2.68 -2.99 -5.91 -13.63 -12.84 -5.53 -19.74 -19.42
Price of domestic goods 1.00 $ -0.24 -0.32 -0.31 0.22 0.20 0.19 -3.34 -3.17 -3.08 6.80 7.77 7.45 11.04 17.70 17.13
Real GDP 189.86 B$ 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.35 0.35 0.46 0.32 0.33 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.29
Factor use 
Formal Skilled 1.43 mill. Indi 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.23 0.23 0.27 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.15
Formal Unskilled 7.39 mill. indi 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.86 0.87 0.94 0.77 0.79 0.61 0.03 0.26 0.40
Physical Capital 288.65 B$ .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
Working Capital 17.15 B$ .. .. 0.15 .. .. -0.19 .. .. 2.31 .. .. -4.99 .. .. 4.93
Tradables Value Added Shares
  Agriculture 10.9 % 0.01 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.02 0.06 -0.08 -0.56 -0.55
Industry 25.8 % 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.04 -0.05 -0.07 -0.04 -0.11 -0.07 -0.06 -0.41 -0.36
Real Wages 
Formal Skilled 16.82 th$/indiv 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.55 0.56 0.64 0.50 0.52 0.32 0.02 0.16 0.35
Formal Unskilled 9.29 th$/indiv 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.43 0.44 0.48 0.39 0.40 0.31 0.01 0.13 0.20
Informal Unskilled 9.29 th$/indiv 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.03 0.01 2.30 2.28 2.58 2.03 1.66 0.90 -0.26 -1.44 -1.83
Physical Capital 0.20 % of stock v. 0.09 0.09 0.13 0.08 0.08 0.03 2.04 2.08 2.58 1.84 1.78 0.57 0.03 0.61 0.56
Working Capital 0.35 % of stock v. .. .. -0.18 .. .. 0.41 .. .. -2.20 .. .. 11.40 .. .. -9.41
Factor Income Shares
Formal Skilled 13.2 % -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12 -0.10 -0.09 -0.06 0.00 0.01 0.06
Formal Unskilled 37.7 % -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.12 -0.13 -0.15 -0.11 -0.08 0.00 0.02 0.08 0.21
Informal Unskilled 14.1 % 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.23 -0.26
Physical Capital 31.7 % 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.14 0.15 0.23 0.13 0.13 -0.10 0.01 0.15 0.16
Working Capital 3.3 % .. .. 0.00 .. .. 0.01 .. .. -0.06 .. .. 0.16 .. .. -0.16
Household Income Shares
Skilled 14.1 % -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.15 -0.15 -0.16 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.16 0.13 0.09
Unskilled 64.6 % 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 0.06 0.00 -0.06 -0.10 -0.72 -1.00
Capitalist 21.3 % 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.15 0.16 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 -0.06 0.60 0.91
Base
Rate of tax on exports 
↓10%
Price of exports ↑10%Price of imports ↓10%
Nominal exchange rate 
↑10%
Rate of tax on imports 
↓10%
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 This domestic appreciation shifts the demand for factors towards the non-tradable sectors 
and lowers the demand for the (informal unskilled) factors intensively used in the 
(primary) export sectors, affecting in turn their relative wages and their factor income 
share.  
 The income increase enjoyed by the capitalist households leads to an increase in their 
household income share. The income share of the skilled and unskilled households falls, 
especially for the unskilled ones, which are affected by the fall in the factor income share 
of informal unskilled workers.   
Real Financial Model 
 The results are driven by the mechanisms explained for the real model, which also lead to 
domestic inflation, higher employment and output levels, a worsening of the trade 
balance, and a shift of income distribution that benefits the capitalist households.   
 However, differently than in that model, there are movements in the capital account of the 
balance of payments: the increase in the world interest rate leads capitalist households to 
increase their deposits abroad, generating a capital outflow from the domestic economy. 
This outflow, together with the increase in payments to non-residents in the form of 
increased net imports and dividends, offsets the increase in the interest payments paid by 
non-residents to residents, with a final worsening in the balance of payments with non-
residents.   
 The rates of return on financial assets move in the following way: as the public deficit 
shrinks, the rate of return paid by the public sector on its debt goes down. The capital 
outflow generates a fall in the monetary supply that, combined with domestic inflation, 
reduces domestic liquidity in real terms and drives bank lending and borrowing rates up. 
Finally, with the increase in the activity level, equity return goes up in every sector except 
the primary one - which is particularly hit by the fall in exports.   
Real Financial Augmented Model 
 The behaviour of the model is similar to the real financial model in relation to i) the 
increase in the world interest rates shifting household income distribution in favour of the 
(capitalist) households who hold deposits abroad; ii) the increase in domestic inflation; 
iii) the changes in the balance of payments.  
 However, in contrast, the capital outflow lowers the supply of working capital and leads 
to a fall in the productivity of the other factors, in turn generating a fall in the use of 
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formal workers. The fall in factors use contracts the activity level, more than offsetting 
the positive effect of higher prices on factor demand.  
 While the fall in the productivity of the other factors leads to a fall in their real wages, the 
drop in the supply of working capital generates excess demand for it and leads to an 
increase in real wages, increasing the financial cost of physical investment and lowering 
the level of investment in the economy, construction activity and the demand for physical 
capital – intensively used in the construction sector, leading to a fall in the real wage and 
the income share of physical capital.  
 Asset returns move as in the real financial model, except for the fall in the return of equity 
in the construction sector, linked to the abovementioned cut in physical investment.  
 
VI. 2 10% cut in non-residents deposits in domestic banks (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ R) 
Real Model 
 As non-residents withdraw part of their deposits in domestic banks, the current account 
deficit that the domestic economy is allowed to finance falls. This, in turn, calls for 
increasing exports and cutting imports, with the equilibrating mechanism - given elastic 
import demand and export supply - being provided by a real devaluation, particularly in 
the form of a drop in domestic prices.  
 The domestic price cut reduces firms’ profits and the dividends paid to residents and non-
residents. They also lead them to lower their factor demand, and thus employment and 
production levels, in turn affecting national income and domestic absorption.  
 Public savings fall as falling prices and activity level lower the tax revenue base.  
 At the sector level, the economy provides signals for producers to move factors toward 
the tradable sector - especially the primary one - benefitting informal unskilled workers.  
 The wage increase for informal unskilled workers leads to an increase in their income 
share, and therefore that of unskilled households. In parallel, as the nominal income of 
labour and capital shrinks, the relative importance of the (nominally fixed) interest flows 
as a source of household income increases, lifting the income share of the (capitalist) 
households who are net interest recipients.  
Real Financial Model 
 The shock has similar effects on the balance of payments than in the real model, except 
that, as public and foreign savings fall, and households savings need to increase to fill the 
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savings-investment gap which is opened, part of these savings are deposited abroad, 
increasing capital flight
1
. As non-residents reduce their deposits in domestic banks, 
interest payments to non-residents fall. Together with the increase in the interest inflow 
permitted by the increase in deposits abroad by capitalist households, net interest 
payments from residents to non-residents fall.  
 Changes in the public deficit, domestic prices, employment and activity levels, sector 
allocation of resources and activity, real wages and factor income shares move similarly 
to the real model. Now, however, capitalist households benefit from increases in returns 
to their public bond holdings (linked to the increase in the public deficit) and bank 
deposits (linked to the fall in real liquidity in the economy caused by the capital 
outflows), as well as from the possibility of reallocating their asset portfolios. As a result, 
household income shares move in favour of the capitalist households and to the detriment 
of other households.   
Real Financial Augmented Model 
 The general effect of the shock goes in the same direction as in the real financial model. 
However, as deposits in domestic banks go down, working capital loans to firms falls too, 
aggravating the contraction of the economy.  
 As the supply of working capital falls, an excess demand for it is generated, leading to a 
proportionately larger increase in its nominal wage (due to the low elasticity of factor 
demand) and an increase in its factor income share.   
VI. 3 10% cut in equity stock held by non-residents (    ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ e) 
Real Model 
 The shock is captured in the form of capital flight, similarly to a fall in deposits by non-
residents, lowering the superavit in the capital account of the balance of payments, and 
involving the same transmission mechanisms as the previous shock. Given that the value 
of equity held by non-residents exceeds that of their deposits, the impulse and its results 
are both larger.   
Real Financial Model 
The model reacts similarly to a fall in non-residents deposits, with the following differences: 
                                                 
1 Capitalist households also increase their deposits abroad because, as domestic deflation and the contraction of 
the activity level leads equity returns to fall, the relative attractiveness of depositing abroad goes up.   
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 The fall in payments to non-residents generated shows up in the current account of the 
balance of payments in the form of falling dividends instead of falling interest flows.  
 As the capital outflow lowers domestic liquidity and domestic interest rates go up, banks’ 
interest payments to domestic and foreign depositors increase, raising the net investment 
income paid by residents to non-residents
2
. 
 Faced with increasing domestic lending rates, banks shift away from their deposits 
abroad, partially offsetting the original worsening of the capital account.   
 Besides the drop in income share of the skilled households (observed after non-residents 
cut their domestic deposits), the capitalist households lose income share due to a fall in 
their earned interest.
3
  
Real Financial Augmented Model 
Effects similar to those where non-residents cut their deposits at domestic banks apply:  
 the general effect of the shock goes in the same direction as in the real financial model. 
However, as the capital flight takes place, working capital loans to firms fall, aggravating 
the contraction of the economy.  
 As the supply of working capital falls, an excess demand for it is generated, leading to a 
proportionately larger increase in its nominal wage (due to the low elasticity of factor 
demand) and an increase in its factor income share.   
VI. 4 10% increase in public bonds stock held by non-residents (  ̅̅ ̅̅ R) 
 
Overall, and compared to a cut in non-residents’ equity holdings, the effect here is larger in 
absolute value given that the value of bonds held by non-residents exceeds their equity 
holdings. It goes in the opposite direction (as holdings increase rather than decrease) and 
starts in a different item of the capital account of the balance of payments: that of the public 
sector. 
Real Model 
The table which signs the direction of the changes of the endogenous variables in this model 
evidences an exact mirror of that of the cut of deposits by non-residents (every + becomes a – 
                                                 
2 The fall in dividends paid to non-residents only partially offsets the increase in interests paid to them. 
3 In turn, this fall occurs because their deposits in domestic banks fall in order to be consistent with the effect of 
the capital flight on the monetary base (critical in the model) and, subsequently, on required reserves held by 
banks, which are a fixed share of deposits. Most of the assets replacing deposits in the portfolio of assets of the 
capitalist households have a lower remuneration, including deposits abroad and equity in every sector.  
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and vice versa), indicating that the same transmission channels are at stake, just than running 
in reverse.  
Real Financial Model 
 The impulse is given to the model in a different place of the capital account than in the 
cut of non-residents deposits: that of the public sector, instead of that of the non financial 
private sector.  
 As with changes in non-residents deposits, there are changes in foreign and public savings 
(now positive) which affects private savings (which fall), the amount of deposits abroad 
held by capitalist households (which also falls), and (now endogenously) the asset 
position of the non-financial private sector in relation to non-residents (as before, it 
worsens).   
 As domestic liquidity increases, bank rates decrease, and interest payments to non-
residents fall. With the activity level and domestic prices increasing, profits rise, and the 
dividends paid to non-residents increase, generating an increase in the investment income 
paid to non-residents which is only partially offset by the fall in interest payments paid to 
them. 
Real Financial Augmented Model 
The effects are similar to those in the real financial model, only that the capital inflow now 
leads to an increase in the availability and use of working capital, providing extra fuel to the 
expansion of the economy. Mirroring the changes in the market for working capital, as 
working capital supply increases, its real wages and its share in factor income falls.   
 
VI. 5 10% cut in export taxes (terc,r) 
Real Model  
 While the cut in import taxes reduces the import price perceived by demanders, the cut in 
export taxes lifts the export prices perceived by producers, specially for the industrial 
commodities, which face an original export tax rate (5.9%) significantly higher than the 
one on primary commodities (1.8%). This shift resources and output towards the 
industrial (instead of the primary) activity. As the shift of production towards exports 
provides the domestic commodity market with excess demand, it increases (instead of 
reducing) domestic prices. As export and domestic prices increase, the producer prices 
increase. As producer prices increase, the nominal dividends paid to non-residents (and 
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residents) increase (rather than decrease), the trade balance shifts upward (to finance this 
increase in dividends paid to non-residents) and the real value of interest flows (which are 
nominally fixed) go down (rather than down).  
 As with the cut in import taxes, public sector revenue falls, the public deficit increases, 
and the relative prices - of exports vis-à-vis non-traded goods and import vis-à-vis non-
traded goods - shiftsm giving incentives to increase both imports and exports. Similarly to 
before, employment levels and real wages increase, now because of the producer price 
increases lifting factor demand at given nominal wages and also due to the CPI (the 
denominator of the real wage) including some goods (imports) whose price is fixed.   
 As in the import tax case, the changes in the structure of the economy and the changes in 
the real value of interest flows alter the income distribution among factors and household 
groups. With the industrial sector growing, the demand for the factors intensively used in 
the sector grows, leading to an increase in the income shares of capital and the formal 
unskilled workers. The fall in the real value of interest flows leads the income share of the 
capitalist households to fall, offsetting the increase in the income share of capital in value 
added. The fall in the income share of the informal unskilled offsets the increase in that of 
the formal unskilled, letting the income share of unskilled households fall.   
Real Financial Model  
Most of the critical transmission mechanisms of the export tax cut in this model were 
captured in the real model, but the variations in the financial returns and in the allocation of 
financial portfolios have major effects on the balance of payments of the country and on 
income distribution.  
 The abovementioned increases in the public deficit and in capital income have significant 
indirect effects on the balance of payments. The fall in public savings is offset by 
increases in private savings, with the bulk falling on capitalist households. As their 
savings increase, so do their asset holdings, including their deposits abroad
4
. This implies 
a capital outflow - captured in the capital account of the balance of payments – that 
lowers domestic liquidity, leading to an increase in the bank rates.
5
 In parallel, the returns 
on other domestic financial assets increase: the higher public deficit, by increasing the 
public debt, increases the return on bonds; the increase in capital income translates into an 
increase in equity return. The generalised increase in the return of domestic assets leads to 
                                                 
4 The implied fall in foreign savings only partially offset the effect on total savings.  
5 Also reinforced by the increase in nominal transactions as the economy expands and the domestic price level 
increases.   
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some capital inflow (by capitalist households and banks) that only partially offsets the 
observed capital outflow. The capital outflow restricts the current account deficit that the 
country can finance. With the return on domestic assets held by non-residents increasing, 
investment income paid to them increase, reinforcing the need to adjust the trade balance 
upwards.   
 As the asset portfolio held by capitalist households and the returns on their domestic 
assets grow, so does their capital income, allowing their share in total household income 
to grow too. The effect is reinforced by the other RHGs being net debtors to banks, so 
that the increase in the loan rates adversely affects them. 
Real Financial Augmented Model  
The critical causal chains are those identified in the real financial model, with the only 
exception being that the mentioned presence of inflation lowers the supply of working capital 
in real terms, with the following effects: 
 The real wage of working capital goes up, and its use falls, reducing the output increase. 
This affects tax revenue and the public deficit, lifting the return on public bonds.  
 As the wage of working capital increases, the bank interest rates increase, shifting up the 
financial cost of physical investment, reducing the demand for the construction activity 
(with intensive use of physical capital), and reducing the share of physical capital in value 
added.  
 The increases in the return of domestic assets (bonds, deposits and loans) attract capitalist 
households and banks, generating a capital inflow that allows the economy to finance a 
higher current account deficit.  
 
VI. 6 10% fall in foreign price of imports (pwmrc,r) 
Real Model 
The shock operates through the same causal chains that the fall in import taxes, with the 
following mentionable exceptions: 
 The public sector revenue does not go down, and actually increases due to the increase in 
trade (imports and exports) already explained. This allows the public deficit to fall, so that 
households can allocate a lower share of their available income into savings.   
 With private consumption increasing, the increase in imports is larger than before and, 
with imports being intensive in industrial commodities, demanders substitute away of 
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domestically produced industrial goods, so that the value added share of the sector now 
falls.   
Real Financial Model 
On top of the mechanisms operating in the real model,  
 The fall in private savings reduces the size of the financial portfolios of the households. 
As a consequence, capitalist households withdraw a fraction of their deposits abroad, 
generating a capital inflow to the domestic economy.  
 With the reduction in the public deficit and its effect on the public debt, the rate of return 
on bonds falls. With the capital inflow and the domestic deflation, domestic liquidity goes 
up in real terms, and bank rates fall. Both give incentives for capitalist households and 
banks to increase their shares of deposits abroad in their portfolios, in turn generating a 
capital outflow by banks and partially offsetting the capital inflow of capitalist 
households.  
 As the return on bonds and deposits fall, the interests paid to non-resident holders shrink. 
Together with the capital inflow, they provide the means to the domestic economy to 
finance an increase in net imports.   
Real Financial Augmented Model 
On top of the causal chains in last model,  
 Domestic deflation increases the working capital supply, leading in turn to a fall in its 
real wage and its value-added share.  
 The associated fall in the loan rate leads to increase investment and the share of 
construction in total value added, lifting the value added share of capital (intensively 
used in the construction sector) enough to increase the income share of capitalist 
households and make that of the other household groups fall.  
 
VI. 7 10% increase in foreign price of exports (pwerc,r) 
Real Model  
 
The only critical differences with the export tax elimination simulation are: 
 Public finances improve rather than deteriorate due to higher trade and non-decreasing tax 
rates.  
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 The export prices perceived by the producers increase uniformly in the primary and 
industrial sectors (10%).  Given that the primary activity is more export intensive than the 
industrial one
6
, the increase in exports shifts factors to the primary activity away from the 
other sectors, increasing the income shares of the factors intensively used there - capital 
and informal unskilled workers against the other factors. Also, the increase in the income 
share of the latter allow unskilled households to increase their income share. 
 With public savings increasing, private savings are allowed to fall, allowing private 
consumption to increase.  
 
Real Financial Model  
Compared to the real model: 
 While the fall in the private deficit allows the return on bonds to fall, the higher activity 
and price levels increase the transactions demand for money and shift the bank rates up. 
The increase in public savings also allow households to lower their savings, with the 
capitalist households withdrawing deposits abroad and generating a capital inflow to the 
domestic economy which is only partially offset by the bank’s increase in deposits abroad 
(allowed in turn by higher households’ deposits). The capital inflow allows the economy 
to incur a higher current account deficit. As the bonds and deposit returns go down, the 
interest payments to non-residents fall, making the net investment income paid to non-
residents fall and allowing the net imports to increase.   
 While as in the real model, the value added share of informal unskilled workers grows 
and that of formal unskilled workers falls, in this model the latter offsets the former, 
allowing the income share of unskilled RHG to fall.   
Real Financial Augmented Model 
Compared to the real financial model, the main differences relate to income distribution at 
factor and household level.  The mentioned inflation lowers the real supply of working 
capital leading to an increase in its remuneration - i.e. through bank rates – and in factor 
income share. Higher bank rates disincentivise physical investment, lowering the demand and 
the income share of physical capital. In turn, this allows to reinforcing the fall in private 
savings and the boost on final consumption. Given the heavy weight of private services on 
final consumption and the intensive use of formal unskilled workers in the services sector, the 
income share of the formal unskilled grows, letting those of the skilled and the informal 
                                                 
6 Export shares being 25.3% vs 11.6%, respectively. 
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unskilled fall. The fall in the income share of the informal unskilled drives distributional 
changes at the household income level. 
 
VI. 8 10% devaluation of the domestic currency (exr) 
 
Real Model 
 The devaluation reduces the dollar-denominated interest payments to non-residents 
holding local currency denominated assets. To keep dollar-denominated foreign savings 
fixed, the trade superavit shrinks, the adjustment mechanism being a real appreciation in 
the form of domestic inflation i.e. the price of domestic goods increases proportionately 
more than the nominal exchange rate. Domestic inflation increases the nominal dividends 
paid to non-residents even after accounting for the nominal devaluation, which in turn 
only partially offset the fall in net investment income paid to non-residents generated by 
the abovementioned fall in interest payments.  
 The real appreciation make resources and production shift to non-tradables and make net 
imports grow. As in previous simulations (e.g. increase in export prices), inflation leads 
to expand the employment levels and the activity level, and to increase the nominal value 
of public revenue and shrink the public deficit. 
 The shrinking of tradable sectors – in special that of the agricultural sector - reduces the 
real wages of informal unskilled workers (intensively used in the primary sector), their 
share in factor income and the share of the unskilled in household income. Given the 
nominal fixedness of the interest payments received and paid by the households, the 
presence of (factor wage) inflation operates against the income share of the capitalist 
households, who are net interest recipients.   
 
Real Financial Model 
On top of the causal chains operating in the real model:  
 as the public savings crowd out private savings, the asset portfolio of the capitalist 
households shrink, making them withdraw some of their deposits abroad, generating a 
capital inflow that allows the economy to finance an increase in the current account 
deficit. Motivated by a fall in the return on bonds, banks increase their deposits abroad, 
only partially offsetting the mentioned capital inflow. 
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 income distribution at factor and household levels change similar than in the real model, 
except that capitalist RHG, by benefitting from a higher return in pesos on their deposits 
abroad, increase their income share.  
Real Financial Augmented Model 
This works similarly to the real financial model but with working capital supply growing as 
driven by 1) withdrawals of deposits abroad by capitalist households (as noted) and 2) a 
higher conversion of the dollar-denominated capital inflows in local currency given the 
appreciation of the foreign currency. As seen before, this leads to increases in demand for 
other factors, in their productivities and in activity levels, as well as reductions in the real 
wage and the income share of working capital.   
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